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Abstract
This thesis examines informal and corruptive activities agents may pursue within 
organisations. Chapter 1 is a brief introduction to the general theme and the related literature.
Chapter 2 develops a simple theory of non-monetary collusion, where agents collude 
by exchanging favours. It examines the optimal use of supervisory information in a simple 
hierarchy under potential collusion. It is shown that when only the supervisor's information 
about the agent is used, collusion does not arise, since favours can not be exchanged. 
Secondly, it is analysed whether the agent's information about his superior should be used. 
In this case collusion is possible, and there is an interesting trade-off between the benefits of 
using additional information and the costs of collusion. It is then shown that sometimes the 
principal may be better off when using less than all available information.
Chapter 3 considers task assignment and whistle-blowing as measures a principal 
may use to break collusion. The principal's response to potential collusion is to allocate less 
time to monitoring, and he breaks collusion with money. It is shown that the principal may 
also break collusion by hiring a third worker, and the decision how to break collusion 
optimally is endogenously determined. Breaking collusion by task assignment is costly, and 
therefore we consider whistle-blowing as a collusion breaking device. It provides the 
principal strictly higher welfare than the collusion-proof solution. It is also shown that under 
reasonable conditions, the collusion-free outcome will be achieved with no further cost.
Chapter 4 develops a model of blackmail, where a piece of information an agent 
prefers to keep private may facilitate blackmail when another agent, namely a blackmailer, 
threatens to reveal that information. The crucial feature of the blackmail game is the 
commitment problem from the blackmailer's side. The blackmailer can not commit not to 
come back in future to demand more despite the payments received in the past. The chapter 
outlines conditions under which successful extortion may arise, and shows that there is a 
unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium, which gives a precise prediction how much money the 
blackmailer is able to extort from the victim. It is also shown that the blackmailer receives 
a blackmail premium that compensates the blackmailer for not taking money from the victim 
and revealing information anyway.
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Chapter 1
Collusion, Blackmail and Whistle-Blowing 
in Organisations: An Introductory Essay
1.1 Introduction
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This thesis examines informal and corruptive activities agents may pursue within 
organisations. The very origin of these activities arises due to asymmetric information 
between members of an organisation and an organisation designer (a principal). Within the 
class of models which consider a so-called hidden information (adverse selection) problem, 
an agent has more information than the principal, and due to this private information the 
agent is able to earn informational rents. Hence, the principal offers a so-called second-best 
contract, which optimally distorts the effort level required from an inefficient type to reduce 
an informational rent the principal has to pay for the efficient type.
However real world organisations are not isolated principal-agent relationships, since 
the members of organisations interact as well. For example, a role for a so-called middle 
manager or a supervisor arises endogenously if the supervisor has access to more detailed 
information about the agent's private information than the principal does. In that case the 
supervisor is able to help the principal in controlling the agent, and thus reducing the 
informational rents the principal otherwise has to pay.
This immediately introduces the possibility of collusion (side contracting) between 
the supervisor and the agent. Hence organisations become a nexus of official incentive 
contracts between the principal and many agents, and a nexus of illegal side contracts 
between the members of organisations. As a consequence some new and quite important 
questions arise. Namely, how is the principal able to control the agents when they prefer to 
pursue activities apart from those which the principal prefers them to do? What are the 
consequences of potential collusion for the organisation design, optimal use of information, 
mode of incentive schemes, optimal task assignment, and time allocation between different 
activities the agents are expected to perform? Furthermore, how can the principal prevent 
collusion or at least make it less profitable? And, more generally, how can individual 
incentive contracts be designed so that they minimize the costs of potential collusion.
Roughly speaking, one can distinguish four types of corruptive activities agents may 
pursue in organisations. The broadest class is so-called influence activities, which may take 
various forms. The influence activities refer to the often observed behaviour of members of 
an organisation who spend a great deal of time and effort attempting to influence decision
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makers. An important economic point is that time and effort are lost from productive 
activities: i.e., the activities for which the workers were hired in the first place. In addition, 
influence activities usually have a negative effect on the quality of decision making.1
The second activity, and the one which gets the most attention in the present thesis, 
is collusion. This refers to a situation where two agents cooperate against a third party. In our 
context this refers to a supervisor and an agent (or simply two agents) who together 
manipulate information against a principal for their own benefit. This, of course, is costly for 
the principal, who has to pay informational rents which would be saved within a collusion- 
free world. A third type of activity agents may pursue is called framing. Framing means a 
situation where one agent alone is able to frame another agent, making him, for instance, 
appear to be responsible for some misbehaviour: e.g., accepting bribes, neglecting 
organisation rules, and so on. An important point is that the agent who frames the other agent 
does not need help from anyone. Framing^s a^er^s^qssib ility  that an organisation 
designer has to take into consideration especially in a situation where the agent is able to 
benefit himself if he frames the other agent and makes him appear to be responsible for some 
misbehaviour. Finally comes blackmail or extortion. The concept of blackmail refers to 
payments to avoid revelation of information. Blackmail arises when there exists a piece of 
information which an agent prefers to keep private, and another agent, namely a blackmailer, 
threatens to reveal that information. The crucial feature of the blackmail situation is the 
commitment problem from the blackmailer's side. The blackmailer can not commit not to 
come back in future to demand more despite the payments he has received in the past.
It is important to notice that in practice it is not always possible to separate informal 
activities as clearly as above, because sometimes they overlap; and in some cases they even 
coexist. Furthermore, it is perhaps not wrong to argue that in the broadest sense the first 
activity, namely influence activities, includes all the remaining ones, and that collusion, 
framing and blackmail are merely different forms of influence activities. Nevertheless, each 
of them deserves closer analysis.
The present thesis examines collusion and blackmail in greater detail. Chapter 2 
develops the idea that within organisations collusion appears more often in a non-monetary
1 For more about influence activities, see Milgrom (1988) and Milgrom and Roberts 
(1988).
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form rather than in monetary payments and examines the optimal use of supervisory 
information. Chapter 3 in turn analyses possible actions a principal may take in breaking 
collusion.The principal is able to prevent collusion either by task assignment (time 
allocation) or by creating a whistle-blowing mechanism, which is an additional incentive 
device that makes collusion less profitable and ensures that workers perform well and 
honestly the tasks for which they were hired in the first place. Chapter 4 puts aside collusion 
and examines the economics behind the phenomenon of blackmail in a dynamic framework. 
There a blackmailer extorts money from a victim in return for suppressing a piece of 
information the agent prefers to keep private.
In the next section we briefly discuss the development and the current state of the 
related theoretical literature.
1.2 The Related Literature
Corruption, bribery and extortion are unfortunate and well-documented phenomena as old 
as humankind itself. Already the Old Testament warned of the harmfulness of bribery. The 
Lord warned Moses: "Do not accept bribes, since it blinds even the most careful man, and 
it destroys the businesses of those who are right“.2
Rent seeking, bribery and corruptive activities have long been among the interests of 
economists.3 Generally speaking, the harmful effects of these activities are reasonably well 
known. That is, resources are allocated to those who have money, but who are not necessarily 
those in need. And, more generally, decision making and resource allocation are inefficient, 
public funds are diverted from public use to private pockets, and-so on. Furthermore, bribery 
has an adverse effect on growth, especially in developing countries.
Interestingly enough, it took quite a long time before corruptive activities within
2 The quotation is from Newsweek (1994).
3 See, for example, Krueger (1974) for a seminal article on rent-seeking and Shleifer- 
Visny (1993) on the economic organisation of corruption, and a recent work by Carrillo 
(1995a) on the optimizing model of corruption.
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organisations received the full attention of economists. Presumably, one of the main reasons 
was that the main tools for analysing such issues, namely incentive theory and informational 
economics in general, have been developed during the last twenty years.
Before economists started to analyse collusion, sociologists - e.g., Crozier (1964) and 
Dalton (1959) - had already realised the potential problems of collusion and capture in 
organisations and within agency relationships. The sociological and also organisation 
theoretical approach emphasize that behaviour of organisation members should not be 
understood and considered only from the point of view of an individual organisation 
members's incentive, but one should also realise interaction between group and individual 
incentives. This is precisely what modem economic research does by introducing coalition 
incentive constraints in addition to individual incentive constraints. Political scientists have
also raised the question of potential collusion. Their worry is that politicians collude with 
interest groups and pursue policies which are favourable to them but not to the public in 
general. In the early 1970s some economists - e.g., Stigler (1971) and later Peltzam (1976) - 
paid attention to the capture problem within the regulatory framework. Stigler in particular 
emphasized that the power of an interest group depends on the (benefits) stakes of collusion 
on one hand and a group's organisation costs on the other. Even though economists in the 
early 1970s raised important questions concerning capture in the regulatory process, they did 
not really answer those questions thoroughly. For example, the effects of potential collusion 
on optimal organisation design as well as potential solutions to collusion problems were left 
unanswered for some 10 to 15 years.
In this respect a big change in the depth of the analysis occurred when economists 
adapted incentive theory in the analysis of collusion in organisations. In contrast to the earlier 
literature, now the very source of collusion is considered to arise from the fundamental 
asymmetry of information between a principal and other members of the organisation. Ten 
years ago Tirole's (1986) seminal paper started a whole new branch of literature, which 
modelled and analysed the effects of potential collusion in organisations by using incentive 
theory.
Tirole's seminal paper had a profound effect on the way collusion is modelled. The 
basic set-up in his paper is actually very simple. An organisation is modelled as a three-tier 
hierarchy: a principal, a supervisor, and an agent. The principal hires the agent to perform
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some production task and the supervisor to control the agent. The supervisor has access to 
more precise information about the agent's type than the principal, and thus he is able to help 
the principal control the agent. In short, the principal is able to save in informational rents 
he otherwise would have to pay. The problem is that the agent has an incentive to bribe the 
supervisor to conceal information about his type by promising to pay the supervisor an ex­
post bribe. This side contract is by assumption enforceable. To prevent collusion the principal 
has to match the benefits of collusion: i.e., he has to satisfy a so-called coalition incentive 
constraint. The optimal solution is that the principal offers the supervisor and the agent a 
collusion-proof contract which does not leave any room for profitable collusion. This 
collusion-proof contract in fact replicates the potential bribes between the supervisor and the 
agent, and thus of course it is costly for the principal. Note that this is the simplest possible 
set-up, which facilitates the analysis of tension between group and individual incentives, 
which is the very heart of the collusion problem.
Laffont and Tirole (1991) elegantly formalise the idea of collusion in a regulatory 
framework. In their model a firm may bribe a regulator who has access to more detailed 
information about the firm's costs than the government does. They show, among other things, 
that the optimal response to potential collusion is to offer a low-powered incentive scheme 
to the firm.4
Parallel to this evolving literature which focuses on the adverse effects of collusion, 
a closely-related, but still different literature developed by considering beneficial collusion. 
The seminal article is Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990), where the authors make the point that 
cooperation (effort coordination) between agents may actually benefit a principal in a case 
where agents share some private information which is not available to the principal. The 
benefits of cooperation are totally driven by risk-sharing motives. Some other authors have 
further elaborated these ideas along the lines of Holmstrom and Milgrom.5
Tirole's (1992) article from the 1990 Econometric Society's World Congress reviews 
the early theoretical literature and summarises the most important results that were 
discovered by that time. In particular, the roots of collusion and the potential measures taken
4 Laffont (1990) and Varian (1990) are other early contributors to this literature.
5 See for example Itoh (1993) and Felli and Villas-Boas (1996).
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to prevent collusion in terms of organisational design were reasonably well known. In his 
article Tirole also raises some interesting and new research problems and develops a simple 
model of dynamic collusion. We will come back to this later.
In recent years the number of studies analysing collusion in organisations has 
increased rapidly. In order to understand what has been done within the last few years and 
in order to judge what the main theoretical achievements in the theory are, it may be useful 
to categorise the studies in some way. The simplest and also perhaps the most fruitful way 
to do this is to categorise them along the lines of how collusion is modelled and what type 
of collusion these studies consider.
In principle, the members of an organisation are able to collude in three alternative 
ways. First, most of the papers model collusion as ex-post monetary transfers which are 
based on fully enforceable side contracts. The second approach takes the problem of the 
enforceability of illegal side contracts more seriously and considers dynamic collusion, where 
side deals have to be self-enforcing. Thirdly - the approach which is developed here - 
collusion may also take a purely non-monetary form where members of an organisation 
collude by exchanging favours and no money is needed.
The overwhelming majority of studies that consider collusion borrow the basic 
"machinery" from Tirole's (1986) seminal article: that is, a static adverse model with a three- 
tier hierarchy with a principal, supervisor and agent. Monetary side contracts between the 
supervisor and the agent are by assumption fully enforceable. In addition an assumption of 
“hard” supervisory information is adopted. That is, the supervisor can not lie when reporting 
to the principal, but the supervisor can however conceal information.
Perhaps the most important and widely known among these papers is an article by 
Koffman and Lawarree (1993), who consider collusion within an auditing context. There a 
manager, who is hired by shareholders, is willing to bribe an internal free corrupt auditor to 
report him favourably to a principal. To prevent collusion the principal has to offer a 
collusion-proof contract, which leaves no room for profitable collusion. Then the authors 
introduce a costly external uncorrupt auditor who learns the same information as the internal 
auditor does. Among other interesting results, they show that costs of collusion can be 
constrained by hiring the external auditor with a positive probability in a case where the 
internal auditor and the manager may have colluded.
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In Koffman and Lawarree (1995), the authors show that under some circumstances 
it may actually be profitable for a principal to let collusion occur in an equilibrium, because 
they consider a case where the auditor probably is corruptible. Therefore, when the 
probability that the auditor is honest is high enough, it may be profitable to take a chance and 
offer a normal second-best contract.
Laffont-Martimort (1994) is an interesting paper that considers the optimal 
organisational response to potential collusion. They compare two regulatory structures, a 
unified regulator or two separate regulators in cases where there is a firm which has two 
pieces of private information concerning its costs and a regulator knows only the prior 
distributions of them. They show that separation of regulators works as a commitment against 
the threat of regulation capture, since separation reduces the amount of asymmetric 
information a single regulator holds, and thus also reduces the potential benefits of collusion.
Felli (1996) considers delegation as an organisation measure taken by a principal to 
prevent collusion between a middle manager and a worker. The idea in his paper is strikingly 
simple. A crucial assumption is that collusion takes place under conditions of asymmetric 
information. When a supervisor has the authority to exploit an agent's private information, 
the latter has no incentive to collude, because collusion will reveal information to the 
supervisor, who will exploit him by reporting what he has learned to the principal. Thus, in 
an equilibrium, collusion does not take place. One must note that a delegation works against 
the supervisor, who is worse off under an optimal collusion-proof contract. Felli also 
demonstrates that his collusion prevention scheme coincides with one where the supervisor 
chooses a contract for the agent.6
What, then, are the main contributions of these studies that have adopted the 
traditional approach to collusion with monetary side payments? Even though the approach 
has its limitations, it seems to have achieved many goals. Firstly, the literature has introduced
6 Other interesting work includes Olsen and Torsvik (1994) and Mogilianski (1995), 
both of whom consider collusion when a principal is unable to commit an incentive contract 
he proposes. Brundin (1995) in turn considers collusion in a debt contract. Che (1995) 
considers the phenomenon of revolving doors. Koffman and Lawarree (1996) consider the 
old question, namely "who polices the police" within their "standard model". Laffont- 
Martimort (1995a) and (1995b) and Baliga (1995) have considered collusion when agents 
collude by manipulating "soft" information. Prendergast and Topel (1996) is an interesting 
work in which the authors analyse favouritism in organisations.
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many real-life applications and extended the analysis of collusion in several important 
directions. Generally speaking, it has increased our understanding of potentially corruptive 
organisation structures that may facilitate collusion. Thirdly, it has provided a large number 
of rather simple and realistic organisational measures to prevent collusion that an 
organisation designer may use in practice. This literature has also shown the precise 
conditions under which it may be optimal not to fight against potential collusion.
A starting point for the analysis of side contracts within a dynamic framework is that, 
due to their illegality, they must be self-enforceable. The most natural way to proceed in this 
direction is to look at the repeated relationship between the colluding parties and analyse 
reputation as a mechanism that enforces side deals. Tirole (1992) develops a simple dynamic 
model of collusion using reputation as such a mechanism that makes side contracts self- 
enforcing. Interestingly enough, the insights of the main results that are derived from a static 
model seem to carry over to self-enforcing side contracts as well.
Acemoglu's (1995) paper is an interesting attempt to model collusion in a dynamic 
framework where enforceable monetary side contracts are not feasible. There shareholders 
hire an empire builder manager to run a firm, and a manager in turn hires an auditor. The 
possibility for collusion between the manager and the auditor arises since the auditor can hide 
some information to the benefit of the manager and the manager prefers to continue a project 
whatever the state of nature is. The auditor has an incentive to hide information due to his 
own career concerns, since the manager has the authority to fire him. Whenever this threat 
to fire is credible, collusion may arise even though no enforceable side deals can be written. 
In Acemoglu's model, collusion is a serious problem when the manager has the authority to 
hire and fire the auditor, which clearly is an inefficient arrangement. This brings us to the 
interesting question of why we see this type of arrangement in practice, since it facilitates 
collusion.
Recently Martimort (1996a) has written an interesting paper on self-enforceable 
collusion. He considers an infinitely repeated game where a principal hires two agents to 
produce. In his model collusion between agents arises due to the possibilities for agents to 
realise future benefits from an ongoing relationship. That is, even though from a static point 
of view, truth-telling is a dominant strategy for a single agent, it may still be profitable to lie 
when reporting his type to the principal. This is because of the existence of future benefits
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that will be achieved from reciprocal behaviour by a fellow agent. This type of collusion 
introduces dynamic coalition incentive constraints that the principal has to satisfy in order 
to prevent collusion.7
In contrast to static monetary collusion, a dynamic approach has at least purely 
technical merits, since it has dropped an arguably strong assumption of fully enforceable 
monetary side contracts. Of course, at this point it is very difficult to fully acknowledge the 
main contributions, since there exist only a very few studies. However, the value of studies 
seems to be at least two-hold. The existing studies have greatly increased our understanding 
of the organisational structures and features that may lead to self-enforcing collusion. They 
have also clarified the role of such organisational measures as rotation and task assignment 
in collusion prevention. On the other hand, the complexity of models has increased 
enormously, and, at the moment, not very many new insights have been achieved. So it 
seems to me that a dynamic approach has its limitations as well.
The present thesis takes a slightly different approach to collusion than the 
"mainstream" literature. We consider collusion that takes place only between the members 
of an organisation, and the main idea is that collusion in organisations appears more often 
in a non-monetary form than in monetary payments. A third possible way to collude is 
developed by proposing a simple theory of non-monetary collusion, where members of 
organisations collude not by transferring money, but by exchanging favours among 
themselves. That is, an agent bribes another agent to do something illegal by offering a 
counter favour. This type of collusion is fairly common in most real-world organisations and 
everyday examples are numerous.
In the present thesis, collusion is modelled as mutually beneficial information 
manipulation where agents conceal private information they have learned about each other 
from a principal. In that way, the agents are able to earn information rents that would not be 
possible if they reported to the principal truthfully. Of course, this is not the only possible 
way to model non-monetary collusion, and arguably it is quite mechanical as well. It is, 
however, probably the simplest possible way to incorporate the idea of non-monetary
7 See also Carrillo (1995b), who develops a dynamic optimization model of 
corruption and analyses different measures in fighting bribery. Martimort (1996b) 
constructs a theory of the life cycle of regulatory agencies.
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collusion, which takes the form of a simultaneous exchange of favours. In addition, it is very 
convenient and tractable since the modeller is then able to use a normal adverse selection 
framework to analyse many interesting questions.
In practice, of course, there are many alternative ways agents can collude without any 
actual monetary transfers. We can easily relabel and reinterpret variables we have chosen to 
use in modelling non-monetary collusion. For example, workers may agree not to reveal 
some unfavourable information to their superiors just to save their own jobs. A foreman and 
a worker may jointly cover up each other's mistakes to avoid interference by their superiors 
and possible firings. An auditor and a manager may agree on information concealment from 
shareholders for their own benefit. A civil servant may look the other way when his superior 
is involved in bribery if, for example, the superior civil servant performs a counter favour by 
promoting the civil servant for being quiet, and so on. Note, by the way, that this type of 
collusion motivates Tirole's (1986) seminal paper that, however, considers only monetary 
bribes.
In principle both monetary and non-monetary types of collusion may coexist in 
organisations. In the theoretical literature, it has been assumed that monetary bribes involve 
transaction costs. That is, if an agent bribes a supervisor with a bribe b, then the supervisor’s 
utility from such a bribe is: b/(l+A), where X  >  0 stands for the transaction costs of this illegal 
side deal.
One way to justify our choice to consider only non-monetary collusion is to assume 
that the transaction costs of monetary bribes are infinitely high (A.=°°), because, for example, 
a principal has a perfect monitoring technology over monetary transfers within an 
organisation. In that case, members of organisations may collude only by exchanging 
favours. Note that this type of collusion has an extremely efficient transaction technology, 
since transaction costs are zero (A,=0). Collusion by exchanging favours does not involve 
actual transfers at all. Rather, agents simply exchange favours, and the benefits flow directly 
to them, for example, in the form of higher wages.
Non-monetary collusion as it is modelled here extends hierarchial collusion between 
a supervisor and an agent to lateral collusion, where collusion takes place between agents 
who work at the same organisational level. For example, in Chapter 3 workers on the “factory 
floor” jointly conceal information about each other for their own benefit. Collusion as it is
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modelled here does not require ex-post monetary transfers as is the case with the traditional 
approach. Consequently, collusion is much easier for agents, and for the principal it is more 
difficult to observe and more costly to prevent.
The second point where the present thesis departs from the current theoretical 
literature is our analysis of blackmail. The literature has almost totally ignored the 
phenomenon of blackmail and concentrated purely on collusion. Tirole (1992), however, 
mentions the phenomenon of blackmail, where a supervisor is able to hurt an agent by 
threatening not to report information that is favourable to the agent. Mogiljanski’s (1994) 
study then tries to model this type of blackmail within a static adverse selection framework. 
However, that approach is not very satisfactory, since it overlooks the two fundamental 
features that we believe are crucial for blackmail. The first is the credibility problem: that is, 
whether the blackmailer will carry out the threat if a victim declines to pay. Secondly, there 
is a fundamental commitment problem: the blackmailer may come back to ask for more 
money in future. Clearly, the phenomenon of blackmail has a very strong dynamic feature, 
and any satisfactory model of blackmail should be dynamic. At the moment there is no 
economic theory of blackmail. Chapter 4 is a first attempt in this direction. There we 
construct a dynamic model of blackmail, where a piece of information an agent prefers to 
keep private may facilitate blackmail, when the blackmailer is able to reveal it. There also 
the credibility and the commitment problems are carefully analysed.
This is a good point at which to reflect on the value that economists have added to the 
understanding of organisational collusion. What have economists said about collusion that 
has not been analysed by sociologists and political scientists? In general, the rigorous 
economic modelling of collusion has greatly helped in discovering the roots of collusion in 
organisations. Economists have chosen to emphasize asymmetric information as a crucial 
feature that facilitates collusion. How realistic or relevant is this in terms of practise? 
Interestingly, asymmetric information seems to play a major role in most real-life collusion 
problems, and in that respect the informational economics approach is well justified.
The theoretical literature has derived a large number of organisational measures with 
which to combat collusion. In practice, many of these measures are already in use and 
organisations’ response to potential and existing collusion in terms of organisation design is 
also very often within the lines of the theory. If one thinks about the development of the
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theoretical literature, one comes easily to the conclusion that the main achievements are not 
the development of an elegant and unified theory of collusion. The most important 
contributions lie in the numerous applications, as well as in a better understanding of the 
features that facilitate collusion and the ways collusive activities can be prevented. In terms 
of the methodology of modelling collusion, the recent contributions of dynamic and non­
monetary collusion will be further elaborated. Since Chapter 4 is to the best of my 
knowledge, the first economic model of blackmail, it is clear that there are still many open 
questions. On the whole economic analysis of corruptive activities in organisations is still 
quite a young field, and there are still many open questions, and much work remains to be 
done.
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Chapter 2
Non-Monetary Collusion and Optimal Use of Information
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2.1 Introduction
Why in real-world organisations is all available information typically not used? Furthermore, 
when only a part of the available information is used, why is it the case that only superiors' 
information about their subordinates is used, and workers' information about their superiors 
is ignored? This chapter proposes a simple model to explain the above-mentioned real-life 
facts in terms of organisation members' possibilities to engage in harmful side-contracting. 
We model non-monetary collusion as mutually beneficial information manipulation, where 
agents exchange favours by jointly concealing information from a principal.
Within the model collusion arises only in the case where all available information is 
used. There the principal is trading off between the benefits of using all available information 
and the costs of collusion. It is shown that under certain conditions it is optimal for the 
principal not to use all available information, since then the principal deters collusion and 
gains more valuable information without additional cost. The principal may simply be better 
off when using less information.
In practice, members of real-world organisations often learn information which would 
be valuable for an organisation designer. We refer to information an agent has learned about 
another agent as "supervisory information". It is not so uncommon that the principal prefers 
and expects such information to be reported to him. For example, middle managers are 
supposed to report on their subordinates, line managers should report on the workers, and so 
on. In any organisation in which workers and managers work closely, workers also gain 
information about their superiors, and sometimes they also have the possibility to 
communicate that information to the top of the hierarchy.
In general, an agent's incentive to manipulate supervisory information depends on the 
benefits it brings to him. Compensation from engaging in side-trading and information 
manipulation may take various forms such as money, help, favours, promotions, and so on. 
In contrast to most of the existing theoretical literature, this chapter considers the case where 
compensation takes a purely non-monetary form. More precisely, collusion between agents 
is modelled as a simultaneous exchange of favours, which takes the form of supervisory 
information concealment.This type of collusion is fairly typical and, in contrast to monetary 
transfers, a type of collusion one certainly expects to find in real-world organisations.
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Consider, for example, co-workers who agree not to reveal unfavourable information to their 
superiors, a foreman and worker who jointly cover up each other's mistakes, and so on.
This chapter analyses whether the principal should use all available supervisory 
information or simply a part of it, and if only part of it is used, whose information should be 
used and whose information should be ignored. The chapter uses a simple, three-tier 
Principal-Supervisor-Agent (P-S-A) model to analyse the optimal use of supervisory 
information when a supervisor and an agent are able to exchange non-monetary side 
transfers.1 The novelty in our version of the P-S-A model is the self-interested supervisor 
who also has a production role and the agent who potentially also has a monitoring role. The 
supervisor is regarded as a middle manager who monitors the agent and informs the principal 
by means of reports, but he also has a productive function of his own. This productive 
function may take various forms such as cost minimization, coordination of production, 
coordination of management, and so on. We regard the supervisor's production task as a fine- 
tuning of production.
The agent is a worker at the bottom of the hierarchy, and the agent learns information 
about his superior. Therefore, the principal may also ask the agent to monitor his superior and 
report back his observations. In practice, this monitoring by workers may be in the form of 
questionnaires distributed to the workers in which they are asked to assess the manager's 
management and coordination activities, advisory activities, management style, the manager's 
"type", and so on. The mode of collusion we choose to consider can be understood, for 
example, in terms of practice as a case where the supervisor and the agent together fill out 
questionnaires, seal them and send them away.
We analyse two organisational structures: Organisation I: principal-productive 
supervisor-agent: We have a situation in which the supervisor has the dual task of supervision 
and production, but the worker's information about his superior is not used. Organisation II: 
principal-productive "supervisors": This structure allows for the dual role of production and 
monitoring by the agent as well as the supervisor. The principal may or may not use the 
agent's information about his superior. Organisation I is, therefore, a particular case of 
Organisation II.
^irole (1986) is the seminal paper which introduced the P-S-A model in the analysis 
of collusion in organisations.
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We derive an interesting trade-off which is related to the use of supervisory 
information. We show that when only one supervisory information source (Organisation I) 
is used, collusion problems do not arise, because favours cannot be exchanged. A collusion- 
proof equilibrium is achieved without further costs. When two supervisory information 
sources (Organisation II) are used, collusion problems do arise. In general, the more 
information, the better; but in our model it makes non-monetary collusion possible, and this 
creates additional costs which are bome by the principal. Thus, a trade-off arises with respect 
to whether it is more beneficial to use only one source of supervisory information and avoid 
the costs of collusion or to use both supervisory information sources and bear the costs of 
collusion.
We describe precise conditions under which additional supervisory information the 
agent may provide about his superior should and should not be used. This decision is related 
to the value which supervisory information provides the principal. The value of supervisory 
information is directly related to the size of the supports of the random variables a member's 
production task includes. Then, by considering asymmetric supports, the value of supervisory 
information differs.
It is shown that when collusion is not an issue, all available information should indeed 
be used. When collusion is a problem, the principal has to calculate the benefits which new 
detailed information provides and compare them to the costs of collusion. After that, the 
decision concerning the optimal organisational mode is straightforward. In the case in which 
an agent and a supervisor are symmetric, we show that all available supervisory information 
should be used. By considering asymmetry we derive interesting results, one of the main ones 
being that when the asymmetry between the supervisor and the agent is great enough, it is 
optimal to use only one supervisory information source. Namely, it is optimal to use only the 
supervisor's information about the agent. On the whole, we show that the optimal use of 
supervisory information is endogenously determined. The model demonstrates that in certain 
situations the principal is better off using less information; if the principal commits not to use 
all supervisory information, non-monetary collusion is deterred and he will gain some 
additional important information without further cost.
The main contribution of this chapter lies in the development of a simple theory of 
non-monetary collusion that we expect to find in many real-world organisations. It is shown
26
that the decision concerning the use of supervisory information is endogenously determined. 
In particular, we show that the choice of organisation mode itself effects whether collusion 
arises or not. Interestingly, we show that sometimes it is not optimal to use all available 
supervisory information, and, moreover, we show whose supervisory information should be 
used and whose information should be ignored. Another aspect of this model is that it tells 
the principal that the supervisor should have on his possession the most valuable information. 
One more interesting fact that arises is that the supervisor will perform his tasks better if he 
is not monitored by a third party. The above results are very much those that real-world 
organisation use in practice, too. Typically, tasks in organisations are assigned in such a way 
that only the superiors monitor and the subordinates perform production tasks. Our model 
provides a rational explanation for this separation of monitoring and production tasks. On the 
whole the chapter provides a basis why organisations typically do not use all available 
information.
This chapter is related to a small and relatively new literature of collusion and the 
theory of organisations.2 The studies closest to the present one are Tirole (1986), Kofinan and 
Lawarree (1993) and Laffont and Tirole (1991).3 They consider monetary collusion between 
the monitor and the monitored agent. The main issue in these studies lies in the analysis of 
how a principal can reduce the costs of collusion. For example, Kofinan and Lawarree (1993) 
show how, by hiring an external auditor, the principal reduces the costs of collusion. Laffont 
and Tirole (1991) in turn show how the principal optimally modifies the incentive contract 
to reduce the costs of collusion. In contrast to these approaches, this chapter introduces a 
model of reciprocal monitoring between the members of an organisation and considers only 
non-monetary collusion. In particular, we choose to emphasize the optimal use of supervisory 
information in organisations. Recently, Laffont and Meleu (1996) have independently of my 
work written a paper that considers reciprocal supervision and collusion. They consider both 
monetary and non-monetary collusion, and in this sense the model presented here is a special 
case of their model, since here the transaction costs related to monetary bribes are assumed
2See Tirole (1992) for a survey of this literature.
3Another related literature has adopted a principal-multi agent framework. Papers 
such as Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) and Itoh (1992) analyse agents' cooperation 
(beneficial collusion) when the agents share information about their effort choices.
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to be infinite. Laffont and Meleu also conclude that sometimes an asymmetric monitoring 
structure (Organisation I in this study) is better, but the way how they derive the result is 
different than here. Even though Laffont and Meleu’s model is quite similar to the one 
presented here, there are differences as well. For example, the moral hazard problem where 
the agent reveals his own type to the other agent so that they will both be rewarded more 
generously by the principal does not arise here. Consequently, in the present model it is never 
optimal to let collusion occur in an equilibrium.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2 we present the 
model. It is analysed in section 2.3. Section 2.4 discusses the economics and interpretations 
of Organisations I and II, and section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
The Parties
The model we construct borrows basic features from Tirole (1986) and Laffont and Tirole 
(1991). We consider a simple, three-tier hierarchy with three players: a principal (P), a 
supervisor (S), and an agent (A). The principal is a risk-neutral residual claimant of an 
organisation who hires a supervisor and an agent to perform production and monitoring tasks 
on an indivisible project. The supervisor and the agent are risk neutral in income and risk 
averse in effort. In other words, they have quasi-linear preferences. P does not have time to 
supervise either the agent or the manager because, by assumption, his attention is limited. A 
is a productive agent at the bottom of the hierarchy. S is a middle manager who has a dual 
role: he contributes to production, but, in addition, he monitors A and reports his information 
to P (Organisation I). In Organisation II A's information about his superior may also be used.
The agent, A has private information about a random cost parameter 0 l5 and he can 
reduce costs by exerting effort eb which only he knows. This effort causes him a disutility, 
which in monetary terms is i|/(e,) with ij;'(e1)>0 and i(;"(e1)>0. 0 can be interpreted, for 
instance, as the agent's type or technological variable related to production. Later, we refer 
to 0, as a good state of nature and to B, as a bad state of nature. The production cost of the 
process in which A is involved can be written as follows: c1=(01-e1). 0, has a binary support
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{0i,D,} with probability p and (1-p) respectively, 0,<B, and AO^Bj-Oj.
The supervisor, S also has private information about random cost parameter 02, and 
he can also reduce costs by exerting effort e2, which only he knows. This effort presents him 
with a disutility, which in monetary terms is i|/(e2). We also assume that ijj'(e2)>0 and 
i|/"(e2)>0. The cost of the supervisor's fine-tuning production task can then be written as 
follows: c2=(02-e2). 02 also has a binary support {02,B2}, and without loss of generality we 
assume that with probability p: 02 = 02, and with probability (1- p): 02 = B2. In addition 
02<B2 and A02=B2-02.
When hiring the agent and the supervisor, P must offer contracts which guarantee 
them at least their reservation utility, which is normalized to zero. We also assume that both 
the agent and the supervisor are protected by limited liability; that is, individual rationality 
constraints must hold ex post in all states of nature. The principal pays the wage w, to the 
agent and w2 as a function of realized costs. The agent's utility is U, = w, - ^(Oj-Cj), and the 
supervisor's utility is U2 = w2 - i|/(02-c2). The ex post individual rationality (IR) constraints 
are as follows:
(0^-^) ^0 i = l , 2 ,  (2.1)
U~.='w' i - ^  £0 i  = l ,  2 . (2.2)
To induce the agent and the supervisor to exert effort, the contract must satisfy incentive 
compatibility (IC) constraints:
p -^\Jj(0i -£.) , i = l , 2 ,  (2.3)
(©T-"oT) ^ . - ^ ( e ~ - £ . )  , i = 1 , 2 .  (2.4)
In addition to cost-reducing activities, the supervisor and the agent sometimes learn 
each other's type. Thus, they are able to help the principal reduce informational rents by 
reporting their observations of each other. We assume that observing and reporting do not 
require any effort. The important point is that the principal does not have to pay for that 
supervisory information. To see why, note that once the agent and the supervisor have been 
offered the incentive compatible contracts, they have no incentive to lie in their reports on
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each other. The supervisor, for example, once offered a second-best contract, is indifferent 
between reporting the agent's type or concealing it if he has learned it. More precisely, he has 
no incentive to conceal that information, because a report does not affect his own welfare. 
In short, the principal gets supervisory information with no additional cost: i.e., the wage for 
supervisory information can be set as equal to zero.
It is assumed that the random cost parameters 0] and 02 are independently distributed, 
and therefore there are no gains to be achieved by conditioning the agent's and the 
supervisor's compensation on each other's types.4 Note that we assume that 0, and 02 are not 
necessarily identically distributed. In particular, we later consider A02  ^A0b which captures 
the idea that the supervisor's fine-tuning activity involves less uncertainty than the agent's 
main production task. As usual with the combined moral hazard and adverse selection, it is 
also assumed that even if P observes realized costs c, and c2, he cannot disentangle their 
components. For example, P does not know whether the realized high cost c, is due to A's 
laziness or a bad state of nature.
The principal, P hires S and A to realize an indivisible project which has 
exogenously set gross value R. The principal's expected utility is:
E [ R - c 1 ~ c 2 - w 1 - w 2 ] . (2.5)
In the above, expectations are formed for all possible states of nature.
Information structure
One of the key elements of the information structure is that P observes neither random 
cost parameters 0j and 02 nor signals of them. However, the principal has priors over 0j and
02. Slightly abusing the notation, we write o, as the signal the supervisor has of the agent's 
type 0,. The supervisor can, therefore, help the principal control A by reporting any 
information he learns to the principal. Similarly, the agent gets signal o2 about the 
supervisor's type 02, and thereby he can help the principal control the supervisor. The agent 
learns signals with probability 1, and without loss of generality we assume that the supervisor
4We use IC constraints which state that truth-telling is a dominant strategy. We could 
have used Bayesian IC constraints without changing the results. This follows from the 
assumption of independent production and the fact that we use ex post IR constraints.
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also learns the signal with the same probability. The probability of learning signals is 
exogenously determined.
We follow the same line as Tirole (1986) and most of the existing literature in 
assuming that signals are hard information: that is, they are verifiable. Having observed the 
other’s type, one can report it to P, and by assumption that report is verifiable. Given that a 
random cost parameter has value 0, a signal can take two values, o={0,0}. In other words, 
the true state of nature is either observable or not. If signal o={0}, one can report r=0 or r=o. 
That is, one can report the true state of nature or remain silent and claim that one has not 
observed anything. However, one cannot report a "wrong" state of nature; that claim is by 
assumption unverifiable. Given that the true state of nature is 0, and signal o=0, one can then 
report r={0,0}. However, if signal 0=0 then one can only report r=0 . The main point here 
is that the principal cannot distinguish whether the agent or the supervisor has actually 
observed a true state of nature or not.
We also assume that A (S) learns whatever signal S (A) learns. In other words, both 
A and S know a state of nature. Bearing in mind that random variables 0! and 02 are 
independently distributed, we must consider all sixteen cases. Fortunately, most cases behave 
symmetrically, which simplifies the analysis. For further details concerning states of nature, 
see Appendix A.
Collusion
In principle, collusion (side transfers) may take either a monetary or non-monetary 
form. In this paper we concentrate on non-monetary side transfers. There are three basic 
reasons for this. First, monetary transfers (bribes) are typically illegal in most societies. 
Secondly, monetary transfers between members of any organisation are typically strictly 
forbidden. Thirdly, in some cases it is quite easy for the principal to monitor monetary 
transfers by examining accounting records. In contrast, non-monetary side transfers are rather 
difficult to monitor. On the whole, non-monetary collusion is a rather more realistic and 
frequently-observed type of collusion in real-world organisations. This idea is modelled by 
assuming that transaction costs related to monetary transfers are infinite. The members of an 
organisation are able to collude only by exchanging favours, and transaction costs of non­
monetary transfers are assumed to be zero.
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The possibility of collusion is, of course, related to the supervisor's and the agent's 
monitoring roles. The idea is that the monitor has discretion over the monitored party, 
because he may release or withhold supervisory information he has learned. Within our 
framework, A and S may agree not to release information that could hurt each other. The 
agent and supervisor prefer the principal to be uninformed about the true state of nature when 
it is good, since they can earn rents because of the asymmetry of information between 
themselves and the principal.
In this chapter collusion appears purely in the form of non-monetary side transfers, 
and these side transfers are unobserved by P. In short, the monitored party "buys" the 
monitor's silence with a favour in return, and he also remains quiet about the true state of 
nature. Within Organisation II, both A and S have discretion over each other's activities, and 
the side contract takes the form of "a favour and a counter favour".5 In our static model these 
favours and counter favours are exchanged simultaneously.
We assume, as does most of the literature, that side contracts are enforceable 
(enforceability approach). Of course, side contracts are unenforceable in a court of law due 
to the very nature of their illegality. However we assume that they are enforced by the agent's 
and the supervisor's willingness to report according to the side contract. In particular, the 
parties' willingness to adhere to the side contract is based on the threat that the benefits of the 
side contracts will be lost if one party breaches the agreement. There is strong reciprocity 
between the agent and the supervisor. When they both face a "good" state of nature, and 
when they have observed each other's type, reporting honestly would make both of them 
worse off. In contrast, by remaining silent, they both end up better off. Note that in contrast 
to monetary side payments that are paid ex post, here agents need to coordinate at the 
reporting stage, and after that there are no enforceability problems.6 It is important to note 
that non-monetary side transfers are invisible. The transaction technology of the non­
monetary transfers is extremely efficient; in fact, there are no actual transfers between the 
agent and the supervisor. What happens is a mutual explicit agreement of silence, in which
5Tirole (1988) reviews four possible categories of non-monetary transfers: human 
relations, acts of cooperation, supervision, and authority.
6For more about enforceable and self-enforcing side contracts, see Tirole (1992).
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the benefits flow directly to the colluding parties.
Timing
Finally, the timing of the model is summarized as follows:
P designs A reports r, c, and c2 Payments
a main contract S reports r2 realised w, and w2
A leams 0,, side A chooses e]
S leams a,, contracts S chooses e2
S leams 02,
A leams o2
At stage 0, all parties learn relevant information. A and S learn their types and signals, 
and P leams the prior distributions of types. At stage 1, P designs a main contract which 
determines wages. At stage 2, A and S may secretly draw up an enforceable side contract. At 
stage, 3 A and S report r, and r2 respectively to the principal. At stage 4, A and S choose 
effort levels. At stage 5, costs are realized; and finally, at stage 6 compensations are paid to 
A and S according to the terms of the main contract.
2.3 The Analysis
2.3.1 Organisation I: Principal-Productive Supervisor-Agent
In this section we consider a situation often observed in real-world organisations. The middle 
manager monitors the worker and reports to the principal, but the worker's information about 
his superior is not used. We begin our analysis with a case of perfect information (first best). 
The principal has full information about 0j and 02, and therefore he can always implement 
the first-best and optimal efforts e* from both A and S. There is no need for monitoring.
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The principal's problem is simply:
M a x eu e2 [K-Oj-e,) - Wl) - ( e 2-e2)-w2)] ,  (2.6)
s.t. ^-ij; ( e i ) ^0, i = l ,  2 .
In the above, i=l is the agent and i=2, the supervisor. A solution to (12) is ij/'(e*)= 1, w1=t|t(e*) 
and U,=0 for the agent and ijj'(e*)= 1, w2=i|/(e*) and U2=0 for the supervisor. We state the 
solution as a Lemma 2.1:
L e m m a  2 . 1  U n d e r  p e r f e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  k e e p s  b o t h  t h e  a g e n t  a n d  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r  
a t  t h e i r  r e s e r v a t i o n  u t i l i t y  l e v e l s  a n d  i n d u c e s  e f f i c i e n t  l e v e l s  o f  e f f o r t  e *  i n  a l l  s t a t e s  o f  n a t u r e .  
T h e  w a g e  l e v e l s  a r e  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  t h e  s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e .
Proof. The first-best results follow directly from the principal's maximization problem 
subject to IR constraints. □
We next analyse a benchmark case - t h a t  o f  a  c o l l u s i o n - f r e e  e q u i l i b r i u m  - in which 
collusion does not exist, and the supervisor behaves honestly. Once the principal offers the 
supervisor a normal second-best contract, he does not have any incentive to lie in his reports 
about the agent's type, because the reports do not effect his own utility at all. If the supervisor 
has learned the agent's type, he reports it truthfully to the principal. P then has perfect 
information about A's type, and there the solution coincides with the first best. If the 
supervisor has not learned the agent's type, then of course P also remains uninformed about 
it. The principal's problem is:
Max E [R- (01“e 1) -wx~ (02- e 2) -w2]
s. t .  ( 2 . 1 ) - ( 2 . 4 ) .  1 }
It is a standard result in contract theory that the individual rationality constraint is 
binding for the inefficient type and the incentive compatibility constraint is binding for the 
efficient type. Thus we can simplify the principal's problem and solve the relaxed problem 
with binding constraints. The binding IR and IC constraints are:
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^ -il;  ( 6 i - c i ) =0, 1 = 1, 2  . (2.8)
{ Q j ~ C j ) =wT-i1j (6^-cT) =0 (e i ) , i  = 1 , 2 .  (2.9)
In equation (2.9), 0(ej)= i|/(ej) - i|f(ej - A0) is a rent function with O'fe) > 0. It indicates that 
a rent enjoyed by the efficient type is an increasing function of the effort level required from 
the inefficient type. This function demonstrates effectively that there is an important trade-off 
between incentives and rent extraction.
The principal's problem is to maximize (2.7) subject to (2.8) and (2.9). We derive a 
solution which involves a combination of the first-best and second-best contracts for the 
agent in Appendix A. The supervisor's contract is a normal second-best contract. There is no 
need to compensate the supervisor for his reports about the agent's type, because the 
supervisor is hired and compensated for production anyway, and his utility is independent 
of reports. With the help of the supervisor the principal is able to reduce the asymmetric 
information between himself and the agent. The solution for (2.7) forms a collusion-free 
contract, which we refer to as Lemma 2.2:
L e m m a  2 . 2  T h e  c o l l u s i o n - f r e e  c o n t r a c t  w i t h i n  O r g a n i s a t i o n  I  p r o v i d e s  f o r  t h e  a g e n t  a  
c o m b i n a t i o n  o f t h e  f i r s t - b e s t  a n d  s e c o n d - b e s t  c o n t r a c t s .  T h e  s u p e r v i s o r ' s  c o n t r a c t  i s  a  n o r m a l  
s e c o n d - b e s t  c o n t r a c t .
P r o o f .  S e e  A p p e n d i x  A .
Assume now that n o n - m o n e t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  b e t w e e n  A  a n d  S  c a n  t a k e  p l a c e .  After the 
principal offers a main contract, A and S may secretly sign a side contract. When offered a 
collusion-free contract, A and S must figure out whether they can do better by colluding.
It follows immediately that the supervisor cannot do any better than with the 
collusion-free contract. The agent, however, has an incentive to collude; the supervisor's 
reports reduce his own utility. The agent prefers that the principal be uninformed about his 
type in good states of nature so that he can earn informational rent Ofo). However, the agent 
cannot provide any favours for the supervisor as compensation for favourable reports.
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Therefore non-monetary collusion does not arise. The collusion-free contract as defined in 
Lemma 2.2 is also (trivially) a collusion-proof contract. Thus we have proposition 2.1:
P r o p o s i t i o n  2 . 1  I n  O r g a n i s a t i o n  I ,  t h e  a g e n t  i s  u n a b l e  t o  d o  a n y  f a v o u r s  f o r  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r ,  
a n d  t h e r e f o r e  c o l l u s i o n  p r o b l e m s  d o  n o t  a r i s e .  T h e  c o l l u s i o n - f r e e  c o n t r a c t  c o i n c i d e s  w i t h  a  
c o l l u s i o n - p r o o f  c o n t r a c t .
Proof. In Organisation I, the agent does not have discretion over the supervisor and thus, by 
definition, non-monetary side-transfers cannot be exchanged. The second part of the 
proposition follows immediately. □
Within Organisation I, the principal always asks for reports from the supervisor. This 
follows from the fact that he is not obliged to reward the supervisor separately for his reports 
because he is compensated for production anyway. The principal's expected profits within 
Organisation I are higher than in the usual second-best case without the supervisor's reports. 
To see this, note that the principal can always ignore the supervisor's information, and 
therefore he can do at least as well as in the second-best case. To see that he is strictly better 
off, note that within Organisation I, the principal acquires more detailed supervisory 
information about the agent's type without any additional costs. This implies that the 
principal must be better off within Organisation I. The conclusion is clear-cut. It is optimal 
for the principal to use the supervisor's information about the agent.
It is interesting to contrast this theoretical result with the actual behaviour of real- 
world organisations. As a general rule in most organisations, a superior monitors 
subordinates. Think, for example, of the hierarchial organisational behaviour in the armed 
forces, the civil service, and so on. Roughly speaking, they all have in common the fact that 
only the superiors' information about their subordinates is used, and no direct communication 
from bottom to the top takes place. As far as only non-monetary transfers between a middle 
manager and a worker are possible, that sort of monitoring and reporting pattern does not 
give rise to the possibility of collusion by exchanging favours.
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2.3.2 Organisation II: Principal-Productive "Supervisors"
From now on, we allow for the possibility that a workers's information about his superior can 
also be used. It is interesting to compare this type of reporting behaviour with what happens 
in the real world, and, in particular to analyse, under which conditions the principal should 
also use the worker's information about his superior. Without the possibility of collusion, 
new, detailed information which the worker can provide about his superior would be used 
without hesitation to tighten the middle managers's incentive scheme. However, the 
possibility of collusion creates new costs which the principal must take into consideration 
when deciding whether or not to use two supervisory information sources. In short, the 
principal has to balance the benefits of using all supervisory information with the costs of 
collusion. Furthermore, the value of supervisory information provided by different members 
of an organisation may differ. In the next section we analyse how this will affect the optimal 
use of information under potential collusion.
The perfect-information case within Organisation II naturally coincides with the first- 
best of Organisation I. Supervisory information is not needed, and wages are independent of 
the state of nature. (See Lemma 2.1)
Consider next the c o l l u s i o n - f r e e  c a s e .  Suppose that the principal offers both A and 
S normal second-best contracts. Thus A and S earn informational rents when the state of 
nature is a good one, and they are kept on their reservation utility levels when the state of 
nature is a bad one. The key point concerning supervisory information is that, for example, 
the agent cannot increase his own welfare by concealing information he has learned about 
the supervisor. Thus, both the agent and the supervisor behave honestly, and P does not have 
to motivate them to report the supervisory information they hold. The principal is, however, 
ignorant of A's and S's types in the remaining states of nature. The principal's problem is:
M a x  E  [ R -  ( 0 , - e j )  - W l - (e2- e 2) - w 2 )
s . t .  (2 .8 )  - ( 2 . 9 )  . y  ’
With the binding constraints the above problem is easy to solve. The solution to the 
principal's problem in the collusion-free case is simply a combination of the first- and
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second-best contracts for both the supervisor and the agent. A detailed solution is stated in 
Appendix A. The collusion-free contract within Organisation II is merely a replica of the 
collusion-free contract within Organisation I, except that here the supervisor's wage schedule 
is also tailored to the supervisory information the agent provides. The collusion-free contract 
within Organisation II is stated as Lemma 2.3:
L e m m a  2 . 3  T h e  C o l l u s i o n - f r e e  c o n t r a c t  w i t h i n  O r g a n i s a t i o n  I I p r o v i d e s  f o r  b o t h  t h e  a g e n t  
a n d  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r  a  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i r s t - b e s t  a n d  s e c o n d - b e s t  c o n t r a c t s .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Assume now that A  a n d  S  c a n  c o l l u d e ,  and the collusion-free contract defined in 
Lemma 2.3 is offered to them. The question then becomes, can they do any better by 
colluding and manipulating the supervisory information they have? Clearly for both of them 
there are strictly positive gains to be realized by coordinating their reports. Namely, they both 
would like to keep the principal uninformed when they face a good state of nature, and thus 
earn informational rents instead of being kept on their reservation utility level. Recall that in 
Organisation I, A could not compensate S for his favourable reports in any way, and in 
particular he could not do any favours for him. Now within Organisation II, both A and S can 
compensate each other's favours with counter favours.
From the principal's point of view giving discretion also to A creates a new way to 
acquire more detailed supervisory information. It also introduces a way to form a side 
contract, which takes the form of "a favour and counter favour" . To put it more simply, an 
explicit, non-monetary side contract is simply the following agreement:" When we both face 
a good state of nature, and if you do not report my type, neither will I report your type". This 
side contract has a monetary equivalent, which of course equals the rents the agent and the 
supervisor are able to earn in a good state of nature. It is important to realize here that the 
rents just flow to A and S, and there are no actual transfers between A and S.
In contrast to monetary side-contracts, non-monetary collusion can occur only in one 
state of nature: namely when both A and S are efficient and perfectly observe each other's
38
type.7 Note that this is the only state of nature when favours and counter favours take place 
simultaneously, which facilitates profitable non-monetary collusion.8
The principal's problem is that he cannot distinguish when A and S are colluding and 
when they actually have not learned each other's types, because they can send the same 
messages in both cases. In particular, in a state of collusion, they are able to jointly conceal 
information from the principal.
To prevent side contracts the principal has to pay S and A as much as they would gain 
from not releasing supervisory information about each other - the principal must match the 
gains that result from collusion. In short, in order to prevent collusion the principal must 
provide both A and S informational rents in the state of nature when they are able to collude. 
The principal has to respect the following coalition incentive constraint
[ -i|[ (e *) + w 2 - t y  (e *) ] * (e^) ] . (2.11)
The left hand side of equation (2.11) states A's and S's utility when they truthfully reveal 
supervisory information (r,= 0b r2= 02), and the right hand side states their utility when they 
conceal it (r,=r2=0). The principal has to respect the above coalition incentive constraint by 
rewarding the agent and the supervisor such that they are as well off as when colluding. 
When Wj = i|r (e*) + $(6;), i=l ,2 A and S have no reason to collude at all, and 
then collusion does not arise in equilibrium.
It is important to note here that in all other states of nature, the agent and the 
supervisor will report honestly because non-monetary side transfers cannot be exchanged. 
And, more importantly, there the agent and the supervisor can not increase their own welfare 
by concealing the supervisory information they hold. The principal's problem under non­
monetary collusion is:
7Monetary side-contracts would also arise when only one of the colluding parties 
faces a good state of nature, because there the monitored party would buy the monitor's 
silence with money.
8Collusion in other cases would require repetition (dynamic collusion). Recently 
Martimort (1996a) has developed a model of dynamic collusion along this line of thought.
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M a x  E  { R -  (61- e 1) - w f )  -  (02- e 2) - w 2 )
s .  t .  (2 . 8)  , (2 . 9)  , ( 2 . 11)  . (2.12)
The detailed solution is derived in Appendix A. The solution for the principal's problem 
forms a collusion-proof contract, which we state as Lemma 2.4:
L e m m a  2 . 4  T h e  c o l l u s i o n - p r o o f  c o n t r a c t  w i t h i n  O r g a n i s a t i o n  I I  p r o v i d e s  f o r  b o t h  t h e  a g e n t  
a n d  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r  a  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  f i r s t - b e s t  a n d  s e c o n d - b e s t  c o n t r a c t s .  F u r t h e r m o r e  
e, < e p a n d  W j = i / f ( e * )  + & ( e )  i n  t h e  c a s e  w h e n  { O j d J  h a v e  b e e n  r e p o r t e d ,  i - l , 2 , j = l , 2 ,  a n d  
i  *  j .  O t h e r w i s e  t h e  o p t i m a l  c o l l u s i o n - p r o o f  c o n t r a c t  i s  s i m i l a r  a s  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  c o l l u s i o n -  
f r e e  c o n t r a c t  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  i n  L e m m a  2 . 3 .
Proof. See Appendix A.
The optimal collusion-proof contract involves further distortion (£;) in the inefficient 
type's effort as compared to the collusion-free case. This further distortion in the inefficient 
type's effort is introduced due to the possibility of collusion in order to reduce the 
informational rents the principal has to leave for A and S. Of course, this further distortion 
increases the ex post inefficiency of the collusion-proof contract.
The general properties of the collusion-proof contract are similar to those in Laffont 
and Tirole (1991), where the authors derive a collusion-proof contract when a regulator and 
a firm collude by transferring money. Here collusion technology is more efficient, since 
collusion by exchanging favours does involve any transaction costs. The principal optimally 
rewards the supervisor and the agent for their supervisory information only in the case when 
they could have colluded. This, however, occurs here less often than in Laffont and Tirole 
(1991), since monetary bribes are not feasible here.9 Therefore, the principal pays less often 
for supervisory information provided by the agent and the supervisor. The difference in the 
optimal collusion-proof contract compared to that of Laffont-Tirole (1991) is purely due to 
the mode of collusion we choose to consider.
9In fact, this occurs with probability p2l2.
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When deciding whether to use one or two supervisory information sources, the 
principal has to balance with a trade-off, which arises from the benefits and costs of using 
two information sources. To judge whether it is profitable to use one or two supervisory 
information sources, one has to compare the principal's expected profits under Organisations 
I and II. The question then is, should all available supervisory information be used?
2.3.3 What is the Optimal Organisation?
In the above we come to the conclusion that the decision as to whether or not to use all 
supervisory information available depends on both the benefits one can accrue by using that 
information and on the costs of collusion which arise immediately when two information 
sources are combined. So far, we have assumed that the value of supervisory information the 
agent and the supervisor hold is equal. From here on the value of their information may 
differ. When the value of supervisory information differs, some comparative statics are 
required to see how this affects the optimal use of information within organisations. We start 
with the case where the supervisor and the agent are symmetric, and in the second part we 
allow asymmetry. When we analyse the effects of asymmetry on the optimal organisation, 
we fix p=l=l/2. Given this restriction, we carry out our analysis and consider how the 
possible asymmetry (A0, - A02) £ affects which organisation ends up being the most 
profitable one.10
Symmetric Supervisor and Agent
This section analyses the symmetry between the supervisor and the agent. By 
symmetry we refer to random variables 0, and 02, which are identically distributed: that is, 
they have equal supports, A0, = A02. In terms of the value of supervisory information, this 
means that the monetary value of the supervisor's and the agent's reports is equal. Consider 
the benchmark case of no collusion. Then the following result follows immediately:
10 Alternatively, we could have fixed the size of the supports and done comparative 
statics with respect to p and 1.
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P r o p o s i t i o n  2 . 2  W i t h o u t  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  c o l l u s i o n ,  a n d  w h e n  t h e  a g e n t  a n d  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r  a r e  
s y m m e t r i c  a n d  r e p o r t  h o n e s t l y ,  O r g a n i s a t i o n  I I  w i l l  a l w a y s  d o m i n a t e  O r g a n i s a t i o n  I .  T h e  
p r i n c i p a l ' s  e x p e c t e d  p r o f i t s  w i t h  a  c o l l u s i o n - f r e e  ( c f )  c o n t r a c t  a r e  a l w a y s  h i g h e r  w i t h  
O r g a n i s a t i o n  I I :  E I I I ]c f  >  E I I I c f
Proof. To prove this we need only two steps. Note first that in Organisation II, the principal 
can ignore the agent's information about the supervisor (i.e., not ask the agent to report 
supervisory information). This means that in Oil the principal can do at least as well as he 
can in 01. To see that in fact the principal does strictly better, note that in Oil the principal 
can acquire more detailed supervisory information at no cost. Therefore, the principal is 
strictly better off under Organisation II. □
The economics behind the above result is that with the aid of honest reports, the 
principal eliminates the rents and ex post inefficiency which the supervisor’s second-best 
contract without A's reports would include. Does the possibility of collusion change which 
organisation ends up being the dominant one? It can be shown that Organisation II dominates 
also under collusion, when symmetry between the agent and the supervisor exists. Thus we 
have Proposition 2.3:
P r o p o s i t i o n  2 . 3  U n d e r  s y m m e t r y ,  i t  i s  a l w a y s  o p t i m a l  t o  u s e  e v e r y  s i n g l e  p i e c e  o f  a v a i l a b l e  
s u p e r v i s o r y  i n f o r m a t i o n  e v e n  i f  t h e  a g e n t  a n d  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r  a r e  a b l e  t o  c o l l u d e .  T h e  
p r i n c i p a l ' s  e x p e c t e d  p r o f i t s  w i t h  a  c o l l u s i o n - p r o o f  ( c p )  c o n t r a c t  a r e  h i g h e r  i n  O r g a n i s a t i o n  
I I :  E I I j j c p  >  E I I Icpr
P r o o f .  S e e  A p p e n d i x  A .
Under symmetric agent and supervisor, costs related to collusion are always lower 
than the benefits of new, detailed information in OIL Organisation II dominates Organisation 
I with or without collusion in the case where the agent and the supervisor are symmetric. 
Therefore, it is optimal for the principal to ask for reports from both the agent and the 
supervisor.
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Asymmetry between Supervisor and Agent
From now on we shall focus on the case in which the agent and the supervisor are no 
longer symmetric. In particular, the supervisor's fine-tuning production task includes smaller 
variation amongst random variables than does the agent's main production task, that is,
A0! > A02. Basically we are curious to know how this asymmetry, typically observed in real- 
world organisations and firms, affects the optimal use of supervisory information. Another 
interpretation of this difference is that in general the quality of the supervisor's information 
is higher. In other words, it is important to keep in mind that the monetary value of 
supervisory information may differ. Note that asymmetry does not change anything in the 
case of no collusion, and Organisation II is still the dominant one.
Now it is interesting to look at whether the possibility of non-monetary collusion 
changes which organisation ends up being the most profitable one. To this end it is necessary 
to compare the principal's expected profits under both Organisations I and II over all possible 
values of (A0, - A02). Comparing the principal's expected profits leads to Proposition 2.4;
P r o p o s i t i o n  2 . 4  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a s y m m e t r y  b e t w e e n  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r  a n d  t h e  a g e n t ,  w h i c h  
o r g a n i s a t i o n  e n d s  u p  b e i n g  d o m i n a n t  d e p e n d s  o n  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  ( A d t  -  A d j .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,
( i )  I f  0  <  ( A d i  -  A d J  <  k * ,  t h e n  i t  i s  a l w a y s  b e t t e r  t o  u s e  e v e r y  s i n g l e  p i e c e  o f  a v a i l a b l e  
s u p e r v i s o r y  i n f o r m a t i o n  e v e n  i f  t h e  a g e n t  a n d  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r  a r e  a b l e  t o  c o l l u d e .  T h e  
p r i n c i p a l ' s  p r o f i t s  u n d e r  t h e  c o l l u s i o n - p r o o f  c o n t r a c t  a r e  h i g h e r  i n  O I L  E I I IIcp> E I I Icp .
( i i )  I f  ( A d j  -  A d J  = k * t h e n  t h e  p r i n c i p a l ' s  e x p e c t e d  p r o f i t s  u n d e r  c o l l u s i o n - p r o o f  c o n t r a c t s  
a r e  e q u a l  i n  O r g a n i s a t i o n s  I  a n d  I I .  E I I U cp = E I I Icp .
( H i )  I f  ( A d ,  -  A d J  >  k * ,  i t  i s  o p t i m a l  t o  u s e  o n l y  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r y  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r  
h o l d  a b o u t  t h e  a g e n t .  T h e r e f o r e  O r g a n i s a t i o n  I  w i l l  d o m i n a t e  O r g a n i s a t i o n  I I .  W i t h  a  
c o l l u s i o n - p r o o f  c o n t r a c t  t h e  p r i n c i p a l ' s  e x p e c t e d  p r o f i t s  w i t h  a  c o l l u s i o n  p r o o f  c o n t r a c t  a r e  
h i g h e r  i n  O r g a n i s a t i o n  I .  E I I IIcp <  E I I lc p .
P r o o f .  S e e  A p p e n d i x  A .
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The economics behind Proposition 2.4, which is further clarified in Figure 2.1, is 
quite straightforward. The proposition demonstrates that the decision as to whether or not to 
use all supervisory information is endogenously determined. This, in turn, determines the 
organisation mode firms adopt in different environments. When making the decision whether 
to use the additional supervisory information a worker can provide, an organisation designer 
has to balance the benefits of that information and the costs of collusion which arise 
immediately when the second information source is used. This trade-off defines which 
organisational mode is the optimal one.
The first part of proposition 2.4 shows that when the agent and the supervisor are not 
"too asymmetric" it is optimal to adopt the mode of Organisation II. This follows simply 
from the fact that the benefits of new detailed information are greater than the costs of 
potential collusion in Oil. However, when asymmetry increases, Organisation I may provide 
greater profits. When the asymmetry is greater than threshold value k \  the expected profits 
under 01 are higher, and this is because the costs of collusion are high enough to offset any 
gain from new, detailed information in Organisation II. Therefore under this regime 
Organisation I dominates Organisation II. The intuition behind the domination result is 
straightforward. When the value of the agent’s supervisory information about the supervisor 
decreases (i.e., when (A0j - ASj) increases), the gains from new additional information 
decrease, and evidently the costs of collusion becomes higher than the benefits. Therefore, 
it is optimal to break collusion by ignoring the agent’s supervisory information by adopting 
Organisation II.
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Figure 2.1 Expected profits in Organisations I and II. (p=l=l/2)
"  A
(A^-Ae^
The results indicate that reporting patterns in all organisations are endogenously 
determined when the members of those organisations are able to exchange non-monetary 
side-transfers. When collusion is not an issue, all available supervisory information should 
be used. However, when collusion may arise, it is shown that there are instances when it is 
optimal for the principal not to listen to the worker at the bottom of the hierarchy: not only 
is his supervisory information less valuable, but also listening to the worker raises the 
possibility that harmful side-trade will take place. In addition, the model gives a precise 
prediction who should be a middle-manager. The supervisor should be an agent who has on 
his possession the most valuable supervisory information, and under some cases he should 
not be monitored. This is a nice result, since it says that the supervisor will perform his task 
better if he is not monitored by anyone. In sum, not only the decision whether or not it is 
optimal to use all available supervisory information is endogenous, but so is the decision who 
should be a supervisor in the first place.11
The main result of this chapter is that in some environments it is optimal for the 
principal to ignore intentionally some additional supervisory information, because by doing
n See also Aghion’s and Tirole’s (1996) discussion of the delegation of authority in 
an incomplete contract framework. They conclude that authority should be delegated to the 
agent whose preferences are most congruent with the principal's.
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so he can get some other and more important supervisory information without further cost. 
Thus, it may be optimal for the principal to commit not to use the workers' information about 
their superiors so as to deter non-monetary collusion and guarantee that the superiors will 
truthfully report their observations of their subordinates' types. This will be achieved only 
if Organisation I is adopted.This result may also explain the empirical fact that if 
subordinates' information about their superiors is used at all, it is typically carried out in such 
a manner that their reports are kept secret, ensuring the reporting subordinate's anonymity. 
This in turn precludes the exchange of non-monetary side transfers. In particular, the 
colluding parties cannot condition side contracts on observable and verifiable reports.
2.4 A Discussion: The Economics and Some Interpretations 
of Organisations I and II
In this section we offer some economic interpretations of the organisational forms and 
analyses carried out earlier. We concern ourselves here with a discussion of task assignments 
within organisations and vertical integration versus non-integration. Our focus on these 
situations relates to the optimal use of information when members of an organisation are 
able to exchange non-monetary side transfers.
Task Assignment in Organisations
Since the days of Adam Smith, the gains from specialization in general have been put 
forth as a main reason for the division of labour in economies. This applies to the 
organisation as well as to the firm. The workers typically perform specific tasks, and task 
sharing (or task overlapping) is not implemented as often as is technically possible. In this 
section we hope to demonstrate convincingly that there may be some other reasons for 
specialization as well that are related to the agents' opportunities to exchange non-monetary 
side transfers.
Suppose that, in addition to paying attention to the normal incentive considerations, 
the principal has the option to design agents’ jobs as well. In the analysis above we have
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shown that non-monetary collusion problems do indeed arise when the supervisor and the 
agent are able to exchange favours. In this context an interesting question that presents itself 
is whether or not the principal can design the agents' jobs in such a way that non-monetary 
side transfers cannot be exchanged.
The solution takes the form of a specialization mode, where both production tasks are 
carried out by the agent and both monitoring tasks are carried out by the supervisor.12 This 
solution automatically avoids any non-monetary collusion problems. Alternatively, a 
collusion-free outcome is achieved when the principal hires four agents: two to produce and 
two to monitor them. The worker who produces cannot do any favours for the monitor; thus, 
by definition, non-monetary side-transfers are unexchangeable. The monitoring party needs 
no motivation to report truthfully; he does so willingly when he is paid at least his reservation 
wage. It is important to note, however, that compensation for supervisory tasks can not 
necessarily be set equal to zero as in our analysis. This is due to the fact that the supervising 
agent's only task is to monitor, and the wage depends on his reservation wage. Therefore, 
when the supervisory wage can be set relatively low, we know that the specialization mode 
is called for as the optimal task-assignment mode.
Specifically, through the specialization the principal can reap the full benefits of 
additional supervisory information in addition to being able to avoid any of the costs of 
collusion. In other words, the principal is able at last to reach a performance level equivalent 
to that of Organisation II in the collusion-free case. Here task assignment also works as an 
effective incentive device against collusion.13 By separating production and supervisory 
tasks, the principal makes the existence of non-monetary collusion impossible.
It is interesting to expand this last observation to a broader context. These results may 
help us to understand how it is that the often observed hierarchial organisation mode can be 
the optimal solution to the problem of non-monetary collusion between the members of that
12Here we assume that the effort required to perform one production task is 
independent of the effort required to perform the other production task. In addition this 
requires that the aggregate informational rents equal to the sum of informational rents in a 
case in which production tasks are carried out by the separate agents.
13The above observation goes along with Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)'s task- 
grouping result. The reason behind their results is not, however, connected to collusion 
problems.
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hierarchy. Namely, designing production and supervisory tasks in an optimal way eliminates 
all collusion problems as long as monetary side-transfers are excluded, as was assumed here. 
Taken together, this implies a hierarchy with a principal at the top, a supervisor in the middle, 
and a worker at the bottom. Hierarchial structures are often characterized as inefficient. Here, 
however, a standard hierarchial solution turns out to be the optimal response to the chronic 
problem of non-monetary collusion. The possibility that members of an organisation can 
exchange non-monetary favours may be an important factor in determining how different 
tasks should be assigned between workers.
Vertical Integration vs. Non-Integration
Suppose the supervisor and the agent are two different units of the firm. These units can be 
under unified control - an integrated firm - or under separate control - a non-integrated firm. 
Both units have some private information which is unavailable to headquarters (a principal).
The non-integrated firm is such that it is comprised of a principal and one unit. Then 
the principal contracts with a separate supplier as well. These units may be able to learn each 
other's type even if they are not under unified control, due to the existence of long-term 
relationships among themselves. The units, however, may be unable to provide verifiable 
reports of each other's types under non-integration, because verifiability requires access to 
the other firm's records. Basically, the principal of the non-integrated firm has no way to 
delegate supervisory authority to his own unit manager such that he would have access to the 
separate supplier's accounting records. In other words, the separate supplier is not obliged to 
provide access to its accounting records, guaranteeing thereby informational rents due to the 
asymmetric information between the separate supplier itself and the non-integrated firm.14
The principal of a non-integrated firm can delegate supervisory authority to the 
separate supplier in such a way that monitoring the non-integrated firm's own unit manager 
is possible. The separate supplier can then be regarded as an external auditor. The separate
14Note that here we analyse the case in which the separate supplier is an owner- 
managed firm. If we had also assumed that the separate supplier was also comprised of a 
principal and an agent, then the principals could always write a contract which would allow 
cross-checking between the firms. However, then the whole distinction between the firms 
would become irrelevant.
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supplier has no incentive to lie if it leams something about the non-integrated firm's unit 
manager; the supplier’s own utility is independent of the non-integrated firm's unit manager's 
utility. Furthermore, the is compensated for supplying, no matter what.
Under non-integration, non-monetary collusion problems do not arise. The principal 
hires a unit manager and separate supplier of his own choice as specified in Organisation I. 
Here the separate supplier is also a supervisor. Under non-integration, the best the principal 
can achieve is the performance of Organisation I.
Suppose now that the non-integrated firm buys up the separate supplier. The 
integrated firm is then comprised of a principal and two units with which the principal 
contracts. It is important to note that under integration, the principal can delegate supervisory 
authority to both of his unit managers such that they are able to compile verifiable reports. 
This is because the principal now has authority over the decision as to whether or not access 
to the firm's accounting records is permitted. Note that in this present interpretation both 
Organisation I and II's forms characterize an integrated firm, and the only distinction between 
them is the use of supervisory information. If in the integrated firm the principal asks his unit 
managers to monitor each other, they may exchange non-monetary side transfers, and thus 
collusion problems do arise as shown earlier.
In general, under integration more verifiable supervisory information is available to 
the principal. However, the actual value of this information depends on whether collusion 
between the unit managers is possible. Within the present framework, the integrated firm 
adopts the organisation form of either I or II. The vertically-integrated firm can do at least 
as well as the non-integrated firm, because it can always ignore any additional supervisory 
information, thereby mimicking the non-integrated firm.
Our discussion here is quite closely related to what is known in the literature as 
influence activities. Milgrom and Roberts (1988) discuss the types of influence activities 
which can arise in organisations under centralized authority. There, members of the firm can 
try to influence decision makers in order to gain personally. These influence activities are 
costly to firms in at least two ways: they skew the decision-making process, because the 
information decision makers use may be biased. Secondly, members who try to influence 
decision makers use up lots of working time and effort advancing their own agendas. 
Milgrom and Roberts go on to argue that the existence of influence activities may be an
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important reason why some firms' vertical integration decisions end up being the wrong ones. 
Their theory explains why firms are quite often observed selling their loss-making additional 
units. They conclude that if these loss-making units were part of the integrated firm, they 
would spend by far too much time and effort lobbying the decision makers to save them.
Our model points out some factors which may affect firms' integration decisions 
because it allows for the costs and benefits of bringing together two separate units under 
unified control to be considered simultaneously.15 The main relation our model has to the 
vertical-integration literature is the existence of integration costs which are incurred when 
a non-integrated firm becomes integrated. In vertical integration literature these costs are not 
explicitly modelled, but are treated as exogenous with a brief mention that they are caused 
by some sort of incentive problems. In the present paper, we regard the costs of collusion as 
endogenous integration costs which occur when a firm integrates, and the firm's unit 
managers can exchange non-monetary side transfers.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have analysed the optimal organisation modes and the optimal use of 
supervisory information under circumstances of potential collusion. The chapter proposes a 
simple theory of non-monetary collusion, where the members of an organisation collude by 
simultaneously exchanging favours. Collusion is possible only when all available information 
is used, and the principal has to decide whether to use only one information source and avoid 
collusion altogether, or use two information sources and bear the costs of collusion.
It has been shown that under circumstances of collusion it may be optimal not to use 
all available information. In particular, when the agent and the supervisor are asymmetric 
enough, it may be optimal not to listen to the worker at the bottom of a hierarchy, since that 
prevents collusion and the supervisor provides more valuable supervisory information at no 
further cost. The main result of the chapter is not only that the use of information is
15Note that the present model cannot, however, answer the ultimate question, which 
determines a firm's boundaries.
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endogenously determined, but so is the decision to whom the supervision task should be 
assigned. The supervisor should be an agent who has on his possession the most valuable 
information. An interesting result is that the supervisor performs his supervision task better 
when he is not monitored by some third party. On the whole, the chapter presents us with 
general guidelines about whose information in a real-world organisation should and should 
not be used, and the simple reason why all available supervisory information is typically not 
used.
We embrace the concept of hard supervisory information, which is clearly 
theoretically questionable. Undoubtedly, it would be better to use soft information, which is 
completely manipulable. An interesting point, but one which lies outside the scope of this 
paper, would be to analyse whether the soft information the agent and the supervisor have 
about one another has any value to the principal. Intuitively, it is less useful; and the question 
then becomes, does it have any value to the principal at all?
The issues of task assignment deserve closer analysis than they receive here. It seems 
that it is possible to design tasks in such a way that non-monetary collusion simply does not 
arise. The challenge for an economist is to figure out whether it is possible to assign tasks in 
such a way that monetary side transfers can be deterred as well.
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Appendix A 
All possible “states o f nature
1. A and S observe 01,r2={0i,0}
2. A and S observe 01,r 2={01,0}
3. A and S observe 0,, r2={0!,0}
4. A and S observe 0b r2={0b0}
5. A observes 0,, S observes 0 , r2={0 }
6. A observes 0b S observes 0 , r2={0 }
7. A observes 0 ls S observes 0 , r2={0}
8. A observes 0b S observes 0 , r2={0}
9. A observes B1# S observes 0 , r2={0 }
10. A observes Bb S observes 0 , r2={0 }
11. A observes Bb S observes 0, r2={0 }
12. A observes 0,, S observes 0 , r2={0 }
13. A and S observe Bls r2={Bb0 }
14. A and S observe Bb r2={0,,0}
15. A and S observe Bb r2={B,,0 }
16. A and S observe Bb r2={Bb0 }
S and A observe 02, r,={02,0}
S observes 02, A observes 0 , ^={0 }
S observes 02, A observes 0 , r,={0 }
S and A observe 02, ^ = ^ , 0}
S and A observe 02, ^={§2,0 }
S observes 02, A observes 0 , r,={0 }
S observes B2, A observes 0 , ^={0}
S and A observe B2, r,={B2,0 }
S and A observe 02, r,={02,0}
S observes 02, A observes 0 , r,={0 } 
S observes B2, A observes 0 , ^={0 } 
S and A observe B2, ri={B2,0} 
and A observe 02, r,={02,0}
S observes 02, A observes 0 , ^={0 }
S observes B2, A observes 0 , r,={0 }
S and A observe B2, r!={B2,0}
S
Proof of Lemma 2.2
Under a collusion-free regime the principal offers a normal second-best contract to the 
supervisor, and thus the supervisor has no incentive to lie when reporting about the agent's 
type. Therefore, the principal acquires the supervisor's information about the agent's type in 
states 1-4 and 13-16, and there the first-best solution i|i'(e*)=l and w=i|/(e*) will apply. In the 
remaining states of nature, the principal knows only the priors of the agent's type. Since the 
principal does not learn any additional information about the supervisor, he knows only the 
priors of the supervisor's type. The principal's problem is thus reduced to two independent 
programs: one for the agent and one for the supervisor.
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We know from the basic result of adverse-selection models that at the optimum the 
IR constraint of the inefficient type and the IC constraint of the efficient type are binding: wr  
i|/(ei)=0 and w1-i|/(e1)=w1-iJj(e-A0). If they were not binding, the principal could increase his 
expected profits by offering a lower wage to the inefficient type without violating his IR 
constraint, and thus the original solution would not be the optimum one. We use this result 
to solve the principal's problem. This relaxed problem is solved by taking binding constraints 
into account. Since the two programs are independent, we only consider the principal's 
problem concerning the agent:
Max — p [ R - ( Q  - e 1) -ijx (e  ) - y  (e7) +\J/( e7-A0 )
£i#ei —^  ^ 1 1 1  (A 1)
+ (1 -p)
The first-order conditions with respect to and ^  are as follows:
=p(l-V(ei ) ) =0 (A.2)
=p(-\J// ( e 1) +ii// ( e 1-A01) )
+ (l-p) (1 V(e^) ) =0. ( }
The first-order conditions for the supervisor are calculated in a similar fashion, but for the 
sake of brevity we do not include them here. With the help of the first-order conditions we 
can now solve for the optimal effort levels and wages in all states of nature. First, the 
principal has perfect information about the agent's type in states 1-4 and 13-16, and then the 
first-best solution will apply : i|f(e*)= 1, w,=i|j(e*), and U,=0. In stating the results, we use 
the following notation: $(e)=i|/(e)-i|/(e-A0). In the good states of nature (5-8), the solution 
is i|/'(ej)= 1, and in the bad states of nature (9-12), the solution
is i|/’(e,)=l- (p! fc 'faM l-p,), w^iKe,), U^O.
The solution for the supervisor is a normal, second-best contract. In the good states 
of nature (1,2,5,6,9,10,13,14) the solution is i|f'(e?)= 1, w?=i{f(e?)+0(e7), y 2=0(e2), and 
in the bad states of nature (3, 4, 7, 8, 11,12, 15, 16) the solution is i|/'(e2)=l- (p2 <$'(e2))/(l- 
P2). w2= t(e 2), 0 2=0.
It follows from the convexity of disutility function iKeO that e, < e* = e,, and 
so Wj < w, < w,. Similarly e2 < O j = e*, and w2 < w2. These wage and effort levels form the
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collusion-free contract defined in Lemma 2.2.
We still must make sure that our solution does not violate the ignored efficient type's 
IR and inefficient type's IC constraints. To check this we must simply substitute the optimal 
effort and wage levels to the ignored constraints. It follows immediately that the efficient 
type's IR constraint is never binding. The inefficient type will never mimic an efficient type, 
because this would push his utility below zero. The inefficient type's IC constraint never 
binds. □
Proof of Lemma 2.3
Under a collusion-free regime, the principal offers the supervisor and the agent normal, 
second-best contracts, and he inherits the supervisory information which the supervisor and 
the agent hold concerning one another. The principal has perfect information about the 
agent's type in states 1-4 and 13-16 and the supervisor's type in states 1,4,5, 8,9,12,13, and
16. Thus, in those states of nature, the first-best solution will apply. In the remaining states 
of nature, the principal's problem is reduced to the normal adverse-selection problem. The 
solution is identical to that presented above, with the distinction that now the principal is also 
able to tighten the supervisor's incentive scheme with the supervisory information provided 
by the agent.
As a space-saving measure we do not state the first-order conditions here, but skip 
ahead directly to the characterization of the collusion free-contract within Organization II. 
For an agent in Organization II, a collusion-free contract includes ijf(e*)= 1, w1=\J/(e*), and 
Uj=0 in the perfect-information states (1-4 and 13-16), ijj,(eJ)= 1, w1=ij;(e])+0(e1), U ^ ^ e j )  
in good states of nature (5-8), i|;'(e1)=l- $'(e,))/(l-p,), w^ilrfo), U^O in bad states of
nature (9-12).
For the supervisor the solution is i|/'(e*)= 1, w,=i|r(e*), Uj=0 and i|f'(e7)= 1 in perfect 
information states (1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16), W2=i|/(e2)+^>(e2), y2=0(e2) good states of 
nature (2, 6, 10, 14), and i|f(e2)=l- (p2 0 '(e2))/(l-p2), w2=il/(e2), U2=0 in the bad states of 
nature (3, 7,11,15).
Similarly as above ej < e* = e1? and Wj < w, < w,. And of course also e2 < e* = Q j and 
w2 < w2 < w2. These results give rise to Lemma 2.3. □
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Proof of Lemma 2.4
If the principal offers the collusion-free contract derived in Lemma 2.3, the supervisor and 
the agent can do better by colluding and manipulating supervisory information. They can 
profitably collude when they perfectly observe each other's type. In state 1 when both the 
agent and the supervisor are efficient and have observed each others’ types, they can 
coordinate and send the same messages as in state 6. By concealing supervisory information, 
they have learned they are able to enjoy informational rents. The principal's problem is that 
he cannot distinguish between cases 1 and 6.
In all other cases, when the agent and the supervisor observe each other's type, they 
will report it honestly, because the agent or the supervisor cannot increase his own utility by 
concealing supervisory information. Thus, collusion is an issue only in case 1, when the 
supervisor and the agent are able to exchange favours, and that occurs with probability 
p2l2. Due to potential collusion, the principal must motivate the supervisor and the agent to 
report honestly their supervisory information in state 1. The principal must compensate the 
supervisor and the agent for their supervisory information such that they are equally well off 
as when colluding.The compensation for supervisory information is determined by the 
binding coalition incentive constraint:
u i  +  U 2 * E i + E z - (A.4)
In other words,
+ w 2 - t y  (e*) ]  ^ [p^-ilr(ei ) ] . (A.5)
In the equation above, the left-hand side shows the agent’s and the supervisor's utility in state 
1, when (r,= 0l9 r2= 62). The right-hand side shows their utility in state 6, when they have not 
actually learned (or they have concealed) supervisory information, (rj=r2=0). Note that both 
U, and U2 go to U*=0 when the supervisor and the agent report honestly. To make the 
supervisor and the agent report truthfully and not collude, it has to be the case that
Ui=E±=®(ei) -^(eT-A©^ , i = l , 2 ,
when [r1=Q7, r7= Q-, ] reported. (A-6)
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When the principal satisfies (A.6), he has perfect information about the agent's type in cases 
1-4, 13-16, and the supervisor's type in cases 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13 and 16. In other cases 
asymmetric information exists, and there the efficient type's IC constraint and the inefficient 
type's IR constraint are binding. Since non-monetary collusion can take place only in one 
case, the coalition incentive constraint has to be satisfied with probability p2l2. The 
principal’s problem can be considered in two parts: one for the agent and one for the 
supervisor, which are identical; and thus we calculate explicitly only the agent’s optimal 
contract. The principal’s problem is:
M a x p2I 2[J?-(ei -e*) -\J/{e ’ ) ]
+p2-M 1 - 1 ) [H- (0^ -e*) -Hr (e*) ]
+ p ( l-p )I ( l - l )  [K-(ei - e ‘) -Ur (e *) ]
♦pCL-pU^R-te^e’) -Hi(e*) ]
+ p 2 a - l ) H R - ( e i - e 1 ) -Hi( -® ( i j  
+p2(l-I)2[J?-(01-e1) -i)r(e  ^-®(e^ ]
+p(l-p) ( l -J )2[i?-(ei -e1) -\|i( e^ )  -<X>(e^ ]
+p(l-p) (A.7)
+ (l-p)p(l-I)I[J?-(S7-e^) -Hr(e~) ]
+ (l-p)p(l-J)2[i?-(57-i7) -Hr(e^ ) ]
+ (1 -p)2 (1 - 1 ) 2 [R- -Ht (e^ ) ]
+ ( 1 - p ) 2 U - 1 )  H R -  (Q l-T j -Hr (e^ ) ]
+ ( 1 - p ) p i 2 [R- (0^ -e*) -1)1 (e‘) ]
+ (l-p)pl(l-l) [R-te^-e') -Hf(e”) ]
+ (l-p)2I(l-I) [H-(07-e')-Hr(e')]
+ (1-p) 21 2 [R- (0 -^e *) -Hi(e*) ] .
The first order conditions with respect to e j:
= (l-i)p[l-il;/(e1) ] =0 
V(e.) =1. (A. 8)
For the efficient type we get the same solution as in the collusion-free case - no distortion on 
the top: ej = e*=l. The first order conditions with respect to e,:
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= (1-1) (1-p) [l-Hr'(i )^ ] - 
[p2l 2+(l-l)p]®'(i^) =0 
j  - Pr  (ex) =1
(1-p)
(A.9)
The inefficient type’s effort e! is further distorted due to the possibility of collusion, which 
costs the principal one more informational rent with probability p2l2. We label the further 
distorted effort level e, < e, The first-order conditions with respect to ^  and e2 follow in 
a similar fashion, and they are not stated here.
With the above first-order conditions we can solve the optimal contract. For the agent, 
the optimal collusion-proof contract offers i|f(e*)= 1, w,=i|r(e), U,=0 under perfect 
information, ij/,(e1)= 1, w,=n|r(e1)+0(61)„ Ui=^>(e,) in cases 5-8, and \|/'(e1)=l-p/(l-p) 
[l+pl2/(l-l)] <f>’(e,), w ^i^e,), Uj=0 in cases 9-12. The principal has to provide informational 
rent the agent in case 1: W! =$(el) and = ^(e,), and this happens with probability p2l2.
For the supervisor, the solution is similar: ilf(e*)= 1, w2=i|/(e*), and U2=0 in the perfect 
information cases, 1, w2=\|;(e2)+0(e2), U2=0(e2) when S is efficient, and
\Jf(e2)=T-p/(l-p) [l+pl2/(l-l)]0’(e2), w2=i|/(e2), U2=0 when S is inefficient. The principal has 
to provide also the supervisor informational rent in case 1: w2=0(e2), U2=<X>(e2).
The solution above involves further distortion in the inefficient type's effort compared 
to the collusion-free case. The agent's and the supervisor's effort levels are further distorted 
to reduce the gains from collusion. From the strict convexity of disutility function, it follows 
immediately that S, < e, < e , . Similarly for the supervisor. These results give rise to 
Lemma 2.4. The ignored constraints are automatically satisfied with the same arguments as 
earlier.
To show that this contract is collusion-proof is straightforward. Assume that the 
principal offers the contract described above. Can the agent and the supervisor do any better 
by colluding when the collusion-proof contract is offered? When the principal offers this 
contract, which satisfies the coalition incentive constraint, IR and IC constraints, the agent 
and the supervisor do not have any incentive to collude. In particular, consider case 1, which 
is the only possibility for profitable collusion. If the agent and the supervisor colluded, they 
would gain the same informational rents that they get in case 6 ( r,=r2=0). The collusion-
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proof contract, however, offers them in case 1 as much when they truthfully report 
supervisory information (r,= 0l5 r2= 62). There are no gains to be achieved by colluding. The 
contract derived above is, indeed, a collusion-proof contract. □
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Since we have fixed the gross value of the project exogenously as R, all that matters 
is the expected total costs under both organisation modes. We divide the proof into two parts, 
and analyse first the expected costs related to the agent, and then we consider the expected 
costs related to the supervisor. Then it is shown that, indeed, Organization II will always 
dominate when the agent and the supervisor are symmetric.
Note first that Organisation I is a special case of Organisation II where A’s 
supervisory information about S is not used. Since we consider here a symmetric relationship 
between S and A, we label A0j =A02 =A0. Since we want to look at whether the value of 
supervisory information has an effect on which is the most profitable organisation, we fix 
p=T=l/2.
When the principal decides to use A’s information, the possibility of collusion arises, 
and the principal has to satisfy the coalition incentive constraint. The principal is certainly 
worse off since he has to provide rents the agent to get him to report his supervisory 
information about the supervisor. There are no other changes when A’s information is used. 
The cost increase is purely due to the informational rent 0(e,) that has to be provided the 
agent with probability p2l2.
The difference of the expected profits between Oil and 01 boils down to the 
following: A 71= - p2l2 0 (e j). The total expected costs related to the agent are indeed always 
higher in Organisation II.
When the principal decides to use A’s information, the expected total costs related 
to the supervisor will decrease. To see this, note that within Organisation II, with the help of 
the agent's supervisory information about the supervisor, the principal avoids paying the 
informational rents $ (e2) in cases 5,9, and 13. These savings accrue with probability pl(l- 
pl). In addition, with the help of the new information, the principal avoids inefficiency in four 
cases (4,8,12,16), and there the solution is at the first-best level. These savings occur with
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probability (l-p)l. However, the principal has to provide the supervisor the informational 
rent in case 1 to motivate the supervisor to report information about the agent. That is, in case 
1 the principal breaks collusion with money.
The expected costs related to the supervisor will then definitely decrease, and the 
profits increase when Oil is adopted:
An, = pl(l-pl)<I>(e2) + (l-p)l [ (B2- e2) + f f e )  - (Br e*) - i|j(e*) ]
Given that we consider a symmetric case, and have fixed p=l=0.5: ®(e,) = Ofe,) =$(e). Then 
we can combine the losses and the gains, Arc = Atta +Atts . Now we see that Organisation II 
is dominant always under symmetry, since: A7U= pl(l-2pl)0 (e) + (l-p)l [ (B2- e2)
(02-e*) - i|/(e*) ] = 1/8 [0(e)] + 1/4 [ (02- e^ +i|i(e2) - (02-e*) ■ ty(e*) ] > 0 □
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Now we allow asymmetry A0,  ^A02 and in proving Proposition 2.4 we use the expressions 
derived in the earlier proof: Att= -1/16 0 (e j), and A7Ts = 3/16 0(e2) + l/4[ (02- e2) - i|/(e2) - 
(02"e*) ■ *Ke*) ]. The increase in costs, -1/16 Ofo) can now be written as:
-1/16 [i|r(ej) - ij/fo -AOO] = - 1/16[A0,- 3/2 A0j2]. The decrease in costs, 3/16 0(e2) + 1/4 
[ (02_ e2) - i|/(e2) - (02"e*) ■ iKe*) ] can be written as :
3/16 [A62- 3/2 A622] + l/4[A622/2].
Now the decision concerning the organisation mode will depend on the sign of expression 
- l/16[A6r  3/2 A0,2] + 3/16 [A02- 3/2 A022] + l/4[A622/2]
= -l/16[A0r  3/2 A0j2] +3/16 A02- 1/32 A022.
When this is positive Organisation II will dominate, and when it is negative Organisation I 
will dominate. Somewhere in between, Organisations I and II will yield equal expected 
profits. In deriving the above expression, we used a disutility function which takes the form 
ijj(e)=e2/2, and the second-best effort level for the inefficient type: e=l-A0.
Clearly the sign of -2/32 A0, + 3/32 A0,2 +6/32 A02 - 1/32 A022 depends on (A0, - 
A02). When deriving characterizations we must start with the case where 01 and Oil will 
yield equal expected profits. We multiply the above expression by 32 and write it as follows:
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-A022 + 6A02+3A0,2 - 2A0, =0. When the above holds, the expected profits are equal 
between Organization I and II. The above relation can be solved by analysing implicit 
functions. We have a relation which takes a form F(A02, A0,) = 0, and we ask whether there 
is an implicit function A02=g(A0j) such that it is a solution to the above relation. Using the 
implicit function theorem, the derivative of (dA02/dA0,) = - FA01 /FA02 = -(6A0,-2)/(-2A02+6). 
The condition for the existence of a local solution is FA02 *  0, thus A02 *  3. This is satisfied 
due to our restriction of the size of supports: A02 e  (0,1/2). Now we can solve A02 as a 
function of A0,, and by using the general quadratic equation's solution method, we get the 
following roots:
- 6 +1/ 3 6 - 4 * ( - 1 )  * (3A0?-2A0.)
A0 ,  =------ 1------------------------------------- —
2 -2
Only one root, namely
-6+ i /36+12A 0i-8A 0,
A0 =--------------   :-!
2 -2
satisfies the restriction we imposed on the support.
Now for all A0t e (0,1/2) the above root will give A02* such that -A022+6A02+3A0,2 
- 2A0j =0. For any A0! define A0, - A02* = k*, which gives us the measure of asymmetry 
under which Organisation I and II are equally profitable. From now on we consider actual 
support A02. N ow  it is evident that when ( A 6 }  -  A G J  = k*, then the principal is indifferent 
between OI and OIL This concludes part (ii) of Proposition 2.4
To prove part (i) of Proposition 2.4 - i.e., that Oil will dominate - we must prove that 
-A022 + 6A02 +3A0!2 - 2A0! > 0. This is indeed the case if ( A d t  -  A 6 J  <  k * . Now the 
relationship between the agent and the supervisor is not too asymmetric, and Organisation 
II will remain the most profitable one. This concludes the first part of Proposition 2.4.
To prove that OI will dominate we must show that A022 + 6A02 +3A0!2 - 2A0, < 0. 
The above is true if ( A 6 ,  -  A 62)  >  k * . Then the relationship between the agent and the 
supervisor is asymmetric enough, and the costs of collusion are higher then the benefits of 
new information. Thus, Organisation I will dominate. This concludes the proof. □
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Chapter 3
Breaking Collusion by Task Assignment 
and Whistle-Blowing
61
3.1 Introduction
One of the most important and difficult decisions an organisation designer has to deal with 
is how to assign various tasks between workers. In this chapter our particular interest lies in 
the analysis of interaction between task assignment and collusion. We consider an 
organisation of two agents and a principal where collusion arises due to reciprocal 
monitoring. More precisely, the agents collude by exchanging favours by jointly concealing 
information from the principal. We do not consider monetary bribes; we simply assume that 
the transaction costs related to monetary bribes are infinite, and thus the agents may collude 
only by exchanging favours.
The chapter analyses how the principal is able to break collusion either by task 
assignment or whistle-blowing. With both of these instruments the principal is able to 
manipulate side-contracting opportunities. Task assignment and whistle-blowing are two 
different ways to break collusion. Through task assignment the principal creates a situation 
where the agents cannot exchange any favours. The idea behind using whistle-blowing is to 
create a situation where, if collusion has taken place, the benefits of it will be "taxed" away 
with some probability by imposing penalties for wrongdoers. When the penalties are high 
enough, the agents do not collude. In this chapter we are interested in whistle-blowing as an 
incentive device that blocks wrongdoing before it has even started. It is important to realize 
that here whistle-blowing is not part of the whistle-blowers' everyday tasks in their job. It 
simply ensures that those tasks are well executed.
In general, whistle-blowing means the disclosure by organisation members (former 
or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices to persons or organisations that may 
be able to affect the action.1 Most of the real life whistle-blowing examples are found in 
situations where an organisation member exposes that the particular organisation is doing 
something illegal: e.g., a worker discloses to a newspaper that cars produced in the factory 
in which he is working are unsafe, a policeman discloses that his boss is taking drug money 
from criminals, and so on.
It is interesting to note that whistle-blowing arrangements are also adopted in some
^ee more about whistle-blowing in Near and Miceli (1995).
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big firms. For example, a telephone "hot line" has been opened to encourage workers to 
expose wrongdoing.2 In the United Kingdom the government have even opened a telephone 
hot line where people are able to call anonymously and expose citizens who are claiming 
welfare benefits on wrong grounds.
At this point, the reader may wonder about the relevance and effectiveness of whistle­
blowing where the agents who are colluding (the wrongdoers) are expected to blow the 
whistle themselves. In other words, they are practically turning in themselves when blowing 
a whistle. In that respect, it is interesting to note that the type of mechanism developed here 
has been proposed in a fight against firms' cartelization within the EU. In fact, the main idea 
there seems to be almost exactly the same as in the present chapter. ’’Under the proposal, 
firms that blow a whistle on a cartel before the commission gets wind of it either would not 
be fined or would see their fine greatly reduced “3
The first part of this chapter considers task assignment and time allocation in general 
as the measures the principal may use in preventing collusion. We consider a firm with two 
agents and a principal where collusion arises due to reciprocal monitoring. The principal 
allocates fixed working hours between monitoring and production tasks, and working time 
is by assumption contractible, but there are fixed adverse selection parameters for each agent. 
Since the agents learn each others’ types, they are able to collude by concealing that 
information from the principal. Due to collusion, monitoring becomes less effective, and 
therefore less time will be allocated to monitoring activities. Moreover, time allocation now 
becomes interdependent, and the principal has to solve both agents’ time allocation problems 
simultaneously.
In the collusion-proof equilibrium, the principal breaks collusion with money. We 
show that there is a simple way the principal can break collusion, namely by hiring a third 
worker and assigning one of the monitoring tasks to him. Under that task assignment 
structure no favours can be exchanged. Then with the fixed cost of the third worker the 
principal implements the collusion-free outcome. However, both ways of breaking collusion
2In the United Kingdom, for example, National Westminster Bank, Esso, and Lucas 
have installed telephone hotlines for whistle-blowers. Financial Times, 29 June 1995.
3The Wall Street Journal Dec. 7, 1995.
63
are costly.
The second part of the present chapter proposes a whistle-blowing mechanism as a 
collusion-breaking device. There the agents blow the whistle after collusion with positive 
probability, and, depending on the rewards and penalties, we show that the principal is 
strictly better off than by breaking the collusion with money (the collusion-proof solution.) 
We also show that if tougher penalties are allowed, the principal breaks collusion altogether. 
The agents do not collude in the reporting stage, out of fear of being exposed by their fellow 
agent. Interestingly, the principal may also break collusion by adopting non-monetary 
penalties. For example, the principal may fire a worker who has participated in corruptive 
activities, and if that is costly for the worker - which is quite plausible - that may prevent 
collusion.
This chapter is related to the literature of collusion in hierarchies. The current 
theoretical literature of collusion has assumed it as given so far that production and 
monitoring tasks are separated and exogenously assigned to workers.4 This chapter builds on 
Chapter 2, where the idea that often many agents hold valuable information and that 
collusion appears more often as a form of non-monetary side transfers was introduced. That 
chapter showed that optimal use of information is endogenously determined, and some 
organisational forms are trivially collusion-proof. Sometimes the best response is to ignore 
one source of information, since doing so blocks collusion. This chapter in turn examines 
whether the principal can do any better than ignore information.
The papers closest to the present one are Felli (1996), Kofman and Lawarree (1996) 
and Acemoglu (1995).5 Acemoglu analyses how implicit collusion may arise in agency 
relations between a manager and an auditor. The manager has the authority to hire the 
auditor, and because of this the auditor may withhold information from the shareholders not
4See Tirole (1992) for a survey of this literature. The only decision concerning task 
allocation which is somehow endogenous is a decision to hire a supervisor in the first place. 
However, if the supervisor were not hired, one would be back in a normal principal-agent 
model, and collusion would not be a problem. Therefore, to make a hierarchy model 
interesting and collusion, possible the supervisor is typically always hired, and his services 
are used.
5 See also Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990), who analyse side-trading among agents in their 
multi-task model.
64
in order to receive monetary bribes, but rather due to his own career concerns. In Acemoglu's 
study the task of the auditor is to find out the type of a project which an empire-builder 
manager is running, and to report what he finds to the shareholders. The type of the project 
is not observed by the shareholders, and thus there is asymmetric information between the 
shareholders and the manager. When the auditor announces that the project is a bad one, 
Acemoglu defines that as whistle-blowing, and discusses how an auditor should be rewarded 
for his task. However, there the auditor is simply doing what he is supposed to do. Whether 
we should call this whistle-blowing or not is not clear. The type of whistle-blowing 
Acemoglu considers is known in sociological and management literature as role-prescribed 
whistle-blowing. Whistle-blowing is just part of the auditor's job. He is expected to report 
any wrongdoing.
Felli (1996) analyses monetary collusion problems in a three-tier hierarchy model 
where an agent who is the only productive unit in an organisation may collude with a 
supervisor. He shows that by using an augmented revelation mechanism, a principal is able 
to achieve a collusion-free solution. In particular, the principal is able to achieve a collusion- 
free equilibrium because the supervisor has the discretion to exploit the agent's private 
information, which he learns during collusion negotiations; therefore an agent never accepts 
any collusion offers from the supervisor. Felli (1996) shows that this corresponds to the 
situation where the supervisor has the authority to choose contracts for the agent.
Kofman and Lawarree (1996) analyse how a principal deters monetary collusion 
between an agent and an auditor by hiring a separate auditor who may also collude with the 
agent. They show that the principal is able to achieve a collusion-free solution by doubling 
the number of auditors. In particular, independent auditors play a prisoner's dilemma type of 
game. They also show that by sending auditors with probability less than one and sometimes 
informing the second auditor of his position, the principal prevents collusion between the 
agent and the auditors. In their model the first and second auditor are not able to collude 
between themselves. In contrast to Kofman and Lawarree, in our case the agents who are 
involved in production and monitoring (working thus as an "auditor") themselves are able 
to collude.
The present chapter shares some lines of thought with all the above papers. However, 
this work is, to the best of my knowledge, the first one to analyse whistle-blowing as a
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collusion-breaking device. The emphasis here is to consider non-role-prescribed whistle­
blowing as an incentive device.6 That means that whistle-blowing is not the primary purpose 
for which the agents are hired. Rather, they are hired to perform production and monitoring 
tasks. In addition to those activities the agents can, if they observe some wrongdoing, blow 
the whistle and collect a reward. Here effective whistle-blowing ensures that the agents do 
not collude at the reporting stage.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2 the model is presented, 
and the main analysis is carried out in section 3.3. Section 3.4 discusses some interpretations 
of the present model. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Model
The Parties
Consider a principal (P) who is the risk-neutral owner of a firm which comprises two 
production processes ("machines 1 and 2"). The principal hires two risk-neutral agents to 
work with the machines. The production processes can be characterized simply by production 
functions, fj(t), i=l,2 and where t=time. Thus, output depends only on the hours that the 
agents work. The two production functions, fj(t), i=l,2 are identical, and have the following 
properties: f '() > 0, f  "() < 0, f(0) = 0, f '() = °°, when t=0, and f '() = 0, when t -  1.
Assumption 3.1 Time, t is observable, verifiable and thus contractible.
Both agents have some private information concerning their types that is not observed by the 
principal. There is a fixed adverse selection parameter, 0{ associated with agent i. 0; is a 
worker-specific fixed cost of working. We assume that 0; belongs to the binary support 
{0i < 0}, 0, < 0 j , and A0j = 0j - 0 j, i=A,B. It is also assumed that p=probability{0j = 0 j} 
and (l-p)=probability{0i = that the types are identically and independently
6 See Near and Miceli (1995), who discuss the difference between role-prescribed and 
non-role-prescribed whistle-blowing.
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distributed. Later, we refer to Bj as a bad (inefficient, high-cost) type and 0; as a good 
(efficient, low-cost) type.
When the agent diverts some time away from production to monitoring, he observes 
with probability P(t) the fellow worker’s type. The agent can then report it to the principal. 
Hence, the informational rents the principal has to pay are reduced. The monitoring task 
involves a monitoring function, P(t), that also has "normal properties": P'O > 0, P"0 < 0, P(0) 
= 0, P(l)=l, and P/0 = °°, when t=0, i= 1,2.
Assumption 3.2 The total working time available for production and monitoring activities 
is two units (t=2).
Each worker’s working hours are given, and the hours are normalized to 1; the working hours 
can be allocated to production and monitoring tasks. Agent i's time constraint is then simply 
1 = tim + (l-tj1”), where t™ stands for time allocated to monitoring activities. The idea behind 
this assumption is to constrain our analysis here to the principal's problem of how to divide 
fixed working hours between different activities. Many modem organisations share this 
feature. Workers are expected to work, say, 8 hours per day, and these 8 hours are divided 
between different tasks.
The principal controls the agents simply by allocating the working hours between 
different activities. In effect, the principal chooses output levels and the expected cost savings 
by time-allocation decisions. In this model the wages are purely determined by monitoring 
reports. Within the model there are no moral hazard problems, and the only problem is 
related to the fixed adverse selection parameters that allow the efficient agents to earn the 
informational rent. Note that in the present model production levels are not contingent on the 
agents' types as in a normal adverse selection model. Here the agents do not report their 
own types to the principal. We come back to this later in this section.
The contract the principal offers A and B has to satisfy individual rationality (IR) 
constraints ex-post, say, due to limited liability:
[/.(e(.)=w,(e,)-e(ao v e(e(0.,e), i=a,b.  (3 .i)
Whatever the agent's type is, ex-post utility can not be negative. To make our analysis more
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tractable, the following assumption is made:
Assumption 3.3 The principal wants to produce even with the bad type, and does not want 
to separate the agents' types without further information. The principal offers only one wage
W;(0i)=B,
When offering Wj(0j)= Bi? the principal wants to produce even with the high-cost type and 
does not want to run the risk that the high-cost type will decline to work. This is precisely 
captured by a condition: f;(t) - 0 > p (fj(t) - 0), which we assume always holds. It is therefore 
optimal to offer w4 = 0j, i= A,B.7 Consequently, ex post Uj = 0 and U; = A0{. Assumption 3.3 
is made without loss of generality to make the analysis of time allocation more tractable. 
Thanks to it we can concentrate purely on the principal's time allocation under potential 
collusion.
Information Structure
If an agent’s working hours are allocated to monitoring activities, he learns his fellow agent’s 
type with positive probability. If, for example, A spends tAm hours monitoring, he learns B’s 
type with probability P(tAm). And similarly for B. When the agent has learned the other 
agent’s type, he can report it to the principal. That report is hard information, meaning that 
he can report it to the principal in a verifiable matter. It is further assumed that monitoring 
information is hard in the sense that the agent can not modify the signal he has learned, but 
can only conceal it.
To reduce the cases we have to consider, we assume that agent i may learn new 
information about agent j only if agent j is of an efficient (low-cost) type. Then, given that 
he has learned a signal o={0}, he can report, r={0,0 .}; and if he has not learned a signal, 
0=0, then he can report only r=0 . If agent j is of an inefficient (high-cost) type, agent i learns 
nothing. In other words, learning that agent j is inefficient does not have any value, and in
7The simplifying of Assumption 3.3 and the way information structure is modelled are 
both borrowed from Tirole's (1992) “bare bones” model.
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particular the principal does not learn anything new.
Since the principal is unable to observe types and signals, it is clear that with the aid 
of new additional information provided by the agents, the principal’s welfare increases. The 
principal cannot distinguish whether an agent has observed a signal or not when he receives 
a report r=0 . This, of course, facilitates information manipulation within a model.
For later purposes it is important to notice that an agent learns whether another agent 
has learned a signal. This, in turn, implies that collusion occurs under symmetric information, 
and then the agents observe the signals, which greatly simplifies the analysis of side- 
contracting. Even though the agents collude under symmetric information, we make the 
following assumption:
Assumption 3.4 The agent is not able to prove to the principal in a verifiable manner whether 
the other agent was informed or not.
This means that when A has learned a signal oA={0B}, he can prove it to the principal by a 
verifiable report Ra. =0B. When collusion takes place under conditions of symmetric 
information, A also learns that B has learned A’s type. However, it is assumed that A is 
unable to prove to the principal whether B was informed or not without some further 
evidence. We come back to this in section 3.3.2.
The reason why monitoring is profitable is the following. Since the wages are purely 
determined by monitoring reports, the efficient (low-cost) type’s informational rent can be 
reduced by monitoring. If there is no monitoring or if monitoring does not provide new 
information, the principal pays Wj=Bj.8 If new information is received, Wj=0j, i=A,B. Due to 
this wage contract, the agents' expected utility is:
^ = [ l-P ( r /) ] ^ + P ( r /) ^ -a = A 0r P(f.M)A0 .,
_______  (3.2)
U=w.-Q = 0, i=A,B, i*j.
8 The reason why Wj=Bi is still optimal is that once the principal receives a report r=0 he 
updates the probability for the efficient type according to Bayes’ rule: prob{0= 0, r=o} = 
p (l-P(t)) / (p (1-P(t)) + (1-p)), which is smaller than p. Now recall the condition: 
fj(t) - 0 > p (fj(t) - 0). Therefore, it still is optimal to offer Wj=0j .
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The principal benefits from monitoring due to the reduced informational rent the efficient 
type earns. Without monitoring, the principal pays an informational rent equal to A0i5 and 
thanks to monitoring the principal pays : A0; - P(tjm)A0i, i=A,B, and i*j. The inefficient 
type's (IR) constraint binds always, and he does not earn any informational rents.
It is important to realize that after an agent has been offered and has accepted a 
contract where wages are determined as in (3.2), agent i has no incentive to lie when 
reporting a signal he has learned about the fellow worker. In particular, since a signal is hard 
information, an agent can not increase his own welfare by individually concealing the signal.
In the present model the agents do not report their own types at all. Alternatively, we 
could have considered a different model, where agents report their types at stage 1, and where 
the principal's time allocation decision would then be based on these announcements. 
However, that model would, in effect, be almost identical to the present one, because there 
also the problem of collusion would arise. Moreover, the principal faces there a commitment 
problem, because monitoring is costly. By committing to monitor ex post after high cost type 
has been announced the principal can deter the efficient type from not claiming to be the 
inefficient one. But then monitoring ex post is costly, because it takes working hours away 
from production. Moreover, the principal knows that he will not learn anything new, since 
only the inefficient types announce high cost. The principal would be better off by not 
allocating time to monitoring after high-cost announcements. After reasoning this, the agents 
would therefore always prefer to claim to be inefficient types. The best the principal can do 
is to monitor always (irrespective of what has been announced) and pay wi=0 i if he does not 
get any new information.
The principal is the risk-neutral owner of an organisation and maximizes expected
profits:
E H = E \ f l ( t )  +/2(0 - ” B ]  = f xi t )  +/2(0 ~ E [ w a  + w b } .  (3.3)
The principal's problem is to allocate fixed working hours between production and 
monitoring tasks in a profit-maximizing way.9 When making this decision, he faces a simple,
9The price of output has been normalized to one.
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yet fundamental trade-off: working hours allocated to monitoring are lost from production. 
The organisation comprises two production and two monitoring tasks and all of them are 
delegated to A and B.10 For later purposes it is useful to recall that monitoring has a positive 
effect on the principal's welfare, but a negative effect on the workers’ welfare. This latter is 
precisely the reason why collusion may arise when the agents cross-monitor one another.
Collusion
Before turning to the analysis, a few words about collusion are in order. The mode of 
collusion we consider here is based on the simultaneous exchange of favours within a 
coalition as developed in Chapter 2. The agents collude to conceal private information they 
have learned about each other from the principal. By jointly concealing information from the 
principal, they are able to earn higher wages due to the informational rents.
Since we consider non-monetary side-transfers, collusion can take place only when 
both A and B are efficient and have learned one another's types. Only in that case can favours 
be exchanged simultaneously. In contrast to monetary collusion, this type of collusion does 
appear on the factory floor. For example, workers may cover each other’s mistakes or jointly 
conceal some unfavourable information from their immediate superiors, and so on.
The crucial question concerning side contracts is their enforceability. Of course, due 
to the informal nature and illegality of side contracts, they cannot be enforced in a court. 
Therefore, in the literature, enforceability is taken to be the case by assumption, and this is 
also the starting point here. Note, however, that with the type of collusion we consider 
enforceability is a less serious problem, since the collusion takes place in the reporting stage, 
and no further actions are needed. Moreover, there is no need for ex-post monetary transfers 
from one agent to the other.
In the present chapter our interest lies in the question why, apart from their being 
illegal and thus unenforceable, agents may be unable to strike profitable side contracts. We 
show that there are some fairly simple ways the principal can affect side-contracting 
opportunities. So as a first step we take it for granted that if agents agree on a side contract,
10We are implicitly assuming here that hiring more agents is too expensive compared 
to the expected benefits the principal would gain. In the next section we show that the 
principal is able to break collusion easily by hiring a third worker.
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they will follow it (ex-ante information manipulation). As a second step we analyse how the 
principal is able to reduce profitable side-contracting opportunities by task assignment and 
by introducing whistle-blowing as a collusion-breaking device.
Timing
The timing of the model is as follows:
The Main Production A reports rA Wage
Contract Monitoring B reports rB Payments
0-------------------- 1-------------------- 2-------------------3--------------------- 4-------------------- 5---------- > t
A learns 0A Side Deals
B learns 6B
At stage 0 the agents learn their own types. At stage 1 the principal offers the main 
contract. At stage 2 both agents accomplish production and monitoring tasks as specified 
in the main contract. At stage 3 agents are able to agree on side deals, which are based on 
information they learned at stage 2. At stage 4 the agents report. Finally, at stage 5 the 
principal rewards A and B according to the main contract.
3.3 The Analysis
3.3.1 Breaking Collusion by Task Assignment
This section considers the principal’s time allocation problem when agents are able 
to collude, and possible ways the principal can break collusion. We start by stating the first- 
best result under perfect information. After that we consider time allocation under a 
collusion-free regime, which will be our reference point for the later analysis. Next we 
consider time allocation under potential collusion and derive the collusion-proof equilibrium, 
where the principal breaks collusion with money. At the end of this section we consider how 
the principal can break collusion by task assignment. It is shown that collusion can be broken
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by assigning tasks in such a way that no favours can be exchanged. In effect, this means that 
at least one agent has to be unmonitored.
Under conditions of perfect information there is no need for monitoring, and all 
available time will be allocated to production. There is nothing to optimise: all available 
working hours are allocated to production, and both agents work full-time with the 
"machines". It is not optimal to leave any time unused. Thus, we have:
L e m m a  3 . 1 .  U n d e r  p e r f e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  a l l  a v a i l a b l e  t i m e  i s  a l l o c a t e d  f o r  p r o d u c t i o n :  t " l* = 0 .  
T h e  w a g e  Wj = 0j, 0j = {gj,Bj}, a n d  Uj= Wj - 0{ = 0, V 0j6{0j,Bj}.
Next we turn to the case of asymmetric information. The principal's problem is to 
minimize the informational rents the agents are able to earn due to their private information. 
To reduce informational rents (wages), the principal allocates working hours also to 
monitoring. Note, however, that the opportunity cost of monitoring is reduced output due to 
the fact that now less time is available for production. However, the benefits of additional 
information more than outweigh the reduced output. When all available working hours are 
allocated to production, the last unit of time in the production task is very inefficient, f'(l) 
= 0. Now those units can be allocated to very effective monitoring activity, since P'(0)=°°.
The principal chooses the working hours the agent spends in each activity in such a 
way that at the optimum the marginal productivity of each task is the same. If this were not 
the case, the principal could increase his expected profits by transferring time from the less 
efficient activity to the more efficient one.
Under a collusion-free regime, the agents are rewarded according to the main 
contract, which gives them: Wj=0j, if ij = 0, and Wj=0j, if rj = 0i? i=A,B, j = A,B and i*j. Once 
the agent has been offered such a contract, he has no incentive to lie when reporting a signal 
he has learned about the fellow worker's type, because he can not increase his own welfare 
by individually concealing the signal. In the collusion-free case, the principal gets additional 
information about the agents at no further cost. The time allocation problem is:
Maxt . r ]fx{\ - / ")+/2( 1 - O - E ^ + w J ]
J ‘  (3.4)
s . t .  (3.2).
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The full solution is derived in Appendix B. The optimal contract is a combination of the first- 
and second-best solutions. The time allocation between production and monitoring tasks is 
determined by the first-order conditions, which boil down to the two following condition:
A :  p y Am ) p A e B = f , - ( i - ‘ A\  (35)
B : p-(tB")pA6A% X \ - t ; ) .
The condition (3.5) has a very intuitive interpretation. The left-hand side stands for the 
expected savings in informational rents. The right-hand side is the marginal value of 
production. Due to the concavity of P(tjm) and f(l-tim), we see that the time allocated to 
monitoring increases when the probability of a good state, p, and the rent, A0j increase, since 
then time spent in the monitoring task becomes more valuable. The results of the collusion- 
free case can be stated as follows:
P r o p o s i t i o n  3 . 1  U n d e r  a  c o l l u s i o n - f r e e  r e g i m e ,  t h e  o p t i m a l  u n i q u e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  w o r k i n g  
h o u r s  b e t w e e n  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  m o n i t o r i n g  t a s k s  i s  s y m m e t r i c :  t Am * = t Bm * , a n d  m o s t  o f  t h e  
w o r k i n g  h o u r s  a r e  a l l o c a t e d  t o  p r o d u c t i o n ,  l - t , m * >  t" '* ,  i = A , B .  T h e  o p t i m a l  c o n t r a c t  i s  a  
c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i r s t -  a n d  s e c o n d - b e s t  s o l u t i o n s .
Proof: See Appendix B.
Under the collusion-free case, the agents' time allocation between the monitoring and the 
production tasks is independently determined. Thus we have:
C o r o l l a r y  3 . 1  W h e n  c o l l u s i o n  i s  n o t  a  p r o b l e m ,  t h e  w o r k e r s '  t i m e  a l l o c a t i o n  p r o b l e m s  c a n  
b e  s o l v e d  i n d e p e n d e n t l y .
Proof: To prove Corollary 3.1 it is enough to consider the first-order conditions. As is evident 
from (3.5), optimal t™ does not depend on tjm, i=j=A,B, and i*j. □
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In the collusion-free regime the principal can concentrate purely on time allocation, and each 
agent’s working hours are allocated to production and monitoring activities independently. 
This is due to a simple economic reason. Here an agent's utility is independent of the other 
agent's type. The principal is, of course, better off due to the lower wages he has to pay.
Now we are in a position to analyse the effects of potential collusion on the optimal 
time allocation. When the principal has offered the collusion-free contract, it is obvious that 
the agents can do better by jointly concealing information they have learned from the 
principal. However, collusion can take place only when both A and B are efficient and have 
learned one another’s types, since only then can they exchange favours simultaneously by 
jointly concealing the signals they have learned from the principal.
The principal can break collusion only by making the agents as well off as they would 
be when colluding. This means that the principal has to provide the agents the informational 
rents they would earn by colluding. When the principal satisfies a so-called coalition 
incentive constraint, the agents have no reason to collude. In other words, the principal breaks 
collusion with money. In the collusion-proof equilibrium, the coalition incentive constraint 
(CIC) has to be satisfied:
(3-6)
In the above, the left-hand side represents the agents'joint utility when they report truthfully 
the information they have learned (rA=0B rB=0A); it has to equal the right-hand side, which 
is what the agents could get by concealing information (rA=o rB=0). The time allocation 
problem under potential collusion is:
M a x t : t « \ f x{ \ - t ” )  +/2(1 - t Bm) - E ( w a  + w b ) }  (3
s . t .  (3.2),(3.6).
The full solution can be found in Appendix B. It is a combination of the first- and the 
second-best solutions as in the collusion-free case. The principal's welfare is, however, 
reduced due to the binding CIC constraint, and thus also the optimal time allocation differs. 
At the optimum, the following time allocation conditions have to be satisfied simultaneously:
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A : P /(/7)^A0s(l -pP(tBm)) =/,'( 1 - tA")
B: P '(tBm) p A Q / l  -pP(tAm))= 4( \~ tB ).
The left-hand side of (3.8) implies that the expected savings are now lower than in the 
collusion-free case (recall (3.6)). Therefore, at the optimum, less time is allocated to 
monitoring than in the collusion-free case: t™" < tjm*,i = A, B. We can summarise the results 
of the collusion-proof case as follows:
P r o p o s i t i o n  3 . 2  I n  t h e  c o l l u s i o n - p r o o f  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  t h e  o p t i m a l  u n i q u e  t i m e  a l l o c a t i o n  
b e t w e e n  t h e  a g e n t s  i s  a l s o  a  s y m m e t r i c  o n e ,  b u t  l e s s  t i m e  i s  a l l o c a t e d  t o  m o n i t o r i n g  a n d  m o r e  
t o  p r o d u c t i o n  t h a n  i n  t h e  c o l l u s i o n - f r e e  s o l u t i o n :  t " 1** <  t" '* ,  i  =  A ,  B .  T h e  o p t i m a l  c o n t r a c t  
p r o v i d e s  f o r  b o t h  A  a n d  B  a  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i r s t  a n d  s e c o n d  b e s t  s o l u t i o n s .
Proof: See Appendix B.
Due to the possibility of collusion, the principal has to provide the informational rents the 
agents as a "monitoring wage". Hence, monitoring becomes less effective, and therefore less 
time is allocated to monitoring activities.The following important corollary follows directly 
from the first-order conditions:
C o r o l l a r y  3 . 2  U n d e r  p o t e n t i a l  c o l l u s i o n ,  t h e  o p t i m a l  t i m e  a l l o c a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  a g e n t s  i s  
i n t e r d e p e n d e n t .
Proof: To see this, consider, for example, A's time allocation condition in (3.8). The optimal 
time A spends in monitoring (tAm**} is negatively related to the time B spends in monitoring 
activities.Taking the cross derivative with respect to tBm A’s time allocation condition 
becomes: - P’(tAm) p A0 P’(tBm) <0 □
The interdependency under collusion is an important and very interesting result. 
Indeed, it shows that the possibility of collusion changes the optimal time allocation, and, 
moreover, it makes totally independent production processes and time allocation problems
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interdependent. The principal can no longer allocate the agents' working hours separately.
In the above we have seen that breaking collusion through time allocation and by 
satisfying the coalition incentive constraint is costly, since the principal breaks collusion with 
money. It is evident that collusion is an issue as long as reciprocal monitoring exists. But 
then a simple question arises: would it be optimal to break collusion by assigning tasks in 
such a way that the agents can not exchange any favours and the coalition incentive 
constraint does not have to be satisfied?
Clearly, the way to break collusion is to create asymmetric time allocation, which 
means that with two agents, at least one of them must be left unmonitored. But this is the 
solution we already know from Chapter 2. Rather than elaborating on that further, we want 
to show that the principal may also break collusion by assigning one of the monitoring tasks 
to an uninterested third party.
Recall the principal’s time constraint of two units of time. So far we have explicitly 
ruled out the possibility of hiring more workers. Assume now, for a moment, that the 
principal is able to hire a third worker with a fixed cost F. Now it is easy to show that with 
the help of a third worker the principal prevents collusion altogether; moreover, this is done 
within the time constraint. Indeed, we can show that the principal implements a collusion- 
free outcome.
The idea is simple. The principal hires a third agent to do one of the monitoring tasks. 
Then the principal is able to assign tasks in such a way that no favours can be exchanged. 
This can be implemented in the following way. A produces for (1- tAm*) hours and monitors 
B for tAm* hours. B only produces for (1- tcm*) hours, and a third agent, C, monitors A for 
tcm* hours. Under this task assignment structure, B can not do any favours for A, and A in 
turn can not do favours for C; therefore, there is no room for collusion, and the principal 
breaks collusion by hiring an extra worker and reallocating the working hours. Note that the 
principal’s time allocation under the above task assignments coincides with the time 
allocation of the collusion-free solution. Since the extra worker is costly, the decision how 
to break collusion becomes endogenous:
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P r o p o s i t i o n  3 . 3  I f  t h e  f i x e d  c o s t  o f  h i r i n g  a  t h i r d  a g e n t  i s  n o t  t o o  h i g h ,  i t  i s  b e t t e r  f o r  t h e  
p r i n c i p a l  t o  b r e a k  c o l l u s i o n  b y  h i r i n g  a n  e x t e r n a l  m o n i t o r .  I f  t h e  f i x e d  c o s t  a r e  h i g h ,  i t  i s  
b e t t e r  t o  b r e a k  c o l l u s i o n  w i t h  m o n e y  a n d  a d j u s t  t h e  t i m e  a l l o c a t i o n  a c c o r d i n g l y .
Proof: See Appendix B.
This is a very interesting and important result, because it implies that one should be able to 
build a simple theory which tells us when a new worker should be hired. Here that decision 
is driven purely by the principal's concern for potential collusion, rather than for any 
technological reasons.
The more general implication is that, given that the agents collude by exchanging 
favours due to reciprocal monitoring, it is always possible to break collusion by hiring an 
extra worker whose only task is to monitor and who himself is not monitored. Then all 
remaining monitoring tasks can be assigned in such a way that no reciprocal monitoring 
exists, and thus collusion is not a problem.
Since, however, our main interest in the present chapter is to consider collusion- 
breaking in the case where there are only two workers, we introduce in the next section a 
whistle-blowing mechanism as a collusion-breaking device. Indeed, we are able to show that 
under some conditions, the principal is able to break collusion with lower costs than by 
simply offering the collusion-proof contract with adjusted time allocation.
3.3.2 Whistle-Blowing as a Collusion-Breaking Device
This section considers a simple whistle-blowing mechanism as a collusion-breaking 
device. In particular, we consider whether the principal is able to achieve the collusion-free 
outcome of Proposition 3.1 by adopting an organisation policy which promotes whistle­
blowing. It is shown that with appropriate rewards and penalties, the whistle-blowing 
mechanism guarantees strictly higher profits than does the collusion-proof solution. And if 
more severe penalties are allowed, the principal achieves the performance of the collusion- 
free solution at no further cost.
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Before going any further, it would be useful to state precisely what whistle-blowing 
means in the present context. In our model whistle-blowing refers to a situation where, after 
collusion has taken place, agent i reports to the principal that agent j lied when he reported 
that he did not learn anything. However, whistle-blowing is possible only when agent i 
receives hard information (evidence) which facilitates his task of proving that agent j was 
actually informed about the signal even though he reported otherwise. In the following we 
assume:
Assumption 3.5 Given that collusion has taken place, then with probability y A  (yB) A (B) 
receives hard information with which he is able to prove whether B (A) was informed about 
the signal oB={0A} (oA={0B}) or not.
It is precisely this new additional hard information, which we assume arrives exogenously, 
that facilitates whistle-blowing. Agent i may now turn in agent j to the principal: "Agent j 
was actually informed about the signal even though he reported otherwise, and here is the 
evidence". An alternative and maybe more intuitive way to express the idea of new 
additional hard information is to assume that there is a third agent, and the hard information 
about collusion (wrongdoing) reaches him. This allows him to blow the whistle and inform 
the principal that collusion has taken place.11
As pointed out in the introduction, the type of whistle-blowing we examine is a so- 
called non-prescribed whistle-blowing. The agents are hired to perform production and 
monitoring tasks, and whistle-blowing is not their priority task. It works as an additional 
incentive device to ensure that the primary tasks are well executed. Here, that means the 
agents do not collude at the reporting stage.
Note that within the time line there is now a new stage for a whistle-blower, who can 
act after the official reporting stage, given that he has learned some additional information.
11 Whistle-blowing should be encouraged only when hard information about wrongdoing 
is available. If no evidence is required from the whistle-blower, it leads to situations where 
innocent persons will be punished. This is especially the case where an agent can not prove 
that he was uninformed when it has been claimed otherwise. See Okuno-Fujiwara, 
Postlewaite and Suzumura (1990) for a similar situation where an agent can not prove his 
own ignorance.
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We assume the absence of any coordination at the whistle-blowing stage due to the fact that 
there is no official point in the time line when whistle-blowing should take place. There is 
only an interval between the reports and the payments, and the agents are unable to control 
one another.
The above is, of course, an assumption, but we believe it captures well the whistle­
blowing arrangements adapted in practice. Consider, for example, a case where a firm has 
installed a telephone hot-line that workers can use to announce corruptive activities in an 
organisation. In that case coordination among the whistle-blowers is very difficult if not 
impossible to achieve or to sustain.
We are now ready to describe the whistle-blowing mechanism. Given that collusion 
has taken place at the reporting stage, then with probabilities yA and Yb the agents learn 
information which facilitates whistle-blowing. The whistle-blowing device is as follows. The 
agent who blows the whistle first will be rewarded, and the second agent will be penalized. 
By manipulating rewards and penalties, the principal creates a situation where whistle­
blowing becomes a dominant strategy when an agent has learned additional information 
which facilitates whistle-blowing. More generally, the introduction of a whistle-blowing 
mechanism makes an agent unable to commit not to blow the whistle ex post, since that is 
a profit-maximizing strategy. This, in turn, destroys the possibility for collusion at the 
reporting stage, when the penalties are high enough. And if the penalties are very mild, the 
agents are unable to fully realize the benefits of collusion, since whistle-blowing makes 
collusion less profitable for the agents. The principal is better off even though he may be 
unable to prevent collusion with probability one.
We consider next different combinations of rewards and penalties the principal may 
use in preventing collusion. In the following we assume that the toughest penalty for being 
found participating in collusion is that the agent’s information rent is "taxed away". That is, 
the agent is held at his reservation utility level. In the following we show that within the 
model of non-prescribed whistle-blowing, a reward for the exposer has to be related to the 
gains from collusion.
Suppose that the principal offers the collusion-free contract. As we have shown 
earlier, collusion may now arise. Assume further that the main contract includes the 
following clause: "If I, the principal, receive information about collusion, then all agents will
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be penalised by taxing their informational rents away."
Consider, for example, A, who is considering whether to collude or not. If there is no 
collusion, the agents report truthfully and both of them get their reservation utility:
Uj = 0, i=A, B. If, instead, A and B collude, then ex post after the reporting stage, an agent 
i, who has on his possession a piece of verifiable information showing that agent j was 
actually informed, has to decide whether to blow the whistle or not. Given that the principal 
does not provide any reward for a whistle-blower, but imposes penalties for both agents, we 
have:
L e m m a  3 . 3  W i t h o u t  a  r e w a r d ,  a n d  g i v e n  t h a t  t h e  p e n a l t i e s  a r e  a s  d e f i n e d  a b o v e ,  n o  w h i s t l e ­
b l o w i n g  i s  o b s e r v e d ,  a n d  w e  h a v e  a  c o l l u s i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  w i t h  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  p 2P ( t A m) P ( t /  ”) .
Proof: To prove this needs only two steps. Firstly, given that collusion has taken place and 
if A has learned additional information he must decide whether to blow the whistle or remain 
quiet, by blowing the whistle he gets:(l-yB)(0) + yB(0) = 0, and by remaining quiet he gets: 
(l-yB)(A0i) + Yb(0) = (1-y b)(A0 ). Clearly, it is a dominant strategy to remain quiet, and 
similarly for B. Therefore, the expected profits from collusion are (1-Ya)(1-Yb)(A0i)+ 
(l-YA)(YB)(A0i)+yA(l-YB)(A0i)+YAYB(A0i) = A0j > 0, i= A, B, because nobody blows the 
whistle. Thus, when possible, the agents always collude and nobody blows the whistle. □
Here we have collusion in an equilibrium with a positive probability, and, furthermore, 
nobody blows the whistle. The clear implication is that the principal has to provide the 
informational rent the agent who blows the whistle, because otherwise no agent would ever 
choose to do so. The reward for a whistle-blower has to be related to the gains from 
collusion.
Assume now that the principal rewards the agent who blows the whistle first by 
allowing him to keep his informational rent and giving him a small additional reward, e. In 
this case the collusion-free contract is supplemented by the following clause: "If I, the 
principal, receive information about collusion, then the first agent who blows the whistle can 
keep his informational rent and he will get an additional reward. The other agent will be 
penalised by taxing his informational rent away.”
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For an agent who has a piece of verifiable information that facilitates whistle­
blowing, it becomes a dominant strategy to blow the whistle. This is because only the agent 
who blows the whistle first collects a reward, and the other agent will be punished. We have:
P r o p o s i t i o n  3 . 4 .  W i t h  t h e  a b o v e  r e w a r d s  a n d  p e n a l t i e s ,  w e  h a v e  a  w h i s t l e - b l o w i n g  
e q u i l i b r i u m  w i t h  p o s i t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  w h e r e  e i t h e r  A  o r  B  b l o w s ,  o r  b o t h  b l o w ,  t h e  w h i s t l e ,  
a n d  a  c o l l u s i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  p 2P ( t / ) P ( t A" )  ( 1 - y J ( 1 ~ Y b) -
Proof: See Appendix B
In contrast to the earlier result, here we have a case where in an equilibrium we have 
collusion and whistle-blowing with positive probability. The economics behind Proposition 
3.3 is fairly straightforward. The main point is that the introduction of a whistle-blowing 
mechanism reduces the costs of potential collusion, and the principal is better off. 
Consequently, more time is allocated to monitoring, because whistle-blowing has made it 
more effective. Now, given that the probability of hard information about wrongdoing 
increases, more time can be allocated to monitoring activities, and the optimal time allocation 
approaches that of the collusion-free case. The principal's welfare increases and approaches 
the one of the collusion-free equilibrium. Indeed, under the whistle-blowing mechanism, the 
principal is better off than by satisfying the coalition incentive constraint by offering the 
collusion-proof contract with a modified time allocation. Note that this is true since the 
savings in informational rents (A0) are higher than the small reward (e) the principal has to 
pay the first whistle-blower, when yA and yB increase. Interestingly, under the whistle­
blowing scheme it may also be the case that in an equilibrium we have collusion.
In the above we have restricted penalties in such a way that ex post an agent's IR 
constraint has to be satisfied ex-post even in that when he is caught for collusion. If this is 
relaxed, it is easy to show that collusion can be broken altogether. Interestingly, an 
organisation designer may not have to use tougher monetary penalties to achieve this. 
Consider the following penalty scheme, which may be more realistic. Let the rewards be the 
same as above, but let the penalty structure be the following. If both agents blow the whistle, 
then both agents’ informational rent is taxed away, and they are allowed to stay in the
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organisation. But if only one agent blows the whistle, then he will be rewarded as above, and 
the other agent's informational rent will be taxed away; and in addition to this he will be 
fired. Assume also that an agent attaches a big negative utility, say - D, to being fired from 
an organisation. One may think of D as a loss of future benefits, pension, and so on. Then, 
the following corollary follows:
C o r o l l a r y  3 . 4  I f  m o r e  s e v e r e  p e n a l t i e s  a r e  a l l o w e d ,  w h i c h ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  a r e  n o t  e x e c u t e d  i n  a n  
e q u i l i b r i u m ,  a  s y m m e t r i c  c o l l u s i o n - f r e e  o u t c o m e  c a n  b e  s u p p o r t e d  w i t h  n o  a d d i t i o n a l  c o s t .
Proof: The first step is to show that, given that if an agent - say A - has learned new hard 
information it is a dominant strategy to blow a whistle, by blowing the whistle he gets: 
(l-YB)(A0i +<x) + yB(0) = (l-YB)(A0i +a), and by remaining quiet: (l-YB)(A0i) + Yb(-D)> 
where D is large. Clearly then it is a dominant strategy for A to blow the whistle, and that is 
true for B as well. This, in turn, implies that the expected utility from collusion:(l-YA)(l-  
YB)(A0i)+(l-YA)(YB)(-D)+YA(l-YB)(A0i+e)+YAYB(O) < 0, i= A, B. Therefore, nobody tries to 
collude, and thus we have no whistle-blowing either. □
The important point, thus, is that the more severe penalties do not necessarily have 
to be monetary penalties. For example, here the penalty is a combination of monetary and 
non-monetary punishments: rents are taxed away as above, and a worker is fired. In practice, 
this type of punishment may be very effective, and if a worker has been fired because he has 
participated in corruptive activities it may be a very efficient punishment. The worker may, 
for example, be excluded from any vacancies in civil service. Similarly, an employer may 
refuse to give references, and make it explicitly known why a worker was fired. These all 
may work as very efficient punishments, and more importantly the agents' wealth is not a 
constraint here in imposing punishments. No doubt, this type of punishment is a far more 
important control mechanism in civil service than the monetary penalties.
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3.4 A Discussion: Some Interpretations
Separation of Monitoring and Production Tasks
In general, all organisations where favours can be exchanged between members of an 
organisation are potentially corruptible. Therefore, the monitoring and production tasks are 
often separated and carried out by different actors. One recent real-life example of this is 
related to the monitoring of MPs' outside interests in the United Kingdom.12 The main point 
in this discussion has been that earlier internal control by fellow MPs (cross monitoring) has 
not worked well enough. Therefore, an independent monitoring committee has been 
established. This is a clear response from "the principal" to break potential collusion, 
mutually beneficial information manipulation by separating policy-making and monitoring 
tasks.13
Similar kinds of arrangements where an agent's or a unit's main task and the 
monitoring task have been separated from one another can be found in many real-life 
situations. For example, in big multinational firms, accounting departments of different 
subsidiaries do not monitor (audit) one another. Typically, auditing is performed by separate 
auditing units or independent auditing firms. That is, book-keeping and auditing tasks are 
separated and carried out by different units. Similarly, in politics, decision-making and 
monitoring tasks are separated from one another. In the UK, for example, Government offices 
do not monitor one another, but a particular office is monitored by a respective shadow 
minister.
In the main analysis we have, however, shown that it may actually be beneficial to 
have non-specialisation task structure; yet, as we have seen above, there are plenty of real-life 
examples where specialisation has been chosen. An interesting question arises: is there too 
much specialisation in practice?
12The Economist 1995,25 Feb and The Financial Times 1 Aug 1995.
13Among the police forces similar accusations about internal investigation procedures 
have been made public.The problem indeed is that "a policeman is policing himself'.
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The Structure of Accounting and Documenting Systems
It is important to note that an organisation designer may actually increase the 
probability that hard information about wrongdoing in an organisation becomes available by 
certain organisational arrangements. For one thing, he may smooth the path for a whistle­
blower by providing rewards and protection to persons who choose to blow the whistle. For 
example, in the US there are laws that provide protection for whistle-blowers.
Secondly, an organisation designer may reduce the number of corporate structures 
that facilitate cover-ups by increasing the number of people who are likely to know about 
possible wrongdoing and therefore capable of blowing the whistle. In practice, a measure 
taken by many organisations is to make the decision-making process more open, which 
creates information. Also, the ISO-9000 standard, as part of Total Quality Management, aims 
precisely at that by making all transactions in an organisation transparent to third parties. 
This type of measure improves the effectiveness of external auditing, and making it easier 
for an external auditor to discover wrongdoing, mistakes, etc.
In practice, accounting and documenting systems serve an important role which 
facilitates whistle-blowing. In many situations these documents reveal who in an organisation 
is informed about something, and in practice signatures in these documents work for this 
purpose. Imagine, for example, an auditor who has to sign documents which show what sort 
of material he has gone through in an auditing process. Later, these signatures may serve as 
evidence that the auditor and perhaps also a manager were informed about, say, the bad state 
of the company, etc. In a similar way, all signatures in contracts, documents, etc. are, in fact, 
evidence ex post that the persons who approved and signed those contracts were informed 
about them. The signature procedure in general can be interpreted in such a way that it 
ensures that different parties are informed enough to blow the whistle.
This type of situations arise also in politics. For example, when President Bush was 
running for the presidency, there was a heated debate whether he was informed about the 
Iran-Contra deal or not. His defence was precisely: "I was uninformed, I was out of the 
loop". Recently, a General Secretary of Nato, Willy Claes, had to resign, because he was 
involved in a bribery scandal. He also defended himself by claiming that he was uniformed 
about the bribes. However, some new evidence came up which proved that he was actually
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informed, and yet he had not blown the whistle.14
In the model presented here, an interpretation is that after collusion, an agent learns 
with some probability new hard information (e.g., documents) which facilitate whistle­
blowing. Of course, within the abstract model, this looks artificial; but in practice whistle­
blowing is generally facilitated by some verifiable information concerning wrongdoing.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have analysed different measures the principal may adopt in breaking 
collusion. In the first part of the chapter, we considered task assignment and time allocation 
in general as measures the principal may use. It was shown that, due to collusion, less time 
is allocated to monitoring than in the collusion-free case. More importantly, the time 
allocation is then interdependent, and the principal has to solve both agents’ time allocation 
problems simultaneously. Under the collusion-proof solution, the principal breaks collusion 
with money. It was also shown that the principal may implement the collusion-free situation 
with three agents under the time constraint by delegating one of the monitoring tasks to the 
hired third agent. On the whole, breaking collusion through task assignment is costly in one 
way or another.
In the second part we introduced a whistle-blowing mechanism that aims at 
discouraging the agents from colluding at the reporting stage. Depending on the penalties and 
rewards, we were able to show that the principal does strictly better than in the collusion- 
proof equilibrium. Moreover, if penalties for participating in collusion are high enough, the 
principal is able to prevent collusion with no further cost and reach a symmetric collusion- 
free solution. Interestingly, the principal is also able to break collusion by adopting a non­
monetary penalties.
In future, it might be interesting to look at how effective the measures adopted here 
are in breaking monetary collusion. Most obviously, the whistle-blowing mechanism will
14See more in Elliot and Willingham (1980), who discuss various aspects of management 
fraud, and especially its detection and deterrence.
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break monetary collusion as well. Also, it would be interesting to elaborate further the idea 
that potential collusion may be a factor that determines when new workers should be hired. 
One potential extension to the present model is to develop a model that also captures framing, 
an issue that was ignored here.
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Appendix B
The Proof of Proposition 3.1
The principal's problem of allocating working hours between production and monitoring 
tasks is as follows:
+/ 2( 1 ~ h ) ~ E ( w a  + w b ) ]  
s . t .  C/i=A0/-P(r/m)A0., (B.l)
U =  0, i  = j - A , B ,  i * j .
After substituting IR constraints into (B.l) and noticing that the principal pays w4 = 04 - 
unless he receives a report rj = 0i5 in which case he pays Wj = 0j - the principal's problem 
becomes:
M a x ,. , .  [7,(1 1P (t" )P (tB )(0A+0E)
*P 2(1 -/> ((7 ))/> (r/)(64 + 0;)+ p (l - p V d ^ ^ + e l )
+PJi>«;)(l-i>(r8"))(0 ;+0a) + (B.2)
P 2(1 -P ( t" ) ) (  i -P ( tB ))(WA*WB)
+P( i -p )o  -i>(rB”))(e^+e;)+(i - p ) p P d A ) ^ A +^
+d  - P)p( i - P d S M e ^ + f y + o  - P)( i - p x v e ; ) ] .
After optimizing (B.2) with respect to tAm and tBm, the first-order conditions boils down to:
— =-/,(! ~ 0 +P A0fi=O 
d t "
a (B.3)
— =-/2( i - C ) ^ V ) M 6 ,= o .^ ntdtB
Rewriting (B.3) we get the condition which determines the optimal time allocation under the 
collusion-free regime:
P'(^m)pA0y=/,(l -*/"), i  = j  - A  , B , i * j .  (B.4)
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At the optimum, the marginal productivity of each task has to be the same. If this were not 
the case, the principal could increase his profits by allocating working hours from the less 
productive task to the more productive one.
Let tAm* and tBm* be the solutions to the principal's problem. Since the problem is 
concave in tjm, a pair of solution (tAm*, tBm*) is a unique solution given any p and A0j, i=A,B. 
The optimal unique allocation of working hours is symmetric between the agents: tAm* = tBm\  
Figure 3.1 further characterizes time allocation:
Figure 3.1 Optimal Time Allocation under the Collusion-Free Regime.
f ( i - T )
In the figure a vertical dash line indicates the number of working hours allocated to 
monitoring activities: tjm\  and at the optimum P,(tim*)A0j = f(l-tjm*).
The optimal contract is a combination of the first- and second-best solutions:
Wj = Bj if q = 0 , and Wj = 0 if q = 0j. The efficient type earns an informational rent, A0j if 
another agent does not provide new information to the principal. The inefficient type's IR 
constraint binds: Uj = 0. The optimal time allocation is: t™* < (l-t™*), i= A, B. □
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The Proof of Proposition 3.2
The principal's problem is to allocate fixed working hours between the production and 
monitoring tasks under potential collusion. To break collusion the principal has to 
compensate A and B for revealing information they have learned: i.e., the principal has to 
match the gains from collusion. The principal does so by satisfying the coalition incentive 
constraint in a case where both A and B are efficient types and have learned the signals. This 
occurs with probability p2P(tAm)P(tBm). When the coalition incentive constraint is satisfied, 
the agents are as well off as they would be by colluding. Then they have no reason to conceal 
the signals they have learned. Since the rents are costly the coalition incentive constraint 
binds:
( W A ~!D +(ws-®a) =(V<Li) +( ( B . 4 )
The left-hand side represents the agents' joint utility when they report truthfully information 
they have learned (rA=0B) ^=0^; it has to match the right-hand side, which is the welfare the 
agents could get by concealing information (rA=o rB=o).
Note that in all other cases the principal does not have to pay the agents for the 
information they provide. This is due to the fact that there collusion is not a problem, since 
favours can not be exchanged and an agent can not increase his own welfare by individually 
concealing the signals. After substituting (CIC) and (IR) constraints for the principal's time, 
the allocation problem becomes:
Ma\ w  I W - 0 +f 2 v - h ) - \ p 2n < ; V ( ' , r ) ( V e >
p \  1 - / '( r ; ) )P ( rB")(0 i +0^)+p(l -p )i>( C ) ( 0 1+0^)+ 
p 2P ( t")(l -P (tBm))(Q~A*QR)+p 2(1 -? ( /”))( 1 - / - ( O x v e ;  (B.6)
+k i -p)o-/-(r”) ) ( e > e >  
( l-p )p P (O (^ +0a)+ 
(i -p)p(i - p ( O ) ( 0 > 0 > ( i  -p)(i -p xe> e;)].
After optimizing (B.6) with respect to tAm and tBm and simplifying the first-order conditions, 
we have a pair of equations:
— =-//(»  -<?)+r  ' ( ' > A 0 B(i -PP(tB")=o
6 ‘ a  (B.7)
—  = - //(  1 K ) P A6aO -pP(t")=o.a TtidtB
Let tAm** and tBm** be the solutions to the principal’s problem under potential collusion. 
Rewriting (B.7) gives us the optimal time allocation conditions:
P 'O p A e ^ l  -pP( te )= f[ ( \ - l " )
(B.8)
P 1 -p POa ) ^ ( 1 -< /)•
When we compare (B.8) to (B.4), we see that due to the possibility of collusion the expected 
savings are smaller, since the possibility of collusion has reduced the effectiveness of the 
monitoring activity. At the optimum, less time is allocated to monitoring activities and more 
to production: t/"** < t™*. In contrast to the collusion-free regime, the optimal time allocation 
is now interdependent, and, of course, the principal's welfare is lower. In Figure 3.2 this time 
allocation problem is further clarified.
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Figure 3.2 Optimal Time Allocation under the Collusion-Proof Solution.
f d - c ) f d - C )
p (
t
1
P ( t mB )
In Figure 3.2 the vertical continuous lines correspond to the optimal time allocation under 
the collusion-proof solution (t™” ), and the dash line shows the optimal time allocation under 
the collusion-free regime (tim*), i=A, B. The optimal contract offers: Wj = Bj if {rA= 0B rB= 
§a}. wi = if Tr 0 . wi = if rj= 5 i» H =A, B, i*j. And t™** < (l-t™**), i= A, B. □
Proof of Proposition 3. 3
Assume that the principal is able to hire a third agent with a fixed cost F, whose only task is 
to monitor. With the help of the third worker, the principal is able to implement the 
collusion-free outcome. The optimal time allocation corresponds to the time allocation of the 
collusion-free regime. A produces for (1- tAm*) hours and monitors B for tAm* hours. B only 
produces for (1- tcm*) hours and a third agent, say C, monitors A for tcm* hours.
Given that tasks are assigned in this way, A and B are unable to collude, because they 
can not exchange any favours. Note also that A can not do any favours for C, and thus 
collusion is not an issue. The benefits of hiring a third agent are clear, since it breaks 
collusion; but the cost side is the fixed cost of hiring the third worker. The principal's welfare
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with three agents is:
(B.14)
Recall the principal’s welfare under the collusion-proof solution:
(B.l 5)
Now, depending on n 3 - 7Tcp, the principal breaks collusion either with money by satisfying 
the coalition incentive constraint or by hiring a third agent. When (i)7t3 - 7tcp > 0, the principal 
prefers to hire an extra worker to monitor one of the agents, and when (ii) 7t3 - n cp < 0, the
The Proof of Proposition 3. 4
The first step is to show that blowing the whistle is a dominant strategy. The expected utility 
from blowing the whistle is EUf = yj (0) + (l-Yj)(A0i+e), which is higher than the expected 
utility from not blowing the whistle: EUj = Yj (0) + (l-Yj)(A0i), i=j= A,B, i*j. The agent will 
always blow the whistle if possible.
Secondly, note that the expected utility from collusion is higher than the utility from 
not colluding. Even though whistle-blowing may occur, the agents still willing to take a 
gamble, because they can not be worse off by colluding than by not colluding. The expected 
utility from collusion is: Yi [ Yj (0) + (1- Yj) (A0j + e) ] + (1- Yi)[ Yj (0) + (1- Yj) A0i ]
= (1- Yj) A0j + (1- Yj) Yie > i=j=A,B, i*j. Now we can also write the expected wages in 
the case where collusion and whistle-blowing take place: y A  Yb( S a + § b) + Ya 0" Yb) ( Ba
+ e + e„) + (1-Ya )Yb ( §A + 0 B + e) + (1-Ya ) (1-Yb) ( Ba + 9 b )
= B„ - y AA0B+ Ba - YBA0A+ e (y B-YAYB) + e(YA-YAYB). Notice that this stands for the
principal satisfies the coalition incentive constraint. Whenever the costs of collusion are 
higher than the fixed cost of hiring a third worker, it is optimal for the principal to break
collusion by hiring the third worker. □
principal's expected wages under potential collusion when the whistle-blowing mechanism
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is adopted. The principal's problem is:
Ip  2P(tA" ) P ( 0 ( Q B- y AAQB +eA- yB A0
+t(.yB-yAyB)+e(yA-yAyB)) 
p 2( i - i ’( O ) / ,(C)(0i +^ ) +
(B.9)
+P 2p Q V - p K M Qa +Q£> +
p  2(i - p ( t  "» (i -?(/B”,))(e;+e;)+
P d  -/.X I - Jp(/s” ))(0 j+ e ^ )+
( i - p ) p p ( . t Am ) ( W A + e B ) +
(i - p ) P (  i -p (//» (e ;+ e ;)+ (i -P)(i -p)(e;+e;)]
Note that the term:p2P(tAm)P(tAn,)[BB - yaA 0b +  0 A - YBA 0A+ e (y A- y A Yb> + «(Ya- Ya Yb)
] stands for the expected wages under potential collusion. We see that if the probability of 
hard information is zero - i.e., Yj = 0, i= A, B - then the principal's problem is equivalent to 
that of the collusion-proof case. And if Yi = 1, i= A, B, the problem is identical to that of the 
collusion-free case. After optimising the principal’s problem with respect to tAm and tAm and 
some manipulation, the first-order conditions are:
(B.10)
And by rewriting (B.10) we get the optimal time allocation under the whistle-blowing 
mechanism:
P ' ( O p A d B[l -PP(tB m  - y B)+e(yA- y AyB))]]=fl(l - tA ) 
P '{tB )pAQA[ l - PP(tA ){(\ - y A)+e(yB- y AyB))]=f'o
(B .l 1)
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When we compare (B.l 1) to B(8) and (B.4), we immediately observe the obvious 
relationship. We see that if yA = Yb = 0, the optimal time allocation is equivalent to that of 
the collusion-proof case. And if Ya =  Yb = 1, (B.l 1) boils down to (B.4), and the time 
allocation is identical to that of the collusion-free case.
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Chapter 4
"Money or Reputation" - A Rational Theory of Blackmail
4.1 Introduction
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"E v e n  i f  y o u  p a y  t h e  b l a c k m a i l , t h a t  i s  n o  g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  h e  w o n ' t  d e m a n d  m o r e  l a t e r . "  
( T h e  O x f o r d  T h e s a u r u s .  A n  A - Z  D i c t i o n a r y  o f  S y n o n y m s . )
" T h e  b l a c k m a i l e d  p e r s o n  t o  M a d s o n :  " H o w  c a n  I  t r u s t  t h e  b o y  t h a t  h e  w o n ' t  c o m e  b a c k  t o  a s k  
m o r e  m o n e y ? "  M a d s o n :  D o n ' t  w o r r y ,  h e  i s  j u s t  a  k i d ,  h e  i s  n o t  a  p r o f e s s i o n a l  b l a c k m a i l e r . "  
( M a d s o n ,  B B C  1 ,  1 9 9 6 . )
What is the economics behind the phenomenon of blackmail? Should a victim pay a 
blackmailer or not? How much, if anything, should the victim pay the blackmailer? When 
is the blackmailer’s threat to carry out his action credible? What if the blackmailer comes 
back to ask for more money? These are among the questions the present chapter tackles.
In recent years relatively much has been written about collusion (bribery) in 
organisations. Very little thought has been given to blackmail, which, in general, forms a 
complementary part of corruption.1 The concept of blackmail in legal and sociological 
literature has originally been used to refer to payments to avoid physical harm; today it 
primarily refers to payments to avoid revelation of discreditable information.2 This is 
precisely how blackmail is modelled in the present chapter.
Even though collusion and blackmail are closely related, there is, however, an 
important difference. Under collusion two parties (e.g., a manager and an auditor) act 
together and collude against a principal (e.g., the shareholders), for example, by agreeing on 
information manipulation. They enter the collusive relationship voluntarily, and after 
successful collusion they are both better off than by not colluding. In the case of blackmail, 
a blackmailer operating alone, is able to hurt a victim. The blackmailer extorts the victim by 
threatening to reveal a piece of information which the victim prefers to keep private. The 
relationship between the blackmailer and the victim is involuntary and takes the form of pure
1 See, for instance, Tirole (1992) on collusion.
2 See Hepworth (1980), who discusses several aspects of the phenomenon of 
blackmail from a sociological point of view.
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extortion. Furthermore, after successful blackmail the blackmailer is better off, but the victim 
worse off compared to the case of no blackmail.
This chapter develops a dynamic model of blackmail. It takes into consideration the 
blackmail game, where a piece of information which an agent prefers to keep private may 
facilitate blackmail when the other agent, namely the blackmailer, is able to reveal that 
information. The crucial feature of the blackmail game is the commitment problem from the 
blackmailer's side. The blackmailer cannot commit not to come back in future to demand 
more despite the payments received in the past.3
The infinite horizon blackmail game has a very simple structure. Two players move 
sequentially in every period. First the victim decides how much to hand over as a blackmail 
payment, and then the blackmailer decides whether to reveal or suppress a piece of 
information about the victim. The equilibrium concept we use is a Markov Perfect 
equilibrium. That is, we consider strategies that are conditioned only on the payoff-relevant 
variables, and not on the entire history of the game.
We analyse first a situation where there exist no rewards for information revelation. 
This includes the cases where, for example, the tabloid press do not pay rewards for scandal 
stories, an organisation designer does not pay rewards to organisation members who turn in 
fellow workers, and so on. In this case it is shown that there is a unique Markov Perfect 
equilibrium where blackmail does not arise, and the victim pays nothing, and the blackmailer 
suppresses information.
Next we introduce rewards for information revelation, and consequently then the 
blackmailer has two potential buyers for a piece of information: the victim or the tabloid 
press. When a piece of information is revealed to the tabloid press, the game ends. On the 
contrary, if the information is suppressed, the game continues, and the blackmailer comes 
back in the next period to demand more money. In this case we show that in an equilibrium 
blackmail is an issue. The victim pays the blackmailer and information is not revealed. This 
Markov Perfect equilibrium is unique, and it gives us a precise prediction how much money 
the blackmailer will get by extorting the victim.
3Imagine, for example, a case where the blackmailer's evidence is a videotape. The 
victim can not be sure when buying the tape that the blackmailer does not have a copy of the 
tape. If the blackmailer has a copy, he can come back and ask for more money.
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Our results remain the same in case where the blackmailer announces a blackmail 
demand in a beginning of each period. What is important for the outcome is that the 
blackmailer always moves after the potential blackmail payment, and the blackmailer has an 
option to end the game by revealing the information. This, by the way, works partially 
against the blackmailer, who is unable to fully exploit the victim. Interestingly, the blackmail 
payment does not depend on the victim's valuation of the information, but only on the 
external net reward.
Due to the blackmailer's commitment problem, blackmail appears in the form of an 
infinite stream of small blackmail payments, rather than in the form of a large one-off 
payment in the beginning of the relationship. Since there is nothing which forces the 
blackmailer to suppress the information, even though he has received money from the victim, 
the optimal blackmail payment turns out to be a combination of the offered external net 
reward and a blackmail premium. The premium compensates the blackmailer for not taking 
money from the victim and revealing information anyway. The case when potential rewards 
are the blackmailer's private information is also considered. It is shown that information 
about the victim will be revealed with positive probability.
Before going any further, a few words about the related literature are in order. This 
paper naturally relates to the recent theoretical literature on corruption in organisations. As 
said above not very much has been done so far. For example, Koffinan and Lawarree (1993) 
explicitly rule out the possibility of blackmail. Tirole (1992) also mentions the phenomenon 
of blackmail, but does not model it.
To the best of our knowledge, the only serious attempt to incorporate blackmail in the 
economic analysis of organisations is done by Mogiljanski (1994). Mogiljanski develops a 
concept of regulatory blackmail in a static adverse selection model a la Laffont and Tirole 
(1991). She defines blackmail as a situation where a regulator threatens a firm that it will 
conceal some favourable information from a principal, unless the firm pays the regulator ex 
post. The regulator has all the bargaining power when proposing a "take it or leave it offer" 
to the firm. Note that if the firm declines to pay, the regulator is indifferent between reporting 
the information or concealing it. Then the question becomes, whether the blackmailer will 
release or conceal the information if the firm declines to pay. She assumes that the firm’s 
threat to conceal information is a subgame perfect. However, if one follows the paradigm of
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the principal-agent models strictly in this case, the regulator should behave as the principal 
prefers by reporting a piece of information to the principal. Then, of course, the threat is not 
credible, and blackmail is not an issue. Note also that if the principal commits to an 
infinitesimal reward for information revelation, the blackmail there is not an issue anymore, 
since then the regulator will certainly report. Mogiljanski’s study ignores the dynamic aspect 
of the phenomenon of blackmail, which we choose to emphasize. We put aside collusion and 
concentrate purely on blackmail in a dynamic framework. In particular, we focus on the way 
the potential surplus will be shared between the victim and the blackmailer.
Outside of organisation theory Konrad and Skaperdas (1995) consider credible threats 
in the extortion business between a gang and shopkeepers. They emphasize a fundamental 
credibility problem: i.e., whether the gang will actually carry out a threat if a shopkeeper 
declines to pay. There the gang has to make a costly up-front investment that is unobserved 
by the shopkeepers, and these investments facilitate punishments in a case when the 
shopkeepers decline to pay. They show that only a no-extortion equilibrium exists if there 
is only one shopkeeper. This equilibrium disappears when the number of shopkeepers 
increases, and then the only subgame perfect equilibrium that will remain is an extortion 
equilibrium. They do not consider the blackmailer’s commitment problem: i.e., that the 
blackmailer may come back. In order to derive their main results, they have to make two very 
strong assumptions. They assume that if the gang has invested in punishment technology, it 
has to always use it if a shopkeeper declines to pay. They also assume that the gang can not 
punish if the shopkeeper pays the gang. In the present chapter both of these assumptions are 
relaxed.
Recently some authors have also considered collusion in a dynamic framework. 
Acemoglu (1995) develops a dynamic model of implicit collusion between an auditor and 
a manager. Martimort (1996) in turn has proposed a model of self-enforcing collusion by 
modelling a static adverse selection problem as an infinitely repeated game. However, none 
of those papers examines the phenomenon of blackmail and the question of how the benefits 
of information suppression will be shared.
The outline for the rest of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 describes the model. 
The analysis is carried out and the main results are provided in section 4.3. In section 4.4 
some interpretations and potential extensions are discussed. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2. The Model
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The Players
Consider a model with two agents: a blackmailer (B) and a blackmailed person (V); we refer 
to V also as the victim. V has on his possession a piece of information (I), which he prefers 
to keep private: i.e., not to share with others. The monetary value of V's privacy (or, say, 
reputation) is equal to v(I) > 0, and v(I) = 0 if information is revealed. In particular, we 
assume that the value of privacy is a per-period benefit. Later, we use v as a short-hand 
notation for v(I). The time horizon we consider is infinite. We also assume that information 
revelation causes the victim a permanent damage. That is, the victim never get back his 
privacy.
The blackmailer, B also has access to a piece of information I, and is able to reveal 
it to a third party. The cost of information revelation for B is a fixed cost, c  ^ 0. We assume, 
for the sake of simplicity, that B also learns v.4 The blackmailer does not derive any direct 
utility himself from releasing discreditable information about V, and B hopes that the victim 
will pay him to suppress the information. In his article Hepworth (1990) puts this nicely: "At 
the heart of reputational blackmail lies the willingness of the blackmailer to exploit the 
victim's desire to prevent others sharing a secret".
The model we consider has many potential interpretations. Within an organisation, 
V may be a civil servant who has taken bribes from a contractor, and B is another civil 
servant who has observed this and blackmails V. Alternatively, V may be a politician who 
has had an "affair", and B is a person who blackmails the politician by threatening to reveal 
that information to the tabloid press. This latter example is more closely related to the very 
idea of reputational blackmail ("newspaper blackmail") on which we want to concentrate 
here.
So far the model has a simple feature where one agent prefers his privacy, and the 
other agent is able to provide that by remaining silent. The blackmail game has a very 
intuitive and familiar interpretation, namely that of a seller and a buyer. Here the blackmailer
4This is not a restricting assumption. Later, it is shown that the optimal blackmail 
payment does not depend on the victim's valuation at all.
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(the seller) is able to provide the victim (the buyer) a service by remaining silent. The 
question is how much the buyer has to pay for this service. Or, to put it otherwise, we can 
even state that trade has already occurred, because the victim has on his possession an infinite 
surplus stream from privacy: v(I)/(l-S), where 6 is a common discount factor. Now the 
question becomes, how will the benefits from privacy be shared?
Note that in contrast to a normal seller-buyer model, the blackmailer is not needed 
here to create a surplus, since it already exists. However, the blackmailer is able to destroy 
the surplus permanently simply by revealing the information. Note that if the blackmailer 
reveals the information, he basically then also destroys his only asset, and certainly will not 
get anything out of the relationship in future.
The trade here is not a one-off event, since the victim's payment to the blackmailer 
does not end the game. In every period, given that no information has been revealed in the 
past, a new surplus arrives and the blackmailer is around demanding a share of it. Before 
describing the blackmail game, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 4.1: No contracts can be conditioned on whether the blackmailer comes back in 
future to demand more money.
Assumption 4.1 is a crucial one, and states the fundamental commitment problem we 
believe captures the very essential feature of blackmail. The blackmailer can not commit not 
to come back in future to demand more money. That is, the blackmailer is unable to commit 
not to exercise a profitable action. For example, this is the case of unfortunate and well- 
documented practices among small businesses who have to pay "protection money" to 
criminals just to be able to run their businesses. In those cases blackmail exists exactly in the 
form of "small" blackmail payments criminals collect from small businesses, say every week, 
rather than in a form of a large one-off payment. The model presented here describes 
therefore also racketeering.5
interestingly, Konrad and Skaperdas (1995) do not consider this feature in their 
extortion analysis.
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Assumption 4.2: No contracts can be conditioned on information suppression.
According to assumption 4.2 such contracts are not enforceable. The only reason why the 
blackmailer may suppress information is that it is individually rational to do so. That is, even 
if the victim hands over money, it is no guarantee that the blackmailer will suppress the 
information. This last point further emphasizes the fact that the relationship between the 
victim and the blackmailer is a game and not an enforceable contract.
How much money the blackmailer is able to extort from the victim is what we call 
blackmail, and a blackmail payment is labelled as m. There are presumably many alternative 
ways to model blackmail, and we have chosen to stick with that of dynamic games.6
Timing, Strategies, and the Solution Concept
As stated above, the time horizon we consider is infinite (T=°°). Within every period 
of the blackmail game, and given that information has not been revealed, there are two 
sequential stages (see figure 4.1). First, the victim decides how much to hand over as a 
blackmail payment (m). In stage 2, the blackmailer decides whether to reveal (r) or suppress 
(s) the information.7 The blackmailer either accepts V's offer and suppresses the information, 
or rejects it and reveals the information. Since the blackmailer pockets m in any case, we 
can further simplify the blackmailer’s action in each period. He either reveals or 
suppresses information. If B suppresses information, the game continues and in a next period 
stages 1 and 2 are repeated, and so on. Information revelation ends the blackmail game 
immediately in that very period, because after that there is no valuable information left
anymore. It is in the blackmailer’s hands whether the game continues or not.
The introduction of an external reward (R) has a crucial effect on the blackmail game, 
since then the blackmailer is able to sell a piece of information also to the third party. We do
6The Rubinstein-Stahl model could provide another way to proceed. However, there an 
acceptance by one party ends the game, which is not valid here. There a contract between 
players is an enforceable contract; here the relationship is a non-cooperative game.
7 Later, it is shown that this order of moves is preferred by both the victim and the 
blackmailer. The blackmailer does not want to move first, but he prefers to move after the 
victim has handed over the blackmail payment.
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not incorporate the third party explicitly in the model, and it is assumed that when offered, 
the exogenously given R is available in every period to the blackmailer, who exposes 
discreditable information about the victim.
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Figure 4.1 The Blackmail Game. The victim moves first.
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Rather than finding all the perfect equilibria of the blackmail game, we restrict 
ourselves to the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). That is, we consider only Markov 
strategies, where player i’s strategy in period t does not depend on the whole history of the 
game, but only on the variables that affect its present period’s payoffs.8 Once we have 
constrained the set of strategies to Markov, the structure of the game becomes stationary, 
and on the condition that information has not been revealed earlier, the blackmail game 
looks similar in every period.
Consider next the players’ strategies. The victim moves first by handing out the 
blackmail payment n^. n \  is chosen from a finite set (0,v). The blackmailer’s strategy 
space is discrete: he either suppresses (s) information or reveals (r) it: bt e {s,r}. Define 
the available net reward for the blackmailer in the beginning of period t as 0t = (Rt-c). We 
say that 0t describes “a state of the system” in period t.
Define the history of the game in period t as ht={(m1,b1,01), (m2,b2,02),
(m3>b3,03) , ..... (mt.1,bt.lf0t.1)}. Note that the game has a history in period t only when
no information has been revealed earlier. In period t the only aspect of the history that 
directly affects the victim’s action in the present period is 0t Interestingly, since the 
external net reward is exogenously given, 0t depends only on what B did in period t-1. 
Thus if bt.j = r, then the game would have ended, and if bt.j = s, then 0t = (R^c). 
Therefore, the victim’s strategy depends only on 0t: (0^. Due to the sequential timing
of moves in each period, the aspect of the history that directly affects the blackmailer’s 
payoff is 0t, but the blackmailer’s payoff relevant history also includes n^, the blackmail 
payment handed over by the victim in that very period: bt (11^ ,0,). Moreover, the reactions 
by the victim and the blackmailer do not depend on the calendar time, but only on the state 
variable and the state of the system. The victim’s strategy is then a reaction function: n^ 
=R(0t), and the blackmailer’s strategy is: bt = RCn^O^.
Both the victim's and the blackmailer's objective is to maximize the present 
discounted value of their payoffs:
oo
£  5 t-1n£(jnt ,bt) ( 4 . 1 )
t=i
8See Maskin and Tirole (1997) for the Markov Perfect Equilibrium.
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E 5
t = l
t-1 B /n t (m. , K ) ( 4 . 2 )
Define Vv and VB respectively as net present values of being the victim and the blackmailer 
at the beginning of a period. Now we can use dynamic programming and write both the 
victim's and the blackmailer's payoffs (intertemporal profits from period t onwards) as 
valuation functions:
V^=Maxmn vt {mt l b t ) + b V ^ .  ( 4 . 3 )
V*=Maxb n%{bt , m t ) +5VtB+1. ( 4 . 4 )
Now we are in a position to write down the payoffs in terms of the strategies. The victim's 
payoffs in the case of information suppression and revelation are respectively:
V t = n Vt {mt , s )  +bVt+i= ( v - m t ) +5V^+1. ( 4 . 5 )
V t = n l  (mt , r )  = - mt . ( 4 . 6 )
If the blackmailer suppresses the information in period t, the victim’s payoff is the net benefit 
(v-mj plus the continuation value. In the case of information revelation, the victim loses his 
reputation immediately as well as the payment mt, which the victim handed over. Note that 
this means that the victim pays a blackmail payment out of his pocket, and that v is realised 
at the end of each period only in the case of information suppression. The blackmailer's 
payoffs are:
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VrtB=nf ( m t ,  s )  + 5 V * + 1 = m t + b V * + 1 . (4 .7 )
VtB=iiB( r , m t ) = { m t ~ c )  . (4 .8 )
In the case of information suppression, the blackmailer pockets mt immediately, and 
he gets the continuation value as well. If the blackmailer decides to reveal the information 
he bears a cost of revelation c as well, and receives ( mt - c), and the blackmail game ends 
immediately in that very period.
4.3 The Analysis
4.3.1 No Rewards for Information Revelation
This section considers a case where no rewards exist for an agent who reveals some 
discreditable information in public. In practice this includes cases where the tabloid press 
pays no rewards for scandal stories, an organisation designer does not reward workers who 
disclose information about fellow workers' activities, and so on. The case of "no rewards" 
further clarifies the idea that the blackmailer does not enjoy any direct utility from releasing 
discreditable information about the victim.
The blackmail game proceeds as follows. In every period t, given that information has 
not been released earlier, the victim hands over mt to the blackmailer. The blackmailer's 
strategies are then simply: to suppress (s) or reveal (r) the information. That strategy 
corresponds to the decision of ending the game or letting it to continue.
In the following we argue and prove that in the case of "no rewards", blackmail will 
not arise. The victim pays nothing and the blackmailer suppresses the information. In order 
to derive an optimal blackmail payment, we have to find out the blackmailer’s optimal 
responses to an arbitrary blackmail payment. It is shown that B's best response to any 
blackmail payment is to suppress the information. And, of course, then the victim optimally
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pays nothing for information suppression.
Consider period t and the blackmailer to whom the victim has handed over mt. If the 
blackmailer suppresses the information, he receives mt and the game continues. If B reveals 
the information, the game ends immediately in period t, and the blackmailer receives (mt - 
c). Note that once the information is revealed the blackmailer can not come back in future. 
In fact, a piece of information is like an asset for the blackmailer, and revelation of the 
information destroys this asset. Thus we have Lemma 4.1:
L e m m a  4 . 1  G i v e n  t h a t  t h e  v i c t i m  h a s  h a n d e d  o v e r  a  b l a c k m a i l  p a y m e n t ,  t h e  b l a c k m a i l e r ’s  
b e s t  r e s p o n s e  i s  t o  s u p p r e s s  i n f o r m a t i o n .
Proof: Suppose not, and assume that B reveals the information, thus ending the game 
immediately. In that case B gets (mt-c) < mt + 6VB, which he would get by suppressing 
information. Clearly, it is optimal for the blackmailer to suppress the information, and we 
have a contradiction, and information suppression is the blackmailer’s optimal response. □
Consider next in turn the victim’s problem of choosing m, when information has not 
been released earlier. Note that if the information had been released in period t-1, the game 
would have ended and V's action would be irrelevant. In the following we show that an 
optimal offer m*=0, which makes the blackmailer suppress the information and the game 
continues. Therefore we have Lemma 4.2:
L e m m a  4 . 2  G i v e n  t h a t  t h e  b l a c k m a i l e r  s u p p r e s s e s  i n f o r m a t i o n  a f t e r  a n y  a r b i t r a r y  b l a c k m a i l  
p a y m e n t ,  t h e  v i c t i m ’s  o p t i m a l  r e s p o n s e  i s  m *  = 0 .
Proof: Suppose not, and assume that the victim hands over m>0, given that the blackmailer 
always suppresses the information. In this case the victim receives (v-m) + 6VV < v + 6VV, 
which the victim receives when he pays m=0. Thus, we have a contradiction, and the victim’s 
optimal and unique best response is m* = 0. □
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The main result in the case when there are no rewards is stated as Proposition 4.1:
P r o p o s i t i o n  4 . 1  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  ‘‘n o  r e w a r d s  ”  t h e r e  i s  a  u n i q u e  M P E  o f  n o  b l a c k m a i l .  T h e  
v i c t i m  p a y s  n o t h i n g  a n d  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  s u p p r e s s e d ;  m * = 0 ,  V * ' =  v / ( l - d ) ,  V 8  = 0 .
Proof: We want to show that a pair of strategies, (m*=0 and s) forms an equilibrium. We 
refer here to "one-period deviation - principle". By playing his equilibrium strategy, m* = 0, 
the victim gets: v/(l-6), which is greater than (v-e) + Sv/(1-S), which is what he would get 
by deviating and handing over m=e, and then conforming to the equilibrium strategy. By 
playing the equilibrium strategy, the blackmailer receives: 0 + 6VB > 0 - c, which he would 
get by deviating and revealing the information. In sum, neither the victim nor the blackmailer 
prefers to deviate from the equilibrium path. □
The economics behind Proposition 4.1 is strikingly simple and yet it confirms the 
intuition Hepworth (1980) provides: "If the blackmailer is unable to persuade the victim he 
has access to a receptive audience he is powerless to commercialise or gain any other kind 
of advantage from the information which has fallen in his hands." In short, when a piece of 
information is not valuable to anyone apart from the victim, the blackmailer is unable to 
extort money from the victim.
Note that it is not important for the above result that there is a positive cost of 
information revelation. Even if c went to zero, information suppression would remain the 
blackmailer's optimal response, since by suppressing information he would get 0 + 6VB  ^0. 
More precisely, information revelation is then weakly dominated by information suppression. 
And after the elimination of dominated strategies, information suppression remains a weakly 
dominant strategy.The victim would choose m*=0, the blackmailer would suppress 
information, and the “no-blackmail equilibrium” would survive.
So far we have assumed that the victim moves first, and the blackmailer is passive, 
and only reacts to the blackmail payment. Would the blackmailer ever prefer to move first? 
It is clear that this is never the case, since by moving first the blackmailer can not receive 
anything which he does not get by waiting for the victim’s blackmail payment. The 
blackmailer does not want to move first, but waits until the victim has handed over the
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payment, and then moves. But here also the blackmailer is a “passive player”. Since we 
consider blackmail or extortion in terms of how much money the blackmailer is able to extort 
from the victim, a far more interesting and relevant case for us is a situation where the 
blackmailer is able to announce a blackmail demand, dt in the beginning of period t. See 
figure 4.2 in Appendix C. This is actually a very interesting case, since it is a kind of 
robustness test of Proposition 4.1.
Suppose now that B moves first, and announces a blackmail demand, dt > m*. How 
does the victim react to the blackmailer's demand? He can either accept it and pay ^  or he 
can reject it. Even if he rejects the blackmailer’s demand, the victim still has to decide how 
much to hand over as a blackmail payment. But now the set-up is exactly identical to the case 
where the victim moved first, and of course it is optimal to pay the same amount as before, 
m* = 0. And for the blackmailer it is optimal to suppress the information. Consequently, no 
matter what the blackmailer’s demand is, the victim pays only m*=0.
The logic behind the result remains the same even though the blackmailer moves first. 
What is crucial for the result is that he also moves last. He moves after the blackmail 
payment has been handed over. As the last mover the blackmailer has an option to end the 
game by revealing information. Here the last mover has a disadvantage, since he will always 
prefer that the game continues, and this destroys the credibility of his threat of terminating 
the game by revealing information if his blackmail demand is not matched. Consequently, 
we have Corollary 4.1:
C o r o l l a r y  4 . 1 .  I f  t h e  b l a c k m a i l e r  m o v e s  f i r s t  b y  m a k i n g  a  b l a c k m a i l  d e m a n d  ( d ,  > m * ) ,  t h e  
r e s u l t  o f  n o  b l a c k m a i l  h o l d s .  T h e  v i c t i m  p a y s  n o t h i n g ,  a n d  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  w i l l  b e  
s u p p r e s s e d .
Proof: The logic is exactly similar to that of the proof of Proposition 4.1. Assume that B has 
announced a blackmail demand dt > m*. V can either pay this, in which case he gets 
(v- dt) + SVV. Alternatively, he can reject B's demand and pay m* = 0, which is the optimal 
payment he would choose when moving first. From earlier we know that B's optimal 
response to that is to suppress the information, which gives V: v + 6VV > (v- ) + SVv.
Therefore, no matter what B asks, the victim hands over m*, and B suppresses the
information.
I l l
□
This an important and interesting result. Indeed, the "no-blackmail" result will hold 
even if the blackmailer moves first by announcing a blackmail demand. The reason behind 
this is that the blackmailer is unable to make use of his threat of information revelation, since 
he is the agent who moves last. In particular, he moves after the victim has handed over m*. 
In effect, this resembles a situation where the victim makes a "take it or leave it" offer, and 
where the last mover has a disadvantage, since it is optimal for him to accept the payment 
and suppress the information.
4.3.2 Rewards for Information Revelation
In this section we consider whether the "no-blackmail" result will hold if there is a reward 
for information revelation. In practice, for example, the tabloid press do pay rewards for 
"scandal stories"; similarly an organisation designer may reward a worker who exposes 
wrongdoing in the workplace, and so on. Here we analyse whether the victim now can 
decline to pay anything, and how much money the blackmailer is able to extort from the 
victim.
Note that now the blackmailer can sell a piece of information also to a third party, 
which values information as well. However, there is an important difference whether a piece 
of information is sold to the tabloid press or to the victim. In the former case, revelation of 
the information will end the blackmail game, since the blackmailer no longer has valuable 
information on his possession. That is, the value of his asset has disappeared. In the latter 
case, there is nothing to keep the blackmailer from returning back to demand more money 
in future despite the payments he received earlier. From the victims's point of view, it is not 
optimal to hand over a blackmail payment which matches the reward offered by the third 
party, since the blackmailer would be back asking for more in the very next period.
Recall that the relationship between the victim and the blackmailer is a game, and not 
an enforceable contract. Therefore, there is nothing to keep the blackmailer from taking 
money from the victim and revealing the information anyway. The reward for information
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revelation represents here the blackmailer's opportunity cost of not releasing information.9 
Before proceeding any further, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 4.3 An external reward, R is small compared to the damage of information 
revelation to the victim and higher than the cost of information revelation to the blackmailer: 
c < R < v/(l-6).
If assumption 4.3 were violated, and (R-c) was greater than the damage, the 
blackmailer would not bother to blackmail, but would end the blackmail game by revealing 
the information and collecting the net reward in the very first period.10
We start again by considering B's best responses to V's offer. Now the victim has to 
take into consideration that if he does not pay the blackmailer, the blackmailer may reveal 
the information, in which case the victim loses his reputation immediately. In the next lemma 
we derive an optimal payment m* which makes the blackmailer indifferent between releasing 
information and suppressing it.
L e m m a  4 . S  T h e r e  e x i s t s  m * = ( R - c ) ( l - 8 ) / 8  s u c h  t h a t  i f  V ' s  o f f e r  m  <  m * ,  
r e s p o n s e  i s  t o  r e v e a l  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y  i f  V ' s  o f f e r  m  >  m * ,  
r e s p o n s e  i s  t o  s u p p r e s s  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n .
Proof: First we derive an optimal payment m*. Assume that V offers m, and the blackmailer 
suppresses the information. In this case B gets: m + 6VB. If B reveals the information, he 
keeps m that V handed over, but he also receives a net reward (R-c). The payoff for 
information revelation becomes: m + (R-c). The victim’s problem is to choose m he hands 
over to the blackmailer in every period so that B is just indifferent between suppressing and
9The role of an external reward is quite similar to that of the outside option in the 
Rubinstein-Stahl Bargaining model. Here, however, the external reward is available to the 
blackmailer in every period, even after the victim’s payment.
10Interestingly, in this case it might also happen that the victim sells his own story, 
since that would be the profit-maximizing strategy. Presumably, this is why we see in 
practice that occasionally celebrities sell their own scandal stories to the tabloid press, and 
indeed this is rational behaviour.
t h e n  B ' s  o p t i m a l  
t h e n  B ' s  o p t i m a l
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revealing the information: m + 6VB = m + (R-c). That is, m + 6m + 6m2 +... = m + (R-c); and 
after some manipulation, this gives m* = (R-c)(l-6)/6. The claim is that if V's offer m < m*, 
then B's best response is to reveal the information. Assume that V hands over (m*-e) < m*. 
If B suppresses the information, it yields a payoff : (m*-e) + 6VB = (m*- e)/(l-6). 
Alternatively, if B reveals the information, the payoff is: (m*-e) + (R-c). Now it is clear that 
B will reveal the information, since (m*-e) + (R-c) > (m*- e) /(I-6), where m*= (R-c)(l-6)/6. 
Alternatively, if the victim offers m > m* - say, for example, m = m* - the blackmailer’s best 
response is to suppress the information. □
An important economic insight follows immediately from Lemma 4.3: the 
blackmailer will remain silent as long as the victim hands over m* = (R-c)(l-6)/6. If the 
victim deviates from this by handing less than m*, the blackmailer will reveal the 
information; and this ensures him a payoff equal to that of the continuation value. In an 
equilibrium path, V is willing to pay B for information suppression, and the blackmailer is 
willing to suppress the information. We have a case of successful blackmail.
The victim’s problem of choosing an optimal offer m* becomes now quite 
straightforward, since he knows that the blackmailer will reveal the information and end the 
game if m < m*. Thus, we have Lemma 4.4:
L e m m a  4 . 4  G i v e n  t h a t  t h e  b l a c k m a i l e r  w i l l  r e v e a l  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  i f  m  <  m *  a n d  s u p p r e s s  
i t  i f  m  z  m * ,  t h e n  t h e  v i c t i m ’s  o p t i m a l  r e s p o n s e  i s  t o  h a n d  o v e r  m * .
Proof: The proof of Lemma 4.4 is included in the proof of Proposition 4.2 below, and is thus 
omitted here.
The main result in the case when there is an external reward for information revelation is 
stated as Proposition 4.2:
114
P r o p o s i t i o n  4 . 2  W h e n  t h e r e  i s  a  r e w a r d f o r  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e v e l a t i o n , t h e r e  i s  a  u n i q u e  M P E  
o f  b l a c k m a i l  T h e  v i c t i m  p a y s  t h e  b l a c k m a i l e r  m *  i n  e v e r y  p e r i o d ,  a n d  t h e  b l a c k m a i l e r  
s u p p r e s s e s  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n ;  m * =  ( R - c ) ( l - 6 ) / 6 ,  V v = ( v - m * ) / ( l - d ) ,  V B = m * / ( l - S ) .
Proof: We want to show that a pair of strategies (m*-e, r and m*, s) forms an equilibrium. 
Once again we refer to the "one deviation only-principle". Given that V and B play 
equilibrium strategies, we show that neither player prefers to deviate. The victim’s 
equilibrium payoff is: (v-m*) + 8(v-m*) + 82(v-m*) + .... = (v-m*)/(l-8), where m* = (R- 
c)(l-6)/6. Suppose that he deviates from his equilibrium strategy by handing over (m*-e). 
Then, for a moment, the victim potentially has on his possession v-(m*-e) from that period. 
However, we know that in this case B will reveal the information immediately. The victim 
loses his reputation, and the blackmail game ends; and the victim’s payoff is: - (m*-e). The 
victim does not want to deviate. The blackmailer’s equilibrium payoff is: (m*) + 8(m*) + 
62(m*) +.... = (m*)/(l-8). If B deviates and reveals the information, he pockets m* + (R-c) 
and the game ends. However, by playing his equilibrium strategy, he receives: m* + 8VB  ^
m* + (R-c), and VB £ (R-c)/5. The blackmailer has no incentive to deviate from 
equilibrium. □
Note that a blackmail payment m* = (R-c)(l-8)/8 does not depend on the victim's 
valuation (v) at all. It only depends on the external net reward and a discount factor 8. Now 
we can see that m* increases in (R-c) and decreases in 8, the latter meaning that when the 
blackmailer becomes less patient ( 6 ->0 ), the optimal blackmail payment increases. 
Interestingly, the blackmailer is able to get more money by extorting the victim than by 
selling the information directly to a third party. The intuition behind this is that the victim 
has to compensate the blackmailer for not taking money (m*) and revealing the information 
anyway. Thus we have Proposition 4.3:
P r o p o s i t i o n  4 . 3  I n  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  p a t h  t h e  b l a c k m a i l e r  g e t s  m o r e  b y  e x t o r t i n g  t h e  v i c t i m  t h a n  
t h e  p o t e n t i a l  n e t  r e w a r d  ( R . - c )  h e  w o u l d  g e t  b y  s e l l i n g  a  p i e c e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  
t h i r d  p a r t y .
Proof: We know that m* = (R-c)(l-6)/6. The flow payment that would match the external net 
reward is (R-c)(l-6), which we label as M. Now m*/M = 1/6. And 1/6 > 1, since 6 < 1. □
We see from Proposition 4.3 that the more impatient the blackmailer is, the bigger is the 
premium which the victim has to pay over the external net reward.
As in the earlier section, we see immediately that the blackmailer prefers for the 
victim to move first. By moving after the victim, the blackmailer is able to get (R-c)/6. By 
moving first the blackmailer is able to get at most (R-c). Then it is clear that the blackmailer, 
as well as the victim, prefers that the victim moves first and the blackmailer last.
What if the blackmailer is able to announce a blackmail demand before the victim 
moves? Intuitively, now the blackmailer should be in a stronger position, since he can make 
profits by revealing information to the third party if the victim declines to pay. One would 
expect that the blackmailer would get more out of the victim than in the case considered so 
far. Interestingly, and against intuition, this is not the case. In arguments which are very 
similar to those in section 4.2, it can be shown that the equilibrium payoffs do not change. 
Irrespective of what the blackmailer demands, the victim hands over m*= (R-c)(l-6)/6, and 
the blackmailer will suppress the information. He does not get any more out of the victim 
even though he moves first by announcing a blackmail demand. And thus we have:
C o r o l l a r y  4 . 2  W h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  r e w a r d  a n d  t h e  b l a c k m a i l e r  d e m a n d s  d t >  m * ,  t h e n  i n  a n  
e q u i l i b r i u m  p a t h  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  P r o p o s i t i o n  4 . 2  h o l d s :  t h e  v i c t i m  p a y s  m  i n  e v e r y  p e r i o d  a n d  
t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  s u p p r e s s e d .
Proof: Assume that B moves first by announcing a blackmail demand dt > m*. The victim 
can either pay it, and then his payoff is : (v- dt ) + 6Vv, since B suppresses the information. 
Alternatively, the victim can reject the demand, and hand over less than the demanded dj. 
Suppose that the victim hands over (c -^e) > m*. How will the blackmailer react? If B reveals 
the information, he gets: (dt-e) + (R-c). However, if he suppresses the information he 
receives:(dt-e) + 6VB. Now, we know that since m*= (R-c)(l-6)/6, we can write (R-c)= 
m*6/(1-6). Then, by revealing the information, B gets: (dt-e) + m*6/(l-6). And now since 
the victim is ready to pay (dt-e) in every period for information suppression, the blackmailer
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gets (c^-e) + 6(dt-e)/(l-6) by suppressing the information. Clearly, it is a dominant strategy 
for the blackmailer to suppress the information, since (dt-e) + 6(dt-e)/(l-6) > (dt-e) + 
m*6/(l-6). But now it is evident that V can lower his payment all the way down to m* - i.e., 
the optimal blackmail payment which the victim chose when moving first. And from earlier 
we know that the blackmailer will suppress the information. This concludes the proof. □
So far we have seen that in an equilibrium, information is not revealed, and the 
blackmailer is able to extort money from the victim only in the case when there exists a third 
party which values the information as well. In the next section we consider whether the fact 
that information about the potential reward is the blackmailer’s private information will 
change this result, and, in particular, whether a blackmailer who does not have access to an 
external reward is able to extort money from the victim.
4.3.3 If a Potential Reward Is Private Information
Will information be revealed if a potential reward is the blackmailer's private information? 
In the following we consider a case where the victim of "newspaper blackmail" does not 
know whether the blackmailer has been promised a reward or not. Indeed, now we are able 
to show that it may well happen that the information about the victim is going to be revealed 
in an equilibrium.
Perhaps the simplest way to model this idea is to assume that the victim does not 
know whether or not the blackmailer will get a reward, R if he reveals the information. He 
only knows a prior probability p=prob{R=R} and that with probability (l-p)=prob{R=0}. 
Recall that we use the Markov Perfect equilibrium as a solution concept, and note that now 
these prior beliefs are part of the “state of the system”. Consider next the victim's (the 
uninformed party's) problem of choosing a blackmail payment to hand over to the 
blackmailer.
The victim knows that if he hands over m=0 he faces the probability p that the 
blackmailer will reveal the information immediately and the probability (1-P) that the 
blackmailer will suppress the information.The problem from the victim’s point of view is that
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both blackmailer types prefer to behave ex ante as if they had been offered R. Consequently, 
if the victim wants to be sure that no information is revealed, he has to pay m*=(R-c)(l-8)/6. 
The intuition for this is straightforward. If the victim hands over nothing, the information will 
be revealed in the very first period with probability P or with probability (1-p). If the victim 
instead hands over m = m*, both blackmailer types will suppress the information. We have 
a pooling equilibrium in which the victim is unable to distinguish the blackmailer's type 
without taking a risk by paying nothing. Thus we have:
P r o p o s i t i o n  4 . 4  W h e n  R  i s  t h e  b l a c k m a i l e r ' s  p r i v a t e  i n f o r m a t i o n , a n d  t h e  v i c t i m  m o v e s  f i r s t  
b y  o f f e r i n g  m = 0 ,  t h e n  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  v i c t i m  w i l l  b e  r e v e a l e d  w i t h  p o s i t i v e  
p r o b a b i l i t y ,  a n d  i f m = m * t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  w i l l  b e  s u p p r e s s e d  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  o n e .
Proof: Consider first the case where the victim hands over m = 0. We know from earlier that 
the blackmailer who has been offered R will reveal the information, and the blackmailer who 
has not been offered R will suppress the information.V’s expected utility is :P(0) + (1- 
P)(v/(l-6)). If the victim hands over m*, the expected utility is: (v-m*)/(l-6), since both 
types will suppress the information. Given that P > m*/v, it is optimal to hand over m*. □
Now it is clear that, depending on probabilities and a reward, we may end up with the 
case that in an equilibrium the information is revealed in the very first period. This may 
happen, for instance, if the external reward is large, but the probability of it is low, since the 
victim may take a gamble and hand over m = 0. In this case, the blackmailer who has been 
promised a reward will reveal the information. Note that if the information has not been 
revealed when m=0 has been handed over, the victim faces a blackmailer who has certainly 
not been promised a reward. After this, the victim optimally pays m=0 from that period 
onwards.
In sum, by paying m*, the victim is unable to distinguish between the blackmailers’ 
types, since both types will suppress the information; but it is certain that the information will 
not be revealed. And by paying m=0, the victim is able to distinguish between the types after 
the very first period. The blackmailer either reveals or suppresses the information, and that
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behaviour reveals the blackmailer’s type completely. Of course, in practice the victim’s 
behaviour is very much related to risk aversion. If the victim is very risk-averse, he will pay 
money even if the probability of facing a blackmailer who has been promised a reward is 
very low.
What if the blackmailer moves first by announcing a blackmail demand? The problem 
is that both blackmailer types announce a demand, since it does not cost anything. The 
blackmailer who has not been offered an external reward also tries also to convince the 
victim that he has on his possession a potential reward, R.
Interestingly, the victim’s problem remains the same as above. If the victim wants to 
be sure that no information will be revealed, then he has to pay m*=(R-c)(l-6)/6 as in the 
case where the victim moved first. The victim does not learn anything new about the 
blackmailer’s type from the blackmail demand, since both types make the demand. It is only 
after the victim has not paid anything, that he learns something new, since the blackmailer’s 
action reveals his type completely. Therefore, we have:
C o r o l l a r y  4 . 3  W h e n  a  r e w a r d  i s  t h e  b l a c k m a i l e r ’s  p r i v a t e  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  a n d  t h e  b l a c k m a i l e r  
m o v e s  f i r s t  b y  d e m a n d i n g  d t >  m *  t h e n  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  v i c t i m  w i l l  b e  r e v e a l e d  w i t h  
p r o b a b i l i t y  p  i f  t h e  v i c t i m  d e c l i n e s  t o  p a y  ( m = 0 ) ;  a n d  i f  t h e  v i c t i m  h a n d s  o v e r  m = m *  t h e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  w i l l  b e  s u p p r e s s e d  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  o n e .
Proof: The logic of proof is exactly the same as above, and in Corollary 4.2, and is thus 
omitted here.
Interestingly also, now information about the blackmailer’s type is revealed only in 
the case where the victim declines to pay (m=0), since then the blackmailer who has been 
promised a reward will reveal the information, and the blackmailer who does not have access 
to a reward will suppress the information.
The case when only the blackmailer knows whether he has access to R changes the 
possibility of information revelation in an equilibrium. Earlier we have shown that in an 
equilibrium information will not be revealed. Now we have the possibility that information 
will be revealed, and of course the victim is worse off. To ensure that the information is not
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released, the victim has to pay m* even though it may well be collected by the blackmailer 
who has no access to an external reward. The blackmail demand does not reveal any new 
information, since both blackmailer types make a blackmail demand; and it is only the 
blackmailer’s action after the payment of (m=0) that may reveal new information to the 
victim.
4.4 A Discussion, Some Interpretations, and Potential 
Extensions
IA  Finite Horizon Blackmail Game
The analysis of this chapter has been done within an infinite horizon blackmail game. How 
realistic is this, since almost every relationship between economic agents is finite? How 
sensitive are our results in respect to the assumption of an infinite time horizon? The finite 
horizon blackmail game provides a robustness test for the main results derived earlier.
Consider now a finite horizon blackmail game without any uncertainty and 
asymmetric information. Then it is obvious that in the last period, the blackmailer will take 
any money the victim hands over and reveal the information if that is his profit-maximising 
strategy. In particular, when the net reward is positive, the blackmailer will reveal the 
information in the very last period, since the blackmailer can not commit to an unprofitable 
action (information suppression) in the last period.
The crucial feature that separates the infinite horizon model from the finite horizon 
model is the following. When the net reward is positive in the infinite horizon model, the 
blackmailer can not commit not to come back to ask for more money in future; but he can 
commit not to reveal the information, since there is no last period. In contrast, in the finite 
time horizon model, the blackmailer is able to commit not to come back to ask for more 
money, but he is not able to commit not to reveal the information in the last period. When 
the net reward is negative, the unique equilibrium of no-blackmail derived earlier in the 
infinite horizon model coincides with the equilibrium of the finite time horizon model.
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Consider next the finite horizon model and assume that T < °° is large. Assume 
that there is a  <1, which is the probability that the blackmailer will reveal the information 
in the last period even if the victim has handed over the blackmail payment. Alternatively 
one may think that a  is the probability that T is the last period. Does the equilibrium of 
the finite horizon model converge now with the one of the infinite horizon model: 
blackmail and information suppression, or something else? Indeed, we can show that we 
get qualitatively the same equilibrium: the information is suppressed and the victim pays 
the blackmailer. However, the optimal blackmail payment differs, since now the victim has 
to compensate the blackmailer for the possibility that in the last period he may be unable 
to reveal the information. To see this, note that the equilibrium condition that determines 
the optimal blackmail payment is as follows:
m +(R ~c) =m +6m +S2m +... +6T~lm + (4.9)
(1 -a)m +(a)(w +(R -c))Sr.
From equation (4.9) we can solve the optimal blackmail payment as :
(* -< 0 ( l -8 ) ( l -a 6 r)
nx ------------------------------------------------
b ( \ - 6 T~l)+dT( \ - 6 ) ( l - 6 )
(4.10)
_ (R -c)(l -6)(1 -aft7)
6 - 6r+1
Now we can see the effect of a  on m* given that T is large. If a = l ,  we get exactly the 
expected result. The optimal blackmail payment coincides with the one of the infinite 
horizon model. This result is obvious, since now the blackmailer is able to reveal the 
information after any blackmail payment. Since T is large, the equilibrium converges with 
the one of the infinite horizon model. When a decreases, the equilibrium remains the same 
-i.e.,  information is not revealed - but the victim has to pay more (m* increases). This 
compensates the blackmailer for the possibility that in period T he may be unable to reveal 
the information after the blackmail payment. In an equilibrium, the victim pays more, and 
the blackmailer suppresses the information. We can conclude that the main result of 
information suppression and blackmail carries over also to the finite case. The only
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difference is that now with probability a  the information may be revealed in the last 
period. However, the victim will be willing to pay the blackmailer if the blackmailer 
suppresses the information in all periods up to T-l.
Escalation of Corruption in Organisations
It is a well-known fact that corruptive activities in organisations often escalate from one level 
to another.11 Here we want to point out how bribery in the first place may lead blackmail. In 
the following we assume that bribe-taking is against the rules in the civil service, and that
the penalty for being caught is that a civil servant is fired.
Imagine a simple organisation, say a government agency with three members and an 
outside contractor. The members of the organisation are two civil servants (A and B) and 
their superior civil servant (P), whose preferences are the same as the government’s. A’s task 
is to choose an outside contractor who will supply material to the government agency and to 
approve the quality of delivered materials. Suppose that the contractor bribes A in one way 
or another in return for accepting low-quality material. That is, the government agency pays 
the contractor according to the standard price, the contractor’s profit margins are higher due 
to the less costly low-quality materials it supplies, and A is bribed by the contractor. On the 
whole, the government is losing money, which is going into the contractor’s and A’s pockets. 
Note that bribery here is not just a redistribution of wealth, but it has serious economic 
consequences as well, since the government is worse off due to the low-quality materials. 
Assume now that B, the second civil servant, observes the bribery with probability one. And 
after observing it, B may start to blackmail A. Will he reveal information about the bribery 
to their superior or nor? We keep the assumption of a small cost, c due to information 
revelation.
We consider first the case where the organisation designer has not offered a reward 
for a member of the organisation who exposes any wrongdoing. We know from earlier that 
in this case B will not reveal the information, since the net reward is negative. A pays nothing 
to B, who, however, suppresses the information about the bribery. The bribery between the
n See, for instance, Basu et al (1992), who consider the controlling of corruption 
when corruption may escalate. See also Carrillo (1995b), who also considers corruption 
in a case where there exist potentially dishonest agents at several levels of a hierarchy.
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contractor and A takes place, but here blackmail is not an issue. The contractor and A end up 
being better off. The economic consequences are severe, since the government loses money 
and receives low-quality materials.
Assume now that there is a reward R > c for a whistle-blower who exposes bribery. 
Now it is clear from our earlier analysis that blackmail may arise, since B is able to reveal 
information about bribery, which will also bring him a positive net reward. Hence, bribery 
in the first place facilitates blackmail, and nobody blows the whistle. In short, the corrupted 
civil servant buys silence from the initially honest civil servant, who becomes a 
blackmailer. The contractor, A and now also B end up being better off, and again the 
government is worse off. Compared to the earlier case of no reward, here the second civil 
servant, B also gets his share of bribes. At the aggregate level the economic consequences 
of bribery are the same as above.
Note that the possibility for blackmail would arise even if the first civil servant had 
been corrupted only once. What is required for the successful blackmail is that A has been 
corrupted at least once, and that there is a positive net reward for the civil servant who blows 
the whistle. In that case blackmail arises, redistributing the wealth between A and B. Note 
that if the organisation designer wants to prevent corruptive activities altogether, he has 
to destroy the roots of corruption in the first place.
Implications for the Organisation Design
From the theoretical literature we have learned a reasonable number of measures 
organisations may adopt in preventing collusion. Among them is rotation of workers. The 
idea is that rotation prevents collusion, since it blocks long-term relationships that are 
essential for collusion to be feasible.
Interestingly, rotation alone does not necessarily prevent blackmail; rather it helps the 
blackmailer, since now the blackmailer can credibly commit not to come back to ask for 
more in the very next period. Assume that a worker is able to blackmail only when being 
an employee in a position to expose a wrongdoer. In other words, a reward for whistle­
blowing is available only in the period when corruption has taken place.
We introduce here rotation by assuming that B, the second civil servant, is rotated 
in every period. Therefore, A meets a different civil servant in each period. In effect,
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rotation changes the relationship between A and B to a one-shot game.
What happens when B is rotated and there is no reward for whistle-blowing? The 
only change is that A and B play a one-shot game. Since information revelation is costly, 
we know that B will not reveal his information, and thus A pays nothing to B. Therefore, 
A will be bribed by the contractor, and blackmail is not an issue. The economic 
consequences are the same as in the case of no rotation. That is, the government loses 
money and receives low-quality materials, and the contractor and A are better off.
Consider now the case where the organisation designer rewards a whistle-blower. 
In this case rotation has an effect, and corruptive activities will be prevented altogether. 
To see this, note that if A does not pay B, B will certainly blows the whistle. And if A 
pays B, the blackmailer will reveal the information in any case. In short, B can not commit 
not to blow the whistle after any bribe paid by A. Now B’s threat to reveal information 
about the bribery is credible. Therefore, A knows that B will expose him in any case, and 
thus A won't get involved in bribery in the first place.
Here the possibility of blackmail is beneficial from the organisation’s point of view, 
since it prevents all corruptive activities. Rotation and a positive net reward are a powerful 
combination in preventing corruption. The economic consequences are as follows. A does 
not get involved in bribery, the government receives high-quality materials, and blackmail 
is not an issue. The organisation designer does not have to pay rewards, since nobody 
blows the whistle. The simple economics behind this result is the very powerful last period 
effect due to rotation. B can commit not to come back, but he can not commit not to reveal 
even after A has paid him.
A Creditor and a Firm
Consider a firm that has borrowed D from a creditor to realise a research and development 
project. When raising the debt, the firm has to disclose and share valuable information about 
the project with the creditor. The debt contract defines the repayment schedule, where the 
firm agrees to make fixed payments p in each period. If the firm does not make the payment, 
the creditor is able to end the project by liquidating the assets. Liquidation of a R&D project 
means the same as selling or revealing information to an interested third party - for example, 
a competitor. That is, the creditor is able to destroy the firm’s potential profit stream in the
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case of default.12
Now two interesting questions arise. First, how much will the creditor get back from 
the firm? Secondly, what is the smallest amount the firm has to pay the creditor so that the 
creditor does not end the relationship by liquidating the assets? Assume that in period t the 
firm, for one reason or another, makes a payment n^ <p. What does the creditor do? In 
principle, he has two alternatives. The creditor can either end the game by liquidating the 
firm with a small cost c. In this case, the creditor gets mt+( L-c) immediately and nothing in 
future. Alternatively, the creditor can accept the smaller payment, and let the project go 
ahead. In this case the creditor gets: mt + 6VC, where Vc is the creditor’s continuation value. 
Clearly, what is optimal for the creditor depends on (L-c).
Suppose first that the liquidation value is low. Then, of course, the firm’s position 
is now stronger and it has to pay only the project’s termination value, and the creditor lets 
the project go ahead. Assume an extreme case, L=0, where no third party values the 
intangible assets of the R&D project. In this extreme case, the firm pays nothing, and the 
creditor can not do anything but let the project go ahead.
Here the last mover, the creditor, has an option to end the game by revealing 
information to the third party - i.e., by liquidating the R&D project. This option works 
against him, since he will always prefer to continue the game and wait one more period for 
the payments. For the creditor it is better to accept lower payments than to terminate the 
relationship by liquidation, since the continuation value of the project is always greater or 
equal to the termination value. The model above seems to belong to a class of models that 
have in common a so-called last-mover disadvantage.
Gromb (1994) considers repeated lending between a creditor and a borrower. In his 
analysis a creditor, the last mover whose decision is whether or not to refinance a project, 
gets zero surplus, which is a return for the termination of a project. This is due to the fact that 
a creditor cannot fully commit to terminate the relationship if the borrower does not meet his 
repayment, since it is mutually beneficial for them to write a new contract under which both 
are better off.
12We do not consider the possibility that the firm is excluded from the credit market 
in future, and we also rule out enforceable credit contracts.
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In the present model the creditor gets a termination value as well, which is (L-c). That 
is the value of the R&D project to the interested third party. But, in addition to that, here the 
last mover (the creditor) receives a premium, which compensates him for not taking money 
from the firm and selling information about the R&D project to the third party in spite of the 
payment. To see this consider next a case where the liquidation value is higher. As earlier, 
the amount the firm has to pay the creditor depends on (L-c). Interestingly, it can be shown 
that here the firm may have to pay more than the agreed fixed payment p. Recall that no 
enforceable debt contracts are in place, and the firm has to hand over the payment that 
makes the creditor indifferent between liquidating the firm (revealing information) and 
letting the project go ahead (suppressing information).13 That is, it has to be the case that: 
nij + 6V0 = nit + (L-c), and thus m*=(L-c)(l-6)/6. Therefore, it may well happen that 
the flow payment m* > p. The firm has to pay more than the agreed fixed payment p.
In this latter case, the creditor is able to blackmail the firm, since the creditor is able 
to sell information about the R&D project to the interested third party. The firm may end up 
paying more than it has borrowed from the creditor. Of course, the possibility of blackmail 
here is quite an extreme case, but presumably not totally unrealistic in the world of project 
financing. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why R&D projects are rarely financed by debt.
4.5. Concluding Remarks
This chapter has considered the phenomenon of blackmail in a simple dynamic framework. 
In particular, we have considered the question of how the potential surplus due to the victim’s 
privacy is going to be shared between the victim and the blackmailer. We have shown that 
there is a unique Markov Perfect equilibrium which gives a precise prediction how much 
money the blackmailer will get by extorting the victim. Interestingly, and against intuition, 
it depends only on the external reward, and not the victim’s valuation of his privacy. 
Furthermore, we have shown that the blackmailer gets more money by extorting the victim 
than by selling his piece of information directly to the interested third party. This follows
13Alternatively, if we assume that the creditor is able to liquidate only if p < d, then 
p is the upper limit of the payment the firm has to pay.
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from the fact that in the former case the victim pays a blackmail premium to the blackmailer 
for not taking the victim’s money and revealing the information anyway. It was also shown 
that even if the blackmailer is able to move first by announcing a blackmail demand, the 
blackmailer is unable to get more money from the victim than he does in the case when the 
victim moves first. This counter-intuitive result follows from the fact that in each period, 
irrespective of who moves first, the blackmailer always moves last - i.e., after the victim has 
handed over the blackmail payment. Despite the blackmailer’s demand, the victim pays only 
as much as he would pay when moving first, and after this optimal payment the blackmailer 
prefers to suppress the information. In this sense, the model has one feature of a last mover 
disadvantage, and the blackmailer is unable to fully exploit the victim.
In future it might be worthwhile to examine thoroughly how an introduction of the 
coexistence of a rational and an insane blackmailer would change the results of the present 
paper. Here we have considered only a “rational blackmailer” who does not reveal 
information if it is unprofitable for him. In practice, of course, there may also exist 
“insane blackmailers” who will reveal information even if it is costly. However, it is a 
well-known fact in game theory literature that the introduction of an insane player may 
change the results greatly. Most obviously, here the victim is worse off, and both 
blackmailer types are better off. However, this potential extension does not add much to 
the analysis of reputation and imperfect information by Kreps and Wilson (1982). The 
main difference with Krep-Wilson is that here the blackmailer who reveals information in 
the very first period will end the game immediately, which is not the case in Kreps and 
Wilson (1982).
A more interesting case for further study would be to develop a model that fully 
integrates collusion and blackmail. Also, it would be interesting to look at whether the results 
presented here will carry on into the bargaining literature. For example, it would be 
interesting to try to incorporate the idea of blackmail with the present assumptions into the 
alternative offers’ bargaining model. How much would the blackmailer get from the victim 
there? What would determine the shares the bargainers get? Is there a blackmail premium? 
These are among the open questions left for future studies.
Appendix C
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Picture 4.2 The Blackmail Game. The Blackmailer Moves First
t= l
m
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